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ARGUING ABOUT THE CONSTITUTION: 
THE TOPICS IN CONSTITUTIONAL 
INTERPRETATION 
Jack M. Balkin* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Constitutional construction is the part of constitutional 
interpretation in which interpreters implement and give effect to 
the Constitution—for example, by creating doctrines, practices, 
and institutions. The idea of constitutional construction is central 
to the New Originalism, which divides constitutional 
interpretation into two tasks. Interpretation (in the narrower 
sense) ascertains the text’s original meaning; construction 
implements the text, giving it effect in practice.1 What most people 
call constitutional interpretation includes both interpretation, in 
the narrower sense of ascertaining the meaning of the text, and 
constitutional construction, which creates and applies doctrines 
and practices that implement the Constitution.2 
The distinction between interpretation and construction 
highlights an important problem in constitutional theory. What 
authorizes constructions of the Constitution that may be 
consistent with the text but are not required by the text? For 
example, the Supreme Court’s decision in New York Times Co. v. 
Sullivan3 created a constitutional privilege that requires public 
officials suing for defamation to prove “actual malice.”4 Sullivan 
 
 * Knight Professor of Constitutional Law and the First Amendment, Yale Law 
School. My thanks to Philip Bobbitt, John Harrison, Jill Hasday, Sanford Levinson, 
Richard Primus, and members of the 2018 San Diego Originalism Works-in-Progress 
Conference for their comments on previous drafts. 
 1. Lawrence B. Solum, Originalism and Constitutional Construction, 82 FORDHAM 
L. REV. 453, 455–58 (2013). 
 2. JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM 4–5 (2011); Jack M. Balkin, The New 
Originalism and the Uses of History, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 641, 645–46 (2013). 
 3. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
 4. Id. at 279–80. 
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purports to follow from the text of the First Amendment.5 But this 
construction of the First Amendment is by no means the only 
possible rule that is consistent with the text.6 So what makes the 
rule of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan a good—much less the 
best—construction of the Constitution? 
Two features of legal practice help ensure that construction 
is guided by and furthers the Constitution. The first is an 
interpretive attitude of fidelity to the Constitution and to the 
constitutional project. The second is a set of rhetorical techniques 
for analyzing problems and devising legal arguments, techniques 
that originated in the common law.  
Lawyers and politicians adapted common law techniques for 
interpreting legal texts to the U.S. Constitution once it became a 
legal document. American lawyers still employ descendants of 
these techniques today. These techniques are what classical 
rhetoric calls topoi or “topics” that are characteristic of American 
constitutional law. These topics are tools for analyzing legal 
problems and generating legal arguments. They involve 
commonplace but incompletely theorized justifications for 
constitutional interpretation. They help interpreters perform the 
work of constitutional construction. 
The point of understanding constitutional construction in 
terms of topics is not to put an end to disputes about contested 
questions of constitutional law. Legal disputes will continue as 
long as our Constitution continues to function. The point, rather, 
is that constitutional interpretation rests on shared rhetorical 
techniques and commonplaces about interpretation. 
Constitutional topics structure constitutional argument in our 
legal culture. They connect the text of the Constitution to its 
implementation. And they allow people with very different views 
to argue that their proposed interpretations are faithful 
interpretations of the Constitution and further the Constitution. 
A. CONSTRUCTION IS INEVITABLE 
All theories of constitutional interpretation must account for 
constitutional construction in one form or another, whether they 
 
 5. Id. (arguing that “[t]he constitutional guarantees require” the actual malice rule). 
 6. Some critics might argue that the result is not even consistent with the text, 
because it applies to judge-made law, id. at 265, and not to a law made by Congress. See 
infra note 253. But see New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 276–77 (rejecting the 
argument). 
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are originalist or non-originalist, and whether or not they 
recognize the idea of constitutional construction. The distinction 
between interpretation and construction merely makes this 
problem especially salient. 
In some versions of originalism—for example, in the New 
Originalism—the importance of construction is obvious. My own 
theory of “living originalism” or “framework originalism,” for 
example, argues that the object of constitutional interpretation (in 
the narrower sense) is the Constitution’s basic framework. The 
basic framework consists of the Constitution’s original public 
meaning plus the text’s choice of rules, standards, and principles.7 
The original public meaning consists of the original semantic 
meaning of the text, plus any generally recognized legal terms of 
art, and any inferences from background context necessary to 
understand the text. Constitutional construction builds on and 
implements the basic framework.8 Most disputed questions of 
constitutional law involve construction. 
This is a relatively thin version of original public meaning. 
The thicker the account of original meaning, the narrower is the 
zone of constitutional construction. The thinner the account, the 
more questions must be decided in the construction zone.9 The 
most important distinction in originalist theory, therefore, is not 
whether one should follow original intention, original 
understanding, or original meaning. It is how thin or thick is one’s 
account of original public meaning, and therefore how often one 
must turn to construction to answer contested constitutional 
questions. 
Some forms of originalism deny any role for construction.10 
Everything is a question of interpretation that, in theory, can be 
derived from a close inspection of original public meaning. But 
these forms of originalism still must account for the role of 
precedent, for applications to new facts and circumstances, for 
long-standing custom, for the development of conventions of 
practice (including whether and when to accept them), and for 
 
 7. Balkin, supra note 2, at 646. 
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. at 646–47. 
 10. See, e.g., ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE 
INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 13–15 (2012); id. at 15 (“[T]he supposed distinction 
between interpretation and construction has never reflected the courts’ actual usage.”) 
(emphases omitted); JOHN O. MCGINNIS & MICHAEL B. RAPPAPORT, ORIGINALISM AND 
THE GOOD CONSTITUTION 15, 139–40 (2013) (rejecting the distinction). 
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doctrinal elaboration and evolution of the Constitution.11 
Grappling with these issues is an inevitable result of attempting to 
implement a Constitution over time. 
This is not simply a question of what to do with non-
originalist precedents decided by non-originalist judges—the 
central focus of most originalist writing on the question.12 The 
point, rather, is that even if all courts always attempt in good faith 
to apply the original meaning in changing circumstances, there 
will likely be reasonable disagreements about the best account of 
the Constitution’s meaning and how to implement that meaning 
in practice. Later courts must then decide whether to defer to 
earlier views.13 
Suppose, for example, that a court decides that a new 
technology involves or does not involve a “search or seizure” 
affecting “persons, houses, papers and effects” covered by the 
Fourth Amendment. Or suppose that a court decides that a new 
technology involves or does not involve “speech” or “press” 
protected by the First Amendment. Should later courts decide the 
issue of original meaning afresh each time they consider a new 
case involving the First and Fourth Amendments? Or should they 
defer to and reason from the previous determination of the 
Constitution’s meaning, unless there are very good reasons to 
abandon it? The latter approach is more consistent with 
American practice. One could generate similar examples for 
many different parts of the Constitution. Therefore, much as 
originalists may try to avoid the term “construction,” they must 
engage in something like it to implement the Constitution in 
practice. 
Non-originalists also try to dispense with the distinction 
between interpretation and construction, but for the opposite 
reason. They do not recognize original meaning as having a 
 
 11. MCGINNIS & RAPPAPORT, supra note 10, at 154–96 (offering a detailed theory 
for treating precedents consistent and inconsistent with original public meaning); id. at 84–
85 (approving application of Constitution to new technologies while rejecting judicial 
updating); Amy Coney Barrett, Originalism and Stare Decisis, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
1921 (2017) (explaining Justice Scalia’s theory of precedent). 
 12. See, e.g., MCGINNIS & RAPPAPORT, supra note 10, at 175–96 (explaining when to 
reject non-originalist precedents); Gary Lawson, The Constitutional Case Against 
Precedent, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 23 (1994) (arguing that all non-originalist 
precedents must be rejected). 
 13. Cf. Caleb Nelson, Originalism and Interpretive Conventions, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 
519, 527–39 (2003) (discussing Founding-era ideas of “liquidation” of unclear texts.) 
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special legal status in interpretation. Hence for non-originalists, 
all constitutional interpretation is a kind of construction, with 
original meaning forming one consideration among many others. 
B. CONSTRUCTION IS AN ENGINE OF  
CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE 
People often imagine the distinction between interpretation 
and construction as a division between two separate tasks. But the 
idea of construction is important for a second reason: it also 
reflects a division of labor among different institutions. This 
division of labor generates constitutional change over time. 
Both judges and the political branches (including state and 
local government officials) engage in constitutional construction. 
Constitutional construction by different branches of government 
generates different kinds of constitutional development. When 
judges engage in construction, the result is a sequence of decisions 
and doctrine. When the political branches engage in construction, 
the result is a series of laws, administrative regulations, political 
conventions, and institutions. 
The political branches assert that their constructions are 
faithful to the Constitution. Often these assertions are 
controversial. Throughout American history, people have 
challenged the constitutionality of political branch constructions 
before the judiciary. When this happens, the judiciary decides 
whether these constructions are consistent, partially consistent, or 
inconsistent with the Constitution. Judges apply the 
Constitution’s text and judicial constructions to decide these 
questions, producing new constitutional constructions in the 
process. Some political branch constructions, however, are never 
challenged before the judiciary, or the judiciary refuses to 
consider the challenges, because of judicial constructions about 
the role of the judiciary and the separation of powers. 
Thus, the American system of constitutional development 
involves competing constructions that interact through struggles 
between the various branches (and levels) of government, and 
especially through the process of judicial review. This ongoing 
process of interaction between the political branches and the 
judiciary is the dialectic of construction.14 It is a dialectic because 
 
 14. Jack M. Balkin, Constitutional Interpretation and Change in the United States: The 
Official and the Unofficial, 14 JUS POLITICUM 1, 9–10 (2015) (Fr.), 
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both the judiciary and the political branches assert that their 
constructions are faithful to the Constitution, and the interaction 
between them affects the development of constructions by both 
sides. 
The continuous process of construction by the political 
branches and the judiciary, and their interactions over time, 
generates constitutional development. Any theory that recognizes 
constitutional construction or its equivalent must also recognize 
that significant elements of the Constitution-in-practice change 
over time. That is why I have argued that originalism and living 
constitutionalism are two sides of the same coin.15 Whatever 
aspect of the Constitution-in-practice arises from construction is 
living constitutionalism. 
The question, therefore, is not whether we will have living 
constitutionalism in the United States, but what kind of living 
constitutionalism we will have, because all constitutional theories 
must account for constitutional implementation, application to 
changing facts and circumstances, and the accumulation of 
precedents and conventions, whether or not they call this process 
construction. 
Thus, the account of construction offered in this Article will 
be useful regardless of whether one is an originalist or a non-
originalist, and whether one regards original public meaning as 
binding or merely as one consideration among many others. 
Similarly, this Article’s account of construction is useful whether 
one distinguishes between interpretation and construction or 
simply labels everything as interpretation. 
C. CONSTRUCTION REQUIRES GOOD FAITH AND EMPLOYS 
RHETORICAL TOPICS 
Constitutional construction has two central features. The first 
is interpretive attitude. The second is interpretive technique. 
Interpretive attitude concerns how interpreters understand what 
they are doing: they must place themselves on the side of the 
Constitution and attempt to further it in good faith. But what 
kinds of interpretive techniques further the Constitution? The 
majority of the Article takes up this second question. 
 
http://juspoliticum.com/uploads/5709f15cf28c4-jp14_balkin.pdf (describing the dialectic of 
legitimation that occurs as a result of construction). 
 15. BALKIN, supra note 2, at 20–21. 
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American constitutional culture employs a series of standard 
rhetorical moves—what classical rhetoric calls topoi or topics—to 
interpret and implement the Constitution in practice.16 These 
rhetorical topics rest on widely accepted justifications for 
interpretation. Within each topic are a vast range of subtopics for 
arguing about the Constitution. 
Because American constitutional interpretation is based on 
rhetorical topics, it involves what rhetorical theory calls 
invention.17 Rhetorical invention means the use of shared topics 
and tools of understanding to analyze problems and offer 
solutions. People turn to rhetorical invention to analyze and 
answer certain kinds of questions—these are the sorts of 
questions that cannot be demonstrated with mathematical 
certainty but instead concern what is most plausible and 
reasonable in a given community. 
The most well-known account of the rhetoric of 
constitutional argument is Philip Bobbitt’s theory of modalities.18 
His theory has two parts. The first part is a list of standard forms 
of argument, which he calls modalities. The second is a 
sophisticated and elaborate theory of constitutional legitimacy 
that argues that legitimacy arises from adherence to practice. 
Bobbitt maintains that all constitutional theories (other than 
Bobbitt’s own theory) that try to legitimate our practices, or that 
attempt to prescribe the correct way to interpret the Constitution, 
are either futile or impossible.19 
This Article revisits and rethinks the idea of modalities of 
constitutional argument. It accepts Bobbitt’s descriptive claim—
with some modifications—but rejects his underlying theoretical 
apparatus and his general dismissal of constitutional theory. 
 
 16. See infra Part III. 
 17. See infra Part III.A. 
 18. See PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION (1991) [hereinafter 
BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION]; PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL 
FATE: THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION (1982) [hereinafter BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL 
FATE]; Philip Bobbitt, Reflections Inspired by My Critics, 72 TEX. L. REV. 1869 (1994) 
[hereinafter Bobbitt, Reflections]; Philip Bobbitt, Is Law Politics?, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1233 
(1989) [hereinafter Bobbitt, Is Law Politics?]. 
 19. As Dennis Patterson puts it, “there is nothing more nor less to constitutional law 
than the practice itself.” Dennis Patterson, Conscience and the Constitution, 93 COLUM. L. 
REV. 270, 270 (1993) (reviewing BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION, supra 
note 18). 
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As a descriptive matter, Bobbitt’s list of modalities is 
incomplete. It is also not well designed for explaining how lawyers 
use history in constitutional argument. For example, Bobbitt calls 
arguments about original intention “historical” arguments.20 This 
is unhelpful in two respects. First, most originalist arguments 
these days concern original public meaning rather than original 
intention. Second, most uses of history in constitutional argument 
do not concern either original intention or adoption history.21 
I agree with Bobbitt that lawyers and judges employ standard 
forms of argument as a shared practice; I also agree that this 
shared social practice contributes to a limited form of sociological 
and procedural legitimacy, one that operates largely within the 
legal profession itself. 
However, most of Bobbitt’s theoretical views do not follow 
from this fact. These include his claims that (1) his list of six 
modalities is complete and comprehends all legitimate 
constitutional argument; (2) the modalities are incommensurable; 
(3) conflicts between different modalities can only be resolved by 
recourse to individual conscience; and (4) all constitutional theory 
that attempts to legitimate our practices is either ineffectual or 
mistaken.22 
My view of constitutional argument is different: the 
modalities are a group of widely used rhetorical topics that help 
constitute American legal culture. They rest on (largely 
undertheorized) commonplaces about what makes a 
constitutional argument plausible or persuasive. People use these 
topics to engage in constitutional interpretation (and hence 
constitutional construction). 
Nothing about these facts undermines the project of 
constitutional theory. In any case, the boundary between 
constitutional theory and constitutional practice is ill-defined and 
 
 20. BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE, supra note 18, at 9 (defining “[h]istorical 
arguments” as those which “depend on a determination of the original understanding of 
the constitutional provision to be construed”); BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL 
INTERPRETATION, supra note 18, at 13 (“A[] historical modality may be attributed to 
constitutional arguments that claim that the framers and ratifiers [of a constitutional 
provision] intended, or did not intend . . . .”); id. (“Historical, or ‘originalist’ approaches to 
construing the text . . . are distinctive in their reference back to what a particular provision 
is thought to have meant to its ratifiers.”). 
 21. Balkin, The New Originalism and the Uses of History, supra note 2, at 656–57, 657 
n.35, 660–61; see also discussion infra text accompanying notes 113–121. 
 22. See infra text accompanying notes 197–231. 
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porous. Legal practice includes plenty of claims about 
constitutional theory, about the proper way for judges to behave, 
and about the correct methods of constitutional interpretation. 
This is hardly surprising. Lawyers want to win arguments; so they 
will make theoretical claims about constitutional interpretation, 
and about how and when to engage in judicial review, whenever 
they think it will make their arguments more persuasive to their 
intended or imagined audiences (or cast doubt on the arguments 
of their opponents). 
This rhetorical approach to constitutional interpretation has 
several advantages. It explains how different interpreters can 
disagree about the Constitution while attempting to be faithful to 
it. It explains how disputes about policy and politics that are 
external to law are reflected in disagreements about the proper 
interpretation of the Constitution that are internal to law. And it 
explains how attempts at constitutional fidelity over time generate 
both constitutional disagreement and constitutional change. 
These are characteristic features of the processes of constitutional 
decision making. At any point in time they help generate a 
constrained or bounded disagreement about constitutional 
questions and a process of change through repeated attempts at 
implementation in changing factual circumstances. 
Lawyers with very different constitutional theories will use 
the same common topics. It is precisely because lawyers hold the 
topics in common that they are able to disagree about underlying 
theories of interpretation and still reason together. Thus, a shared 
system of rhetoric is consistent with many different kinds of 
constitutional theories, not merely Bobbitt’s. Our system of 
constitutional rhetoric involves orthopraxis (correct practice) 
about constitutional argument, but not orthodoxy (correct belief) 
about constitutional theory. Bobbitt is correct that the shared use 
of rhetorical topics helps generate sociological legitimation 
among lawyers and judges. But this orthopraxis among legal 
professionals does not ensure sociological legitimacy among the 
general public, much less moral, procedural, or democratic 
legitimacy.23 Nor—as Bobbitt himself would emphasize—do 
shared forms of argument guarantee convergence on correct 
answers in contested cases.24 
 
 23. See infra text accompanying notes 279–291. 
 24. BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION, supra note 18, at 27–28. 
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The remainder of this Article proceeds as follows: Part II of 
the Article explains the interpretive attitude of fidelity. Part III 
discusses the use of rhetorical topics in construction. Part IV 
considers the relationship of constitutional construction to 
constitutional theory. It reconsiders and critiques Bobbitt’s theory 
of the modalities and argues for a different account of 
constitutional argument based on rhetorical topics. A brief 
conclusion follows. 
II. INTERPRETIVE ATTITUDE AND  
INTERPRETIVE TECHNIQUE 
A. WHAT CONNECTS CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION TO 
THE CONSTITUTION? 
People sometimes describe constitutional construction—
especially by judges—as deciding what to do when original 
meaning “runs out.”25 But the metaphor of “running out” is 
misleading. It suggests that in constitutional construction, 
participants have complete discretion to construct in any possible 
way, and that the zone of construction is a zone of complete 
freedom for decisionmakers, whether members of the political 
branches or members of the judiciary. This raises a problem: it 
implies that there is no connection between the Constitution and 
the constitutional constructions laid upon it.26 
 
 25. Randy E. Barnett, Interpretation and Construction, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 
65, 70 (2011) (“[I]t is not originalism that is doing the work when one selects a theory of 
construction to employ when original meaning runs out, but one’s underlying normative 
commitments.”); id. (“So, just as originalists need a normative theory to explain why we 
today should adhere to the original meaning of the Constitution, they also need a 
normative theory for how to construe a constitution when its meaning runs out. There is 
no escaping this.”) 
 26. See John O. McGinnis, The Duty of Clarity, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 843, 917–18 
(2016) (arguing that if the original meaning “runs out” in the construction zone, judges 
must defer to legislatures and may not invalidate laws that fall within the construction 
zone); Mike Rappaport, Does a Judge Who Decides a Matter Within the Construction Zone 
Enforce the Constitution? A Question About Construction, LAW AND LIBERTY (Aug. 4, 
2015), http://www.libertylawsite.org/2015/08/04/does-a-judge-who-decides-a-matter-
within-the-construction-zone-enforce-the-constitution-a-question-about-construction/ 
(“[I]f a judge employs values that are outside the Constitution to decide a matter, is he 
deciding the matter based on the Constitution?”); Mike Rappaport, More on Construction: 
A Response to Larry Solum, LAW AND LIBERTY (Aug. 7, 2015), http://www.
libertylawsite.org/2015/08/07/more-on-construction-a-response-to-larry-solum/ (arguing 
that New Originalists have not adequately explained how construction is connected to the 
Constitution). 
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The Constitution delegates constitutional construction to 
successive generations. But what kind of delegation is this? Is it a 
delegation for later generations to do whatever they want as long 
as they maintain logical consistency with the original meaning of 
the Constitution? Or does construction entail greater 
responsibilities than avoiding a logical contradiction? If so, what 
are these responsibilities, and what constrains or guides 
constitutional construction? 
One can restate the problem in two different ways: First, why 
is construction a construction of the Constitution rather than 
simply the construction of law that furthers present values and 
policy preferences? Second, how is constitutional construction 
guided in any way by the Constitution? 
New Originalists are not the only theorists who face these 
problems. They apply to all originalists who accept that the 
Constitution requires further implementation in order to apply it 
to new cases, for example, through executive branch practice and 
through the creation and application of judicial doctrine. In fact, 
Article III of the Constitution, which gives the federal judiciary 
the power to hear cases involving the Constitution, and Article 
VI’s Supremacy Clause, which requires state courts to apply the 
Constitution, seem to presuppose the development of judicial 
doctrine that implements the Constitution. 
But if this is the case, all originalists face the same basic 
problem as New Originalists do. What connects judicial 
development of doctrine to original meaning? Why is doctrinal 
development a development of the Constitution? Why is it guided 
by the Constitution? 
One might try to avoid this problem by claiming that the 
content and application of the Constitution are essentially closed 
at the time of its adoption. Original meaning, properly 
interpreted, leaves essentially no room for judicial discretion in 
the development of doctrine. All questions of judicial doctrine 
can, in theory, be answered by a sufficiently careful inspection of 
original public meaning.27 
 
 27. This is how John McGinnis and Michael Rappaport attempt to resolve the 
problem. Using original legal methods significantly narrows the range of possible 
applications of the text; then interpreters should employ the reading that is supported by 
the most evidence, even if it is only barely more likely than not. MCGINNIS & RAPPAPORT, 
supra note 10, at 142. Rappaport calls this the “51/49 rule.” Mike Rappaport, Original 
Methods Originalism Part III: The Minimization of the Construction Zone Thesis, LAW 
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This solution seems unpersuasive. Take the area of First 
Amendment doctrine, by now a luxurious forest of rules, 
exceptions, sub-exceptions, differing levels of scrutiny, burdens of 
proof, constitutional privileges, scrutiny rules, and four and five-
part tests. Does original meaning specify whether judges should 
employ a rule or a standard? Does it specify the choice between a 
constitutional privilege (as in defamation law) or a scrutiny rule 
(as in public forum doctrine)? In most cases, it does not. 
These doctrines, and others like them, have sprung up not 
because judges are power-hungry tyrants or officious bureaucrats, 
but because applying the principles of the First Amendment in a 
wide variety of different institutional contexts and ever-changing 
factual circumstances is quite difficult. Doing so requires 
considerable amounts of judgment, balancing of multiple factors, 
and administrative and institutional considerations. It is 
implausible that the original meaning, no matter how thickly 
postulated, specifies uniquely correct answers to all of the 
technical constitutional questions that appear before the courts. 
Judicial elaboration of doctrine is necessary, and the elaboration 
of doctrine means that constitutional law will be path-dependent. 
Thus, all originalists, and not merely New Originalists, need 
an account of constitutional development that shows how it is not 
merely logically consistent with the original public meaning of the 
Constitution, but is also guided by the Constitution and furthers 
the Constitution. New Originalists will phrase this answer in terms 
of construction; other originalists will phrase the answer in terms 
of interpretation (including original legal methods).  
Non-originalists must also face this question—perhaps 
especially so, because they do not even require logical consistency 
with original public meaning. 
The answer I propose in this Article, with suitable 
adjustments in terminology, should be helpful to both originalists 
and non-originalists of every kind. But in order to give the right 
answer, it is important to be clear about the question. 
 
AND LIBERTY (June 2, 2017), http://www.libertylawsite.org/2017/06/02/original-methods-
originalism-part-iii-the-minimization-of-the-construction-zone-thesis/ (explaining that 
under “the 51/49 rule that we believe was applied at the time of the Framing. . . . an 
interpreter would decide close cases by selecting the interpretation that was better 
supported by the evidence, even if it was only by a little”). 
1 - BALKIN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 7/21/18 3:15 PM 
2018] ARGUING ABOUT THE CONSTITUTION 157 
 
B. CONSTRUCTION ACCORDING TO THE LAW AND THE 
CONSTITUTION 
One might imagine that the most important question about 
construction is what constrains it and makes it predictable and 
determinate. But constraint, predictability, and determinacy in 
and of themselves are not the goal. Political science and sociology 
suggest that political forces and social norms constrain how judges 
behave; they also shape the direction of constitutional doctrine in 
the long run.28 My own scholarship on constitutional development 
argues that technological and economic change, social and 
political mobilizations, evolving social norms, and partisan 
entrenchment of the judiciary shape how members of the 
judiciary decide constitutional cases in relatively intelligible and 
predictable ways.29 
Thus, one might well argue that modern Commerce Clause 
decisions like United States v. Darby30 were highly probable, if not 
inevitable, given changes in industrial and transportation 
technology and the pervasiveness of national markets. One might 
also argue that these decisions were very likely given a succession 
of appointments by a liberal Democrat, Franklin Delano 
Roosevelt, whose party championed New Deal reforms. In like 
fashion, one might argue that something like Griswold v. 
Connecticut31 was very likely in light of the sexual revolution and 
the invention of safe and effective birth control for women. 
This is not the kind of constraint that most constitutional 
theorists—including originalists—are usually looking for. 
Constitutional theorists want something more than an account of 
mechanisms of social influence that make judges’ decisions 
 
 28. See, e.g., Theodore W. Ruger, et al., The Supreme Court Forecasting Project: 
Legal and Political Science Approaches to Predicting Supreme Court Decisionmaking, 104 
COLUM. L. REV. 1150 (2004); JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME 
COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED (2002); JEFFREY A. SEGAL & 
HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL (1993); C. 
Neal Tate & Roger Handberg, Time Binding and Theory Building in Personal Attribute 
Models of Supreme Court Voting Behavior, 1916–88, 35 AM. J. POL. SCI. 460 (1991); see 
also Linda Hamilton Krieger, et al., When “Best Practices” Win, Employees Lose: Symbolic 
Compliance and Judicial Inference in Federal Equal Employment Opportunity Cases, 40 
LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 843, 844–49 (2015) (summarizing multiple literatures from political 
science and sociology on the predictability of judicial behavior). 
 29. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM, supra note 2, at 277–339; Balkin, supra note 14. 
 30. United States v. Darby Lumber Co., 312 U.S. 100 (1941) (upholding Fair Labor 
Standards Act of 1938). 
 31. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (recognizing right of marital privacy 
in the use of contraceptives). 
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predictable. They want constraint according to law. To be sure, 
legal reasoning often may take account of changes in social and 
political realities—as well as changes in technology and 
underlying factual assumptions. So judges deciding cases such as 
Darby or Griswold might justify their decisions by pointing to 
changes in society and technology. But for construction to be 
according to law, law must guide or constrain construction 
through the application of legal methods, legal doctrines, and 
forms of legal reasoning. 
Even this is not enough. Constitutional construction must not 
be merely guided by law. It must also be guided by and further the 
Constitution. Constitutional construction must draw on resources 
provided by the Constitution and promote its purposes. An 
account of constitutional construction, in other words, must 
explain how later interpreters can remain faithful to the 
Constitution over time. 
Constitutional construction has two aspects. The first is a 
particular interpretive attitude about the task of construction. The 
second is a series of authorized legal techniques of construction. 
When interpreters construct, they must have a certain attitude 
about what they are doing—they must want to further the 
Constitution rather than simply use the Constitution as an excuse 
for doing whatever they want to do. They must also employ the 
kinds of generally recognized legal techniques that allow them to 
explain to their fellow citizens why their arguments are guided by 
and connected to the Constitution.32 
These two elements—interpretive attitude and legal 
technique—will combine in practice: Ideally, people should have 
the right interpretive attitude as they employ the appropriate 
techniques. Nevertheless, these two dimensions of construction 
are analytically distinct; hence it is important to describe them 
separately. 
C. THE INTERPRETIVE ATTITUDE OF FIDELITY: PUTTING 
OURSELVES ON THE SIDE OF THE CONSTITUTION 
I begin with interpretive attitude. Most theories of 
constitutional interpretation focus on discovering and elaborating 
 
 32. Cf. Robert Post, Theories of Constitutional Interpretation, 30 REPRESENTATIONS 
13, 18–19 (1990) (constitutional interpretation presupposes methods that give interpreters 
authority to speak in the name of the Constitution). 
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the appropriate techniques for interpreting the Constitution. 
Many debates among originalists revolve around proper legal 
techniques for correct interpretation—whether one should look 
to intentions, understandings, or public meaning, how one should 
ascertain them, and what methods one should use in the process. 
A focus on correct interpretive techniques describes much of 
non-originalist theory as well. For example, Ronald Dworkin 
argues that interpreters should employ a moral reading and apply 
the method of law as integrity;33 David Strauss counsels that 
people engage in common law reasoning;34 John Hart Ely 
emphasizes the protection of democracy.35 
Interpretive attitude, however, is equally important. The goal 
of interpretation is fidelity to the Constitution. Fidelity is more 
than a set of techniques or methods—it means having the right 
attitude toward one’s task. 
In constitutional interpretation, fidelity is not just a good 
thing. It is the whole point of the enterprise. But fidelity is not 
simply a property of an interpretation; nor is it merely a 
correspondence between one’s interpretation and the thing one 
interprets. Rather, fidelity is also a feature of the self who 
interprets. Fidelity is an attitude that people have toward the 
object of interpretation and about the process of interpretation.36 
We attempt to be faithful to the Constitution by putting 
ourselves “on the side of” the Constitution in order to make it 
work and to further its purposes and structures.37 To put ourselves 
on the side of the Constitution means that we regard it as having 
its own intelligible set of norms, principles, and purposes that are 
external to ourselves, and are not simply an extension of our own 
values and policy preferences. Our job is to apply and fulfill these 
norms, principles, and purposes in the present, rather than using 
the task of interpretation as an excuse to engage in a kind of 
Constitutional ventriloquism—that is, to make the Constitution 
into a dummy that miraculously speaks our values. 
 
 33. RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S LAW: THE MORAL READING OF THE 
AMERICAN CONSTITUTION (1996). 
 34. DAVID A. STRAUSS, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION (2010). 
 35. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL 
REVIEW (1980). 
 36. JACK M. BALKIN, CONSTITUTIONAL REDEMPTION: POLITICAL FAITH IN AN 
UNJUST WORLD 103–04 (2011). 
 37. BALKIN, supra note 2, at 78. 
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An interpretive attitude of fidelity to the Constitution 
requires more than maintaining a bare logical consistency with the 
text of the Constitution and its original public meaning. It requires 
a good faith attempt (1) to assess the Constitution’s values and 
purposes; and (2) to develop constructions that remain consistent 
with the original public meaning of the text and further its 
underlying principles and purposes in our contemporary context. 
Fidelity also demands charity toward the object of 
interpretation. It requires that we try to view the Constitution as 
articulating a coherent set of norms that are also sensible and even 
valuable.38 We may not succeed in this attempt. Some laws are 
simply unjust. The Constitution may turn out to be, as William 
Lloyd Garrison once said, a covenant with death and an 
agreement with hell.39 Or it may turn out to be incoherent and 
impractical. But we must begin with charitable presuppositions. If 
we do not, then we cannot be sure that the evils, deficiencies, and 
incoherence we perceive in the Constitution are due to the 
Constitution itself or to our own failure adequately to understand 
it.40 
D. FIDELITY TO THE CONSTITUTION DOES NOT MEAN LACK OF 
DISAGREEMENT 
People with very different views will often see different 
things in the Constitution. They may understand the point or the 
effect of constitutional provisions quite differently. And when the 
Constitution features a tension between different values and 
principles—as it so often does—different people may resolve 
those tensions differently, all the while claiming to be faithful to 
the Constitution. This should hardly be surprising. When we 
interpret, we bring ourselves to the task of understanding, 
equipped with our own values and perspectives. We cannot 
interpret—indeed, we cannot think—without doing so. As long as 
different people interpret and apply the Constitution, and 
interpret and apply it at different times and places, disagreements 
 
 38. BALKIN, supra note 36, at 41–42, 48, 51 (constitutional interpretation requires 
constitutional faith, which requires charity and optimism). 
 39. WALTER M. MERRILL, AGAINST WIND AND TIDE: A BIOGRAPHY OF WM. 
LLOYD GARRISON 205 (1963) (“That the compact which exists between the North and 
South is ‘a covenant with death, and an agreement with hell’—involving both parties in 
atrocious criminality; and should be immediately annulled”). 
 40. BALKIN, supra note 36, at 107. 
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about constitutional interpretation—even by participants who 
seek to further the Constitution in good faith—are unavoidable. 
Does fidelity to the Constitution mean the separation of law 
from politics? Not exactly. Sanford Levinson and I have 
distinguished between “high politics” and “low politics” in 
constitutional interpretation (which, in this context, includes 
constitutional construction).41 “High” politics is a dispute over the 
animating vision, purposes, and principles of the Constitution. 
“Low” politics is a struggle for political or material advantage for 
one’s self or for one’s political allies.42 
Constitutional fidelity surely requires a separation of 
constitutional construction from “low politics.” Yet even when all 
participants act in good faith with a view to furthering the 
Constitution and its purposes, struggles over high politics are 
inevitable in constitutional interpretation. To this extent, fights 
over constitutional interpretation are “political.” Large political 
principles are often at stake in constitutional disputes. Even so, 
participants must not treat the task of interpretation as simply the 
advancement of their values or the values of their political allies. 
It may often be difficult to tell the difference. Because of the 
effects of ideology and mechanisms of social cognition, people 
may confuse their values with the Constitution’s values. No doubt 
some participants are insincere; they only want to pursue their 
own values under the guise of interpreting the Constitution. Even 
so, hypocrisy is the compliment that vice pays to virtue. In order 
to persuade others, people must argue as if they were attempting 
to be faithful to the Constitution. 
Because people may disagree in good faith, the interpretive 
attitude of fidelity does not guarantee convergence on a single 
answer, although, at any point in time, it may narrow the range of 
answers. The interpretive attitude of fidelity imposes a subjective 
constraint—that is, it requires people to act in good faith. This 
constraint operates in addition to—but sometimes in opposition 
to—the sociological and political constraints described above. 
 
 41. Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Understanding the Constitutional 
Revolution, 87 VA. L. REV. 1045, 1062 (2001) (offering “a distinction between . . . ’high 
politics,’ which involves struggles over competing values and ideologies, and ‘low politics,’ 
which involves struggles over which group or party will hold power”). 
 42. Id. 
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E. INTERPRETATION BY CITIZENS AND BY GOVERNMENT 
OFFICIALS 
Randy Barnett and Evan Bernick have offered a theory of 
good faith constitutional construction.43 They argue that 
constitutional construction requires an attempt to realize both the 
“letter” and the “spirit” of the Constitution.44 They derive this 
obligation from three ideas. The first is the fiduciary duty that 
government agents—including judges—owe to the people they 
govern.45 Fiduciaries owe a duty of good faith to those whose 
affairs they manage.46 Second, Barnett and Bernick argue that 
government officials, because of their oaths of office, take on a 
moral obligation to act in good faith.47 Third, Barnett and Bernick 
analogize the Constitution to a contract that gives judges and 
other government officials discretionary power over people—a 
power that can easily be abused.48 Government officials—
including judges—must interpret and perform their obligations 
under the agreement in a spirit of good faith.49 
I would go further. A duty of fidelity in interpretation applies 
even if one is not a government official and even if the 
 
 43. Randy E. Barnett & Evan D. Bernick, The Letter and the Spirit: A Unified Theory 
of Originalism, SSRN (Oct. 9, 2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_
id=3049056. 
 44. Id. at 2; see also id. at 3 (good faith originalist construction seeks to implement 
that meaning “faithfully” by seeking to ascertain and adhere to the “original functions,” 
ends, purposes, or objectives for which that text was adopted—what we call its “spirit”). 
 45. Id. at 20–21; see also id. at 22–23 (arguing that the Constitution was designed as a 
fiduciary instrument and that officials have a duty to act in good faith on behalf of the 
public). 
 46. Id. at 17; see also id. at 19 (“Because we are all vulnerable to judicial decisions 
that bring the government’s coercive power to bear upon us to our detriment, or that 
prevent the government’s power from being used to our benefit, federal judges ought to 
be understood to be fiduciaries, with corresponding duties.”). 
 47. Id. at 21 (“[O]fficials who are entrusted with power over other people that they 
would not otherwise possess in virtue of a voluntary promise to adhere to the terms of that 
document are morally bound to keep that promise.”); see also id. (“[A]n oath to support 
the Constitution creates a morally binding promise ‘to adopt an interpretive theory 
tethered to the Constitution’s text and history.’” (quoting Richard M. Re, Promising the 
Constitution, 110 Nw. U. L. Rev. 299, 323-4 (2016))). 
 48. Id. at 30–33 (“The common evil of opportunism that both the contractual and 
fiduciary duty of good faith are designed to thwart, taken together with . . . [the danger of] 
the opportunistic abuse of discretionary power . . ., suggests the utility of Burton’s theory 
of good-faith contractual performance . . . [to] guid[e] constitutional construction by our 
judicial fiduciaries.”) 
 49. See id. at 26 (“The common evil of opportunism that both the contractual and 
fiduciary duty of good faith are designed to thwart, taken together with [the danger of] the 
opportunistic abuse of discretion[ary power,] . . . suggests the utility of Burton’s . . . [theory 
of good-faith contractual performance in] guiding constitutional construction.”). 
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Constitution is not best analogized to a contract. In Living 
Originalism and in other work, I have argued that interpretation 
by citizens is the standard case, and interpretation by government 
officials is merely a special case.50 So our account of constitutional 
fidelity—and thus of constitutional construction—must be one 
that applies to citizens, and not merely to government officials. 
Citizens must interpret the Constitution in good faith even if they 
lack fiduciary duties because they do not hold public office. 
Interpretive fidelity is not simply an obligation that comes with 
holding office, or being a party to a contract; it is a presupposition 
of constitutional interpretation. As I have argued: 
Fidelity is not a virtue but a precondition. It is not just a good 
thing, but the point of the practice of constitutional 
interpretation. To claim to interpret the Constitution is already 
to claim to be faithful to it. Conversely, insisting that one does 
not care about fidelity does not simply put one at a severe 
disadvantage in convincing others to one’s point of view; it 
takes one outside of the language game of constitutional 
interpretation. It is to announce that one is doing something 
else—whether it is political theory, economics, or sociology, 
but most assuredly not constitutional law. When we say that 
fidelity is not important to us, we are no longer interpreting the 
Constitution, we are criticizing it. Indeed, even when we 
criticize the Constitution, we are in some sense offering what 
we believe to be a faithful interpretation of it. We are saying 
that this is what the Constitution really means and that we find 
it wanting. When [William Lloyd] Garrison called the 
Constitution an agreement with hell, it was because he assumed 
that a faithful interpretation protected slavery.51 
On the other hand, constitutional fidelity may require more 
from government officials than from citizens precisely because 
government officials have responsibilities to the public that 
ordinary citizens do not, and these responsibilities are especially 
important because the legal system clothes government officials 
with the power of the state and charges them with enforcing the 
law against private citizens. These obligations of public officials 
concern not only the duties of good faith and fiduciary obligation 
that Barnett and Bernick describe, but also the importance of 
stability and predictability, the promotion of rule of law values, 
the need to take into account existing constitutional doctrine, the 
 
 50. BALKIN, supra note 2, at 17. 
 51. BALKIN, supra note 36, at 106. 
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practices and expectations of other government officials, and the 
public’s expectations about legality and fairness. 
Constitutional change occurs as positions that were once 
considered “off-the-wall” later become “on-the-wall” and even 
widely accepted or orthodox. Private citizens, motivated by 
individual conscience or political zeal, and legal scholars, in their 
quest to advance scholarship, are generally free to make whatever 
constitutional claims they believe are the best interpretations of 
the Constitution, even if their views are widely considered off-the-
wall. Our constitutional system protects and values the claims of 
constitutional dissenters, because constitutional dissenters 
sometimes turn out to be the prophets of the constitutional law of 
the future.52 Attorneys representing private citizens may also 
make off-the-wall claims, consistent with norms of professional 
responsibility and their duties to represent their clients zealously. 
But when government officials enforce the law (as opposed to 
making political statements), and especially when they enforce 
the law against private citizens, people expect them to limit 
themselves to official constitutional interpretations that are on-
the-wall, even if disputable and controversial.53 In Section III, I 
will argue that the expectation that government officials make 
claims that are on-the-wall offers an additional, intersubjective 
constraint on constitutional construction. 
F. FIDELITY TO THE CONSTITUTION REQUIRES FAITH IN THE 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROJECT 
Fidelity to the Constitution also requires a certain degree of 
faith in the Constitution.54 To be faithful to something or someone 
is to believe in something or someone. Fidelity, in this sense, is a 
relationship between ourselves and another. You are faithful to 
the other because you expect them to be faithful to you, even 
 
 52. BALKIN, supra note 2, at 95–96. 
 53. As Barnett and Bernick note, this creates a possible tension between the duties 
of government officials. Government officials may believe that their fiduciary obligation 
to the original purposes of the Constitution require a significant departure from existing 
law, even changes that are currently considered off-the-wall. Barnett and Bernick argue 
that government officials nevertheless have a duty to implement such a change, even if 
doing so defeats the expectations of citizens, lawyers, and fellow government officials. See 
Barnett & Bernick, supra note 43, at 21 n. 107 (arguing that officials have a fiduciary duty 
to enforce the Constitution at the time of adoption and not the public’s understanding of 
the Constitution at the time they take their oaths). 
 54. The argument in the next five paragraphs is drawn from BALKIN, supra note 36, 
at 2, 124–25; and BALKIN, supra note 2, at 77–81. 
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when you cannot be certain of this. Thus, fidelity involves a degree 
of trust, a leap of faith. Conversely, to be faithless means both to 
lack faith and to betray a trust. When one is faithless, one becomes 
untrustworthy; often because one has lost faith in the other. 
In much the same fashion, constitutional fidelity requires a 
leap of faith in the Constitution. If you do not have faith in the 
object of interpretation, then you will be likely to treat it as an 
obstacle or inconvenience, something to get around by clever 
argumentation. This approach to constitutional interpretation 
lacks an attitude of fidelity toward the Constitution. 
Saying that we have faith in the Constitution does not mean 
merely that we have faith in a particular text. It means that we 
have faith in the constitutional project of government under the 
Constitution. This project is the work of many generations. It 
began before us, and, we hope, it will continue after us. Thus, 
when we say that we have faith in the Constitution, what we are 
really saying is that we have faith in the American people living 
under the Constitution, and that we have faith in the development 
of the institutions of self-government through adherence to the 
Constitution. There is no guarantee, however, that the 
Constitution—that is, the project of constitutionalism in the 
United States—will turn out to be worthy of our faith. The 
constitutional system may be deeply unjust and never get much 
better. Even if it is broadly acceptable, things may fall apart. 
Constitutional institutions may decay. The Constitution may fail, 
as it did once before in the 1860s. Despite all of our best efforts 
and those of later generations, the Constitution may turn out to 
be a covenant with death and an agreement with hell. 
This constitutional faith may not be much of a gamble if we 
think that the Constitution-in-practice is basically just and our 
system of government legitimate and worthy of respect. But even 
if the Constitution-in-practice is currently very unjust, and even if 
we believe that our institutions of democracy have decayed or are 
under threat, constitutional faith means that we continue to 
believe the constitution-in-practice and our constitutional 
democracy will be redeemed. An attitude of constitutional fidelity 
presupposes that we think that fidelity is worth the effort, even 
when we know—or suspect—that others do not behave in the 
same way. 
In sum, constitutional fidelity is not simply a correspondence 
between an interpretation and a text. It is an attitude toward the 
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Constitution and the project of self-government under the 
Constitution. Fidelity to the Constitution requires faith in the 
Constitution, and—especially when things are going badly—in the 
redemption of the Constitution. What is redeemed, however, is 
not simply a set of rules or promises in a document, but a trans-
generational constitutional project and a people. Behind a 
constitution are the people who live within its political 
framework. To make a leap of faith in the Constitution is to 
believe in the people who engage in politics within it. 
Constitutional fidelity requires constitutional faith, which is a 
species of political faith. And political faith is a bet not on 
particular words but on the members of a political community 
who chose to live by those words. 
G. FIDELITY REQUIRES UNDERSTANDING ONE’S POSITION IN 
HISTORY 
Constitutional fidelity also requires understanding one’s 
position in history. As people live within a constitutional system, 
they move further and further from the moment of adoption, and 
a history of interpretations and counter-interpretations 
accumulates. That is why constitutional construction is not simply 
making up things however one likes. Constitutional construction 
is a multigenerational project. Later interpreters do not write on 
a blank slate. They operate within an ongoing tradition of 
readings and re-readings of the Constitution, in the shadow of a 
history of arguments and counter-arguments about the 
Constitution, and against the background of previous state-
building constructions, and good or bad things done in the name 
of the Constitution. To be sure, later generations build on the 
work of previous generations and can correct their errors and 
mistakes. But usually they leave in place as much as they correct. 
Each successive group of interpreters finds itself at the end 
of a line of previous readings and disputes. Their position does 
not make them the culmination of the constitutional tradition, but 
merely the latest installment. Their position in history should, 
however, affect their interpretive attitude. 
Being later in time does not guarantee that one is wiser or 
more moral than earlier generations. But later generations have 
(at least potentially) access to more history than earlier 
generations; they may be able to know more about how the 
Constitution functions in different circumstances, and especially 
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under conditions of stress, emergency, conflict, and rapid change. 
There is no guarantee, however, that later generations will take 
advantage of this history. Indeed, precisely because later 
generations are born later, they have not experienced the same 
crises and dangers, and they may forget (or be unable to 
comprehend) old and hard-won lessons. 
Because every generation emerges as the latest installment 
of a line of previous readers, their position in time demands a 
particular interpretive attitude about the constitutional project, 
expressed through the ideas of redemption, coherence, self-
education, humility, and charity. 
The concept of redemption in constitutional interpretation 
means that in interpreting the Constitution, we should do our best 
to fulfill the Constitution’s purposes and promises in our own day. 
Redemption may be necessary because previous generations have 
fallen short of the Constitution’s promises, or because we 
ourselves have fallen short. 
Coherence means that we should strive to see the 
Constitution as articulating a coherent scheme of political values. 
To do this, we may have to accept some parts of the tradition as 
worth preserving and reject other parts. 
A duty of self-education also follows from being last in line. 
The central advantage of later readers over earlier ones is not that 
they are wiser but that they have access to more information 
about what the Constitution has meant to people and about how 
the Constitution operates over time in multiple situations. 
Therefore we, as the latest readers in the line, should try to 
understand the history of previous constitutional controversies, 
including, but not limited to, the controversies of the Founding 
era. 
The idea of interpretive humility is backward-looking and 
forward-looking. Backward looking humility means that 
contemporary interpreters should recognize that earlier 
interpreters of the Constitution have something to teach them 
about its principles and purposes, even if they disagree with them. 
Forward looking humility is the recognition that we will be judged 
by later generations, often in ways we cannot yet imagine. 
Finally, interpreters have obligations of charity in 
interpretation. Later readers have an obligation of charity both to 
the adopting generation and to each successive generation. They 
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should try to understand why people did what they did in the 
context of their time and try to see what was valuable and useful 
in previous readings of the Constitution. Previous generations 
may have done very unjust things, and later interpreters should 
not hesitate to recognize them as unjust. After all, the U.S. 
Constitution was founded as a republic that permitted and 
protected the institution of slavery. Even so, later interpreters 
should attempt to view the work of previous generations in its best 
light; they should try to understand its lessons for the present even 
when they find it wanting or morally wrong. 
This charity also connects to our position in time. We are the 
inheritors of the readings of previous generations, and we will 
bequeath our own readings to later generations who will someday 
take our place at the end of the line. It is very likely that later 
generations will consider some of what we do to be unjust, morally 
compromised, and even depraved. If we want later generations to 
view our own work with charity, we must be willing to view earlier 
generations with the same degree of charity. 
III. CONSTITUTIONAL TOPICS IN CONSTITUTIONAL 
CONSTRUCTION 
The techniques of constitutional construction are the 
standard forms of common law argument. Once the Constitution 
was adopted, people began to treat it as law. Accordingly, they 
used the techniques for construing texts that they had inherited 
from the common law.55 These techniques are among the original 
legal methods for interpreting the Constitution and they also form 
part of the original “law of interpretation.”56 
 
 55. BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION supra note 18, at 5 (“Since the 
Constitution was a written law, it had to be construed, and this was to be done according 
to the prevailing methods of legal construction . . . the forms of common law argument, 
those forms prevailing at the time of the drafting and ratification of the U.S. 
Constitution.”); Stephen M. Griffin, Pluralism in Constitutional Interpretation, 72 TEX. L. 
REV. 1753, 1758–62 (1994) (arguing that in the process of making the Constitution a 
political as well as legal document, the Founding generation adapted a range of different 
legal methods); cf. G. EDWARD WHITE, THE MARSHALL COURT AND CULTURAL 
CHANGE 1815-35, at 112–18 (1988) (noting the wide range of sources that early jurists drew 
on and adapted to constitutional argument). 
 56. William Baude & Stephen E. Sachs, The Law of Interpretation, 130 HARV. L. 
REV. 1079, 1131-32 (2017) (“The ‘original legal methods’ are, in our view, the law of 
interpretation as it stood at the Founding.”). Thus, there are important points of 
connection between the account of constitutional construction I offer in this Article and 
John McGinnis and Michael Rappaport’s claim that interpreters should employ original 
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The most famous account of these techniques is Philip 
Bobbitt’s theory of “modalities” of constitutional interpretation. 
He identified a list of six styles of argument which have become 
more or less standard in constitutional theory: text, history, 
structure, doctrine, prudence, and ethos.57 Later on in this Article, 
I will offer a different list, better designed to explain how lawyers 
use history when they engage in constitutional construction.58 
Because Bobbitt’s account has been so influential, legal 
theorists may tend to associate the use of modalities of 
constitutional argument with the whole of Bobbitt’s theory. That 
theory is both inconsistent with originalism and generally offered 
as a pluralist alternative to it.59 It also argues that when different 
modalities of analysis conflict, interpreters must decide by resort 
to individual conscience.60 Hence people may assume that any 
theory of construction that employs common-law modalities of 
argument is (1) non-originalist; and (2) bestows considerable 
freedom on interpreters to decide constitutional questions 
according to their individual consciences. Neither of these 
assumptions is correct. 
This Part argues that the standard forms of constitutional 
argument are rhetorical topics. This account does not require that 
one accept Bobbitt’s entire system, and it is consistent with both 
originalist and non-originalist approaches to constitutional 
interpretation. In Part IV, I discuss Bobbitt’s theory and its 
differences from my account in more detail. For the moment, it is 
sufficient to note that one may detach most of Bobbitt’s 
theoretical apparatus from his central insight: Constitutional 
argument is structured in terms of recurring forms of argument; 
these forms of argument provide a kind of know-how that helps 
lawyers analyze constitutional problems and make constitutional 
claims. These recurring forms of argument originate in the 
common law, and people adapted them to constitutional 
argument when the Constitution became law. Although these 
forms of argument may have evolved a bit over time (in ways I 
 
legal methods and William Baude and Stephen Sachs’ arguments about the law of 
interpretation. I will discuss the similarities and differences between our approaches later 
in this essay. See infra text accompanying notes 129–155. 
 57. BOBBIT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION, supra note 18, at 12–13. 
 58. See infra text accompanying notes 109–121. 
 59. BOBBIT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION, supra note 18, at 25 (arguing that 
originalism is circular). 
 60. Id., at 114, 168; Bobbitt, Reflections, supra note 18, at 1873–74. 
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will discuss later on), people have employed the standard forms 
of argument more or less continuously from the Founding 
onwards. 
A. THE MODALITIES AS RHETORICAL TOPICS 
The history and theory of rhetoric offer the best way to 
understand the modalities of constitutional argument. The 
recurring forms of argument in constitutional law are what the 
rhetorical tradition that begins with Aristotle calls topics or 
topoi.61 In particular these forms of argument are what Aristotle 
and later rhetoricians would call “special topics.” 
In rhetoric, a topic is something to talk about, and therefore 
a way of approaching a question, analyzing it, and constructing 
arguments to discuss it.62 The use of rhetorical topics to make 
arguments is known as the rhetorical art of invention.63 
 
 61. ARISTOTLE, ON RHETORIC: A THEORY OF CIVIC DISCOURSE 44–46 [1358a] 
(George A. Kennedy, trans., 2d ed., 2007) [hereinafter ARISTOTLE, ON RHETORIC]; 
MICHAEL H. FROST, INTRODUCTION TO CLASSICAL LEGAL RHETORIC: A LOST 
HERITAGE 27 (2005); David Fleming, Becoming Rhetorical: An Education in the Topics, 
in THE REALMS OF RHETORIC: THE PROSPECTS FOR RHETORIC EDUCATION 93, 95–97 
(Joseph Petraglia & Deepika Bahri eds., 2003); J.M. Balkin, A Night in the Topics: The 
Reason of Legal Rhetoric and the Rhetoric of Legal Reason, in LAW’S STORIES: 
NARRATIVE AND RHETORIC IN THE LAW 211 (Peter Brooks & Paul Gewirtz eds., 1996). 
 62. ARISTOTLE, Topica, in THE BASIC WORKS OF ARISTOTLE 187, 188 [100a] 
(Richard McKeon, ed., W.A. Pickard-Cambridge trans., 1941) (“Our treatise proposes to 
find a line of inquiry whereby we shall be able to reason from opinions that are generally 
accepted about every problem propounded to us, and also shall ourselves, when standing 
up to an argument, avoid saying anything that will obstruct us.”); Balkin, supra note 61, at 
213 (“The point of identifying topics, making lists of them, and committing them to 
memory was to have at one’s immediate disposal a checklist of things to talk about no 
matter what subject one was presented with and no matter what problem of analysis one 
faced.”). 
 63. The classical study of rhetoric was organized into canons or characteristic skills: 
invention (inventione in Latin, heurisis in Greek); arrangement (dispositio, taxis); style 
(elocutio, lexis); memorization (memoria, mnémé); and delivery (pronunciatio, hypokrisis). 
Cicero, De Inventione, I.9 in 2 CICERO 1, 18-19 (H.M. Hubbell trans., 1949); [Cicero], 
Rhetorica Ad Herennium I.2, in 1 CICERO 6–7, 7 n.a (Harry Caplan trans., 1954) 
[hereinafter [Cicero], ad Herennium]; Balkin, supra note 61, at 212, 273 n.4. 
  The first canon of rhetoric, invention, is the art of discovering what to say. It is 
the skill of “discovering and formulating arguments on any subject, opinions on the 
resolution of any problem, or reasons for or against any proposed course of action.” Id. at 
212. Viewed from this perspective, the art of rhetoric is not primarily about ornament or 
display. Rather, it is a pragmatic art. First, we must understand the situation before us; 
then we must find ways to analyze problems, solve them, and explain to others what we 
have found and what should be done. Id. 
  Aristotle distinguished between deliberative, judicial, and epideictic rhetoric. 
Deliberative rhetoric argues for what we should do; judicial rhetoric attempts to analyze 
what has happened; both focus on practical reasoning and on making decisions. Epideictic 
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The Greek word topos means “place,” and it has several 
interlocking connotations. First, topics are metaphorical places 
where one might look for arguments; alternatively, they are 
signposts along a journey to find arguments.64 Some writers have 
compared topics to places in the mind in which one searches for 
arguments and from which one fetches formulas and ideas.65 And 
just as things appear differently from different locations, one can 
also think of topics as perspectives or distinctive ways of looking 
at things.66 
The concept of topoi connects the study of rhetoric with 
practical reasoning. Topics are not only recipes for making 
speeches; they are also methods of analysis and problem-solving. 
Viewed as a form of practical reason, rhetorical invention is the 
art of discovering the most plausible and convincing arguments 
for a given audience.67 The realm of rhetorical invention concerns 
the kinds of questions that cannot be demonstrated for certain, as 
in mathematics, but for which there are a range of possible 
answers, some more plausible and more reasonable than others. 
Plausibility, as Aristotle says, means plausible to some person or 
 
rhetoric, by contrast, is about offering praise or blame, and although it may require 
practical reasoning, it does not call for immediate action. ARISTOTLE, ON RHETORIC, 
supra note 61, at 46–50 [1358b-1359a]; Iain Scobbie, Rhetoric, Persuasion, and 
Interpretation in International Law, in INTERPRETATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 61, 66 
(Andrea Bianchi, Daniel Peat & Matthew Windsor eds., 2015). 
 64. Fleming, supra note 61, at 96; Michael C. Leff, The Topics of Argumentative 
Invention in Latin Rhetorical Theory from Cicero to Boethius, 1 RHETORICA 23, 24 (1983) 
(“[T]he rhetor is a hunter, the argument his quarry, and the topic a locale in which the 
argument may be found”). 
 65. See CICERO, TOPICA, II.6–II.8, in 2 CICERO, supra note 63, at 375, 386–87, 386 
n.b, (describing topoi as places from which one might fetch different kinds of arguments); 
Fleming, supra note 61, at 96. Because topics are often organized into checklists, one might 
also compare them to memory palaces. Guenther Kreuzbauer, Topics in Contemporary 
Legal Argumentation: Some Remarks on the Topical Nature of Legal Argumentation in the 
Continental Law Tradition, 28 INFORMAL LOGIC 71, 74-75 (2008) (citing Christof Rapp, 
Aristotle’s Rhetoric, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Feb. 1, 2010), 
https://plato-stanford.edu/entries/aristotle-rhetoric/). 
 66. See Balkin, A Night in the Topics, supra note 61, at 213 & 273 n.6 (comparing 
topoi to a horizon or perspective in hermeneutical theory; this horizon is formed by the 
place where one stands or the direction in which one looks at things.). 
 67. ARISTOTLE, ON RHETORIC, supra note 61, at 37 [1356a] (defining rhetoric as 
“the ability … to see the available means of persuasion” in a given case.); id. at 39 
[1356a](“Persuasion occurs through the arguments [logoi] when we show the truth or 
apparent truth from whatever is persuasive in each case.”); cf. ARISTOTLE, 
NICHOMACHEAN ETHICS, in THE BASIC WORKS OF ARISTOTLE, supra note 62, at 936 
[1094b] (“it is the mark of an educated man to look for precision in each class of things just 
so far as the nature of the subject admits; it is evidently equally foolish to accept probable 
reasoning from a mathematician and to demand from a rhetorician scientific proofs.”). 
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some audience.68 Hence rhetorical invention involves finding 
ways to convince other people in our community—or our 
audience—about the most reasonable solution to a problem, or 
the best way to go forward. 
This account of rhetoric as problem-solving and practical 
reasoning contrasts with familiar ideas of rhetoric as mere 
technical display, emotional appeal, or the devious arts of the 
demagogue or con artist. Moreover, this substantive vision of 
rhetoric presumes what Chaim Perelman called a “realm of 
rhetoric.”69 It envisions 
[A] large intellectual sphere in which it is meaningful to speak 
of arguments that are “reasonable” and “unreasonable” and in 
which discussion is perceived as useful and meaningful. This 
realm of rhetoric, of civil and reasonable discourse, lies 
between the extremes of a world of certain truth and a world 
of arbitrary wills, each of which exists in a world without 
discussion, the one because catechism—deduction and 
demonstration—has taken the place of discussion, and the 
other because nothing remains that can be meaningfully 
discussed.70 
We turn to rhetoric, and thus to topics, when we must 
consider questions whose answers cannot be known for certain, 
and when we ask instead what is more or less reasonable, and 
more or less plausible to our audience. This is the realm of legal 
and constitutional argument.71 
Aristotle and later rhetoricians divided topics into general 
and special.72 General topics (topoi and koinoi topoi) are concepts 
 
 68. ARISTOTLE, ON RHETORIC, supra note 61, at 41 [1356b]. 
 69. CHAIM PERELMAN, THE REALM OF RHETORIC (1982). 
 70.  Bernard E. Jacob, Ancient Rhetoric, Modern Legal Thought, and Politics: A 
Review Essay on the Translation of Viehweg’s “Topics and Law,” 89 NW. U. L. REV. 1622, 
1644 (1995) (reviewing THEODORE VIEHWEG, TOPICS AND LAW (W. Cole Durham, Jr., 
trans., 1993) (footnote omitted)). 
 71. Giambattista Vico, who sought to rehabilitate the classical study of rhetoric in 
the early modern period as an alternative to Cartesian rationalism, held that topical 
reasoning was crucial for reasoning both in law and in what we would now call the 
humanities. GIAMBATTISTA VICO, ON THE STUDY METHODS OF OUR TIME 15 (Elio 
Gianturco trans., Cornell Univ. Press 1990) (1709) (“Those who know all the loci [Latin 
for topoi], i.e., the lines of argument to be used, are able . . . to grasp extemporaneously 
the elements of persuasion inherent in any question or case.”). 
 72. Aristotle sometimes uses topoi generally to speak of all kinds of topics. More 
specifically, he sometimes uses topoi to refer to general strategies of argument in Book I of 
the Rhetoric, and koina or koinoi topoi to refer to common subjects of argument featured 
in Book II. ARISTOTLE, ON RHETORIC, supra note 61, at 50 (commentary by George A. 
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and strategies for argument that offer people ways to invent 
something to say about almost any subject. Aristotle gives as 
examples (1) part and whole; (2) more and less; (3) opposites; (4) 
time; (5) definitions; (6) categorization; (7) cause and effect; and 
(8) possible and impossible.73 More contemporary examples are 
the reporters’ familiar set of questions: who, what, why, where, 
when, and how. Because general topics are so abstract, and can be 
used for almost any question, they have little substantive 
content.74 
Special topics (idia) are strategies and concepts that are 
relevant to a specific body of knowledge, subject matter or 
professional practice. They are modes of analysis associated with 
a field of knowledge such as medicine or law.75 Special topics 
allow people to make arguments within a particular field of 
knowledge. Diagnostic criteria are special topics in medicine; 
doctrinal categories are special topics in law. These topics are 
special in the sense of “specialized.” For example, medicine, and 
law have topics that are useful for discussing and studying these 
particular subjects but may not be relevant to others.76 
Examples of contemporary topics in American law are (1) 
burden of proof; (2) rules versus standards; (3) justified reliance; 
(4) cheapest cost avoider; (5) fiduciary obligation; (6) the political 
safeguards of federalism; and (7) discrete and insular minority. 
Some of these topics are drawn from legal doctrines; others are 
drawn from familiar theories about legal doctrine. 
 
Kennedy; Fleming, supra note 61, at 97–98. For present purposes, I group both the 
common strategies and the common subjects together as general or common topics. 
 73. ARISTOTLE, ON RHETORIC, supra note 61, at 51 [1359a], 65 [1363b], 172–184 
[1397a–1400b] (offering catalogs of common topics). 
 74. For example, if asked to give a speech on elephants, one could talk about the 
parts of the elephant, the size of elephants, the definition of an elephant, the differences 
between elephants and other species, and so on. As this example suggests, these abstract 
and general topics only help begin the process of discovery. In most cases a speaker has to 
add a great deal more substance (and do considerably more research) to construct an 
interesting argument. Balkin, supra note 61, at 213. 
 75. Aristotle mentions physics as an example. ARISTOTLE, ON RHETORIC, supra 
note 61, at 45 [1358a]. A significant portion of Book I of Aristotle’s Rhetoric lists special 
topics (idia) about politics, ethics, and psychology. Id. at 51–110 [1359a–1377b]. 
 76. Just as there is some dispute about how Aristotle divided up the class of topics, 
—for example, whether there are actually three categories rather two—there are disputes 
about how he characterized the difference between general and special topics. Fleming, 
supra note 61, at 97–100. In any case, the rhetorical tradition following Aristotle 
distinguished between general topics relevant to (virtually) all questions and special topics 
relevant to more specific or specialized fields of study (like law). 
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As one can see from these examples, “any theoretical 
enterprise tends to develop its own set of special topics as soon as 
it creates its own set of distinctive concepts and approaches.”77 
Usually, the set of special topics in any area of thought is not 
closed. As time goes on, participants will add new concepts and 
theories. Although American lawyers still argue using topics that 
existed in the British common law before independence, most 
legal topics developed later on. Moreover, the preponderance and 
dominance of certain topics may change over time. Some topics 
may recede in importance, while other topics become increasingly 
prominent. 
Topics are an aspect of culture and a reflection of culture. 
The accumulation, prominence, and development of topics in a 
given culture reflect that culture’s growth and evolution. For 
example, one way of measuring the influence of other disciplines 
on law is to note how often or how pervasively topics from other 
disciplines (such as economic concepts and theories) become part 
of the discourse of legal scholars, administrators, and judges. 
Topics have a dual character. On the one hand, they are 
concepts or propositions; on the other, they are strategies or 
problem-solving techniques for argument. Topics often serve as 
devices for diagnosing and solving problems, or for the 
organization and exposition of ideas. Usually topics can be 
summed up or memorized in a few words, a checklist, or a 
formula. (Think about legal outlines and lists of legal categories.) 
Viewed from this perspective, topics are heuristics; they offer a 
starting point or a roadmap for analyzing problems and proposing 
solutions.78 The use of topics in law, Theodore Viehweg has 
explained, “is a technique of problem oriented thought that was 
developed by rhetoric.”79 
Topics are useful because people can base arguments on 
them and because they are generally regarded as plausible 
grounds for making arguments. Topics, in other words, draw on 
knowledge and beliefs held in common in a given community, 
whether a knowledge community (for example, an academic 
discipline or profession), a political community, or a religious 
 
 77. Balkin, supra note 61, at 213. 
 78. Id. at 214. 
 79. THEODOR VIEHWEG, TOPICS AND LAW: A CONTRIBUTION TO BASIC 
RESEARCH IN LAW 1 (W. Cole Durham trans., 1993); id. at 25 (“The function of topoi . . . 
is to serve the discussion of problems.”) (emphasis omitted). 
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community.80 This suggests another duality: Topics both involve 
strategies for analysis and reflect conditions of shared belief. 
Communities of knowledge and the topics they regularly employ 
in reasoning and argument are mutually constitutive. To be a well-
trained lawyer in the United States is to be able to use a certain 
set of topics in persuading other lawyers and to find these 
approaches plausible and persuasive. 
Some special topics are commonplaces. Commonplaces are 
ideas, views or expressions that are held in common in a given 
culture. Such commonplaces include “concepts, subjects and 
maxims that are widely shared in the culture or are associated with 
wisdom that has been distilled into commonsense.”81 They also 
include widely held beliefs and opinions in a political, religious, 
professional, or scholarly community.82 One should distinguish 
these “commonplaces” from what Aristotle originally meant by 
koinoi topoi or common topics. Aristotle’s common (or general) 
topics apply universally to any question; commonplaces are 
widely agreed on beliefs or presuppositions in a given community 
or within a given area of inquiry. They may be special topics in 
Aristotle’s original sense—for example commonplaces about 
politics.83 As I shall explain, the standard forms of constitutional 
argument rest on commonplaces about constitutional 
interpretation. 
 
 80. Guenther Kreutzbauer explains the idea of topics along similar lines: “Topoi are 
general propositions or concepts that provide premises of arguments used in a certain 
discourse and are collectively accepted by the participants in the discourse as being 
plausible. They can tackle problems of abstract philosophy, of a specific profession or of 
human life in general. They usually have fixed structure and are linguistically expressed by 
one (or a few) word(s) or sentence(s), have a fixed structural and linguistic design, and are 
generally formulated in a rhetorically elaborate style.” Kreuzbauer, supra note 65, at 79 
(2008). 
 81. Balkin, supra note 61, at 212; see also Leff, supra note 64, at 23 (“[R]hetoricians 
must draw their starting points from accepted beliefs and values relative to the audience 
and the subject of discourse. When these beliefs and values are considered at a high level 
of generality, they become ‘commonplaces’ or ‘common topics’ for argumentation . . . .”). 
 82. Thomas J. Darwin, Pathos, Pedagogy, and the Familiar: Cultivating Rhetorical 
Intelligence, in THE REALMS OF RHETORIC: THE PROSPECTS FOR RHETORIC 
EDUCATION, supra note 61, at 23, 28 (“Topical ‘reasoning’ involves the ability to adapt 
and manipulate one’s repertoire of cultural common sense (expressed in commonplaces) 
to fit new or tenuous situations.”). 
 83. Cf. Fleming, supra note 61, at 103 (“[W]hat recent rhetoricians have described as 
the “special” topics—the particular practices and beliefs of specific communities seen from 
a vantage point outside of them—could just as easily be seen as “common” topics when 
seen from a vantage point inside of them.”). 
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In sum, in a given field of knowledge special topics include 
(1) key ideas and concepts; (2) commonplaces and widely shared 
assumptions; and (3) problem-solving tools and diagnostic 
checklists. 
In the ancient world, lawyers and statesmen studied legal 
argument in terms of topics. Cicero and Quintilian wrote treatises 
on rhetoric with lists of topics for the benefit of advocates.84 Many 
of Cicero’s topics—and his applications of them—were designed 
to be used in legal disputes in the Rome of his time.85 This is hardly 
surprising: it exemplifies the close connections between legal 
practice and topical reasoning. The goal of memorizing and 
practicing topics was to allow advocates to analyze factual 
situations as legal problems and then to make arguments about 
how to characterize both the facts and the law. 
Today in American law schools, law students answer “issue 
spotters,” exam questions that test their ability to recall key 
doctrinal concepts (which themselves are legal topics) and apply 
them creatively to factual situations. The very notion of the “issue 
spotter” as the standard form of legal examination shows how 
lawyers use topical categories to reason and to make arguments. 
Most legal doctrines generate special topics for legal analysis, 
argument and judgment. That is not because legal doctrines are 
nothing more than rhetorical topics; rather it is because legal 
doctrines produce categories and tests that are helpful to think 
with. They provide methods for the organization of social 
experience when viewed through the eyes of the law. For the same 
reason, doctrinal categories and tests also serve as problem-
solving devices. Thus, “legal doctrine has a dual nature, both as 
authority and as topos. Because legal doctrines and distinctions 
are backed by the authority of the state, they help constitute what 
a legal problem is in a given legal culture.”86 
Analyzing fact patterns, classifying them in terms of legal 
categories, and then using these facts and categories to argue for 
one’s position is what legal advocates have done from Cicero’s 
 
 84. Cicero, supra note 63; CICERO, supra note 65; [Cicero], supra note 63; 
QUINTILIAN, THE ORATOR’S EDUCATION (Donald A. Russell trans., 2002). 
 85. See sources cited supra note 84; FROST, supra note 61, at 27–30 (explaining that 
classical rhetoricians devised topic catalogs based on the needs of legal advocates). The 
section of Aristotle’s Rhetoric on judicial rhetoric also offers a list of topics for arguing 
legal cases. ARISTOTLE, ON RHETORIC, supra note 61, at 83–110 [1368a-1377b]. 
 86. Balkin, supra note 61, at 219. 
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day to our own. In the twentieth century, two legal scholars, 
Chaim Perelman and Theodor Viehweg, sought to revive the 
classical tradition of rhetoric by focusing on invention and topical 
argument.87 Significant parts of Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca’s 
The New Rhetoric are a contemporary topic catalog.88 
Viehweg’s 1953 book Topics and Law argued that much legal 
reasoning is problem-oriented reasoning using topics.89 This 
argument was controversial in civil law countries like Viehweg’s 
Germany because the civil code appears to be a systematic and 
deductive system of reasoning.90 It is easier to see the force of 
Viehweg’s argument in common-law jurisdictions like the United 
States. In common law systems, much of doctrine is structured in 
terms of topics, new precedents often create new topics for legal 
analysis, and lawyers naturally argue using the topics they find in 
previous precedent. In fact, the West Keynote System, developed 
in the twentieth century to help American lawyers find relevant 
precedents, is an elaborate topic catalog.91 
During the heyday of critical legal studies, Duncan Kennedy 
and I helped create a field called legal semiotics.92 Legal semiotics 
 
 87. CHAIM PERELMAN & L. OLBRECHTS-TYTECA, THE NEW RHETORIC: A 
TREATISE ON ARGUMENTATION (John Wilkinson & Purcell Weaver trans., 1969); 
VIEHWEG, supra note 79; see also Jacob, supra note 70. 
 88. See Barbara Warnick, Two Systems of Invention: The Topics in the Rhetoric and 
The New Rhetoric, in REREADING ARISTOTLE’S RHETORIC 107 (A.G. Gross & A.E. 
Walzer eds., 2000) (comparing Aristotle’s and Perelman’s topic catalogues). 
 89. VIEHWEG, supra note 79, at 69–85. On the influence of Viehweg and the Mainz 
school that he created, see Katharina Sobota, System and Flexibility in Law, 5 
ARGUMENTATION 275 (1991); W. Cole Durham, Translator’s Foreword to VIEHWEG, 
supra note 79, at xix–xxii. 
 90. Balkin, supra note 61, at 219; W. Cole Durham, Translator’s Foreword to 
VIEHWEG, supra note 79, at xix–xxv. 
 91. See Explanation of How the Topic and Key Number System Works, WESTLAW, 
https://lawschool.westlaw.com/marketing/display/RE/24 (last visited Apr. 23, 2018) (“The 
American system of law is broken down into Major Topics. . ..Each of those topics is 
divided, in greater and greater detail, into individual units that represent a specific legal 
concept . . . .”). 
 92. DUNCAN KENNEDY, A CRITIQUE OF ADJUDICATION (1997); Balkin, supra note 
61, at 216; J.M. Balkin, The Promise of Legal Semiotics, 69 TEX. L. REV. 1831 (1991); 
Duncan Kennedy, A Semiotics of Legal Argument, 42 SYRACUSE L. REV. 75 (1991) 
[hereinafter Kennedy, Semiotics]; J.M. Balkin, The Hohfeldian Approach to Law and 
Semiotics, 44 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1119 (1990); J.M. Balkin, Nested Oppositions, 99 YALE 
L.J. 1669 (1990) (book review) [hereinafter Balkin, Nested Oppositions]; J.M. Balkin, The 
Crystalline Structure of Legal Thought, 39 RUTGERS L. REV. 1 (1986) [hereinafter Balkin, 
Crystalline Structure]; Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 
89 HARV. L. REV. 1685 (1976). Jennifer Jaff, James Boyle, and Jeremy Paul also made 
important contributions. See Jeremy Paul, The Politics of Legal Semiotics, 69 TEX. L. REV. 
1779 (1991); Jeremy Paul, A Bedtime Story, 74 VA. L. REV. 915 (1988); Jennifer Jaff, 
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identifies recurrent argument forms in different fields of law such 
as contracts, torts and criminal law.93 Examples in tort law are 
arguments from fault, causation, rights, incentives, consequences, 
rules versus standards, and consent.94 These standard forms of 
argument, in turn can be transformed or flipped to produce 
opposed sets of legal arguments.95 These forms of argument recur 
at more general and more specific levels of doctrine; they are even 
useful in debating the application of doctrine to specific fact 
patterns. As a result, legal doctrine often has a fractal or 
crystalline structure, in which debates about general features of 
doctrine are replicated at more specific levels of articulation and 
application.96 The recurrent argument forms that legal semiotics 
studies are special topics for these fields of law. Indeed, one of my 
first law review articles is essentially a catalog of legal topics and 
legal arguments in tort and criminal law.97 
Roughly around the same time in the 1980s, Philip Bobbitt 
and Richard Fallon offered what are now well-known catalogs of 
the standard forms of constitutional argument that lawyers and 
judges regularly employ. Bobbitt said that constitutional 
arguments came in six different forms: text, history, structure, 
prudence (including consequences), doctrine (including judicial 
decisions and interbranch conventions), and ethos.98 Fallon said 
that constitutional arguments came in five basic versions: text, 
historical intent, theory (including a wide range of different 
justifications), precedent, and value (including moral theory, 
political theory, and natural law).99 Bobbitt’s list of modalities 
 
Frame-Shifting: An Empowering Methodology for Teaching and Learning Legal 
Reasoning, 36 J. LEGAL EDUC. 249 (1986); James Boyle, The Anatomy of a Torts Class, 34 
AM. U. L. REV. 1003 (1985). 
 93. Balkin, supra note 61, at 216–17. 
 94. Id. at 217–18; Balkin, Crystalline Structure, supra note 92. 
 95. Kennedy, Semiotics, supra note 92. 
 96. See Balkin, Crystalline Structure, supra note 92; Kennedy, Semiotics, supra note 
92 (describing “nesting”); Balkin, Nested Oppositions, supra note 92. 
 97. Balkin, Crystalline Structure, supra note 92. 
 98. BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE, supra note 18, at 7–8; BOBBITT, 
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION, supra note 18, at 12–13. Although the first of these 
books was published in 1982, Bobbitt first presented his list of modalities in his Dougherty 
Lectures in April 1979. Philip C. Bobbitt, Constitutional Fate, 58 TEX. L. REV. 695 (1980). 
 99. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., A Constructivist Coherence Theory of Constitutional 
Interpretation, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1189, 1244–46, 1252–58 (1987) [hereinafter 
Constructivist Coherence]. Robert Post has offered another categorization of kinds of 
appeals to authority in constitutional argument, which is a subset of Bobbitt’s and Fallon’s. 
Post, supra note 32, at 18–19 (discussing three different ways that the Constitution gains 
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provides a useful shorthand for teaching students about different 
approaches to constitutional interpretation, and it has been 
especially influential in constitutional theory. 
Bobbitt adopted the term “modalities” because he wanted to 
make an analogy to modal logic, which concerns the relationship 
between different modes of truth such as actuality, possibility, and 
necessity.100 Analogously, Bobbitt claimed that the modalities of 
constitutional argument represented the different ways in which 
propositions of constitutional law could be true, and because they 
represented different modalities of truth, they were 
incommensurable.101 Since Bobbitt coined the term in his 1982 
book, Constitutional Fate, “modalities” has caught on as the 
standard way to describe the basic forms of argument in 
constitutional law. 
In fact, the modalities of constitutional argument do not have 
very much to do with modal logic. Bobbitt and Fallon were simply 
continuing the basic approach of classical rhetoric. Like Kennedy 
and me, they were reinventing the wheel—a very ancient wheel—
by providing topic catalogues for modern constitutional 
discourse.102 
The “modalities” of American constitutional discourse are 
rhetorical topics. More precisely, they are a class of special topics 
for American constitutional law; and they have all of the 
characteristics of special topics. First, the modalities offer 
 
authority before the public—through the authority of consent (original intent), the 
authority of law (precedent), and the authority of our national ethos or tradition). 
Jamal Greene has offered a catalog of legal arguments with two dimensions. Jamal Greene, 
Pathetic Argument in Constitutional Law, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 1389 (2013). One 
dimension consists of topics for invention: text, history, structure, doctrine, and 
consequences. Id. at 1424. A second dimension consists of modes of address to the 
audience: logos (appeals to reason), ethos (appeals based on the character or integrity of 
the speaker), and pathos (appeals to emotion). Id. at 1398–99, 1443; see also Colin Starger, 
Constitutional Law and Rhetoric, 18 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1347, 1360–62 (2016) (critiquing 
Greene’s account and offering a different classification scheme). Greene’s second 
dimension, the three modes of address, do not focus on how to analyze and solve a 
problem—the concern of this Article—but rather on how to win over an audience through 
various kinds of appeals. 
 100. BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION, supra note 18, at 11–12. 
 101. BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION, supra note 18, at 12 
(“[C]onstitutional modalities [are] the ways in which legal propositions are characterized 
as true from a constitutional point of view.”); id. at 164 (noting the “incommensurate 
nature of the various modalities of argument”). 
 102. This is also how I understand Karl Llewellyn’s work on techniques of precedent 
and canons of statutory interpretation. See infra note 249; see also Starger, supra note 99 
(arguing that Bobbitt’s modalities are actually rhetorical topics). 
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standard ways to discover and invent arguments for proposed 
interpretations of the Constitution. Second, the modalities rely on 
widely shared views about what justifies a proposed constitutional 
interpretation or makes an argument about constitutional 
interpretation both valid and plausible. In other words, they rest 
on commonplaces about constitutional interpretation. Third, the 
modalities serve as a heuristic or diagnostic tool. They operate as 
a checklist for analyzing situations and making arguments about 
the Constitution. Faced with a novel problem of constitutional 
law, students can work their way through the standard forms of 
argument, just as a journalist can organize a story by asking who, 
what, why, where, when, and how. 
American constitutional law has hundreds, if not thousands 
of other special topics besides the modalities: justiciability, levels 
of scrutiny, less restrictive alternatives, clear and present danger, 
limited and enumerated powers, smoking out unconstitutional 
motivation, the concept of commercial speech, the Central 
Hudson test for regulating commercial speech,103 and so on. Some 
of these topics emerge from existing doctrine; others reflect 
widely used ideas in constitutional theory. 
Most doctrinal categories in constitutional law are special 
topics, but they only apply to certain questions. Youngstown 
analysis—which classifies Executive Branch action into one of 
three different boxes104—applies to separation of powers 
questions, but not to many other constitutional questions—for 
example, whether the Constitution protects the right of same-sex 
marriage. Other doctrinal frameworks, like levels of scrutiny, and 
multi-part tests, are special topics that help us analyze some 
constitutional questions but not others. In addition to doctrinal 
topics, theoretical concepts in constitutional law like “process-
protection,” “smoking out invidious motivation,” “clear and 
present danger,” “the states as laboratories for experimentation,” 
or “the political safeguards of federalism,” are also special topics, 
but, again, they are relevant only to some questions in 
constitutional law. 
 
 103. Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 
563–66 (1980) (offering a four-part test for determining the constitutionality of regulations 
of commercial speech.). 
 104. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635–38 (1952) (Jackson, 
J., concurring) (offering a three-part test for determining the constitutionality of executive 
action in foreign affairs). 
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The modalities of constitutional argument, on the other 
hand, are a distinctive subset of the special topics in American 
constitutional law. First, they involve commonplaces about 
constitutional interpretation—that is, they rely on widely shared 
views in American legal culture about what makes a 
constitutional interpretation valid.105 
Second, the modalities offer general ways to create and 
justify legal interpretations of the Constitution irrespective of the 
subject at hand. More correctly, they represent classes of roughly 
similar approaches to interpretation. Within each modality or 
class of arguments there are many more specific forms—which we 
might call “subtopics.” For example, John Hart Ely’s theory of 
representation-reinforcement is a subtopic of the more general 
modality of structural argument;106 Alexander Bickel’s theory of 
“the passive virtues,”107 and Cass Sunstein’s theory of judicial 
minimalism108 are subtopics of the more general class of 
prudential argument; and the various common law canons of 
interpretation are subtopics of the more general category of 
textual argument. 
The modalities, in short, are the most general of the special 
topics about interpretation in American constitutional law. They 
are most general not because they are the most abstract, but 
because they are the most general-purpose. One can use them to 
generate arguments about most constitutional issues, and they are 
relevant to almost every constitutional question, because we 
employ these topics whenever we want to understand the 
Constitutional text or the Constitution as a whole. If we think of 
topics as strategies for argument, then the modalities are the basic 
moves of legal exegesis in the American constitutional tradition. 
That is why they seem so elemental, and that is why Bobbitt 
viewed them as central features of the practice of constitutional 
argument. For these reasons, I will continue to use Bobbitt’s term 
“modalities” to distinguish these “most general special topics 
 
 105. Cf. Post, supra note 32, at 19 (explaining that each form of argument “appeals to 
a different conception of constitutional authority”). 
 106. BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION, supra note 18, at 133 (noting 
Ely’s connection to previous structural theorists such as Chief Justice Marshall and Charles 
Black). 
 107. Alexander M. Bickel, Foreword: The Passive Virtues, 75 HARV. L. REV. 40 
(1961). 
 108. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE 
SUPREME COURT (1999). 
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about interpretation” from the many other special topics in 
American constitutional law. 
If we understand the modalities as special topics, much of 
Bobbitt’s theoretical system becomes unnecessary, as I will 
explain more fully in Part IV. In particular, we need not accept 
Bobbitt’s view that there are six and only six categories, and that 
they are incommensurable. Rhetorical topics do not have a fixed 
number, nor do they have natural boundaries. Topics are 
pragmatic classifications by people within a culture (or field of 
knowledge) of standard ways of analyzing problems and making 
arguments within the culture. A culture’s topoi are useful for 
persuasion precisely because they are common tools of analysis 
that reflect shared cultural assumptions. 
The list of topics in a given culture will grow and evolve as 
the culture grows and evolves. Moreover, depending on the 
problem before us, it might be helpful to divide up these topics in 
different ways. My list of topics is different than Bobbitt’s because 
his list is not very good for thinking about the different ways that 
lawyers use history, whereas I created mine specifically for that 
purpose. 
The evolution of special topics in constitutional law is the 
history of legal analysis and problem solving by people arguing 
about the Constitution. New doctrinal and theoretical categories 
are added all the time, while others fall into desuetude. But the 
most basic of these special topics—the modalities—have been 
with us from the beginning. 
B. THE COMMONPLACES OF CONSTITUTIONAL ARGUMENT 
I divide constitutional arguments into eleven different topoi 
or modalities.109 They represent eleven different ways that lawyers 
argue about the Constitution. They are distinctive because they 
presuppose eleven different but widely-shared theories—that is, 
commonplaces—about how to justify a constitutional 
interpretation. For the same reason, they offer eleven different 
ways to employ history in constitutional argument. 
Most lawyers’ arguments about the Constitution fall into the 
following basic categories: 
 
 109. The list of topics is taken from Balkin, supra note 2, at 659–61. 
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1. Arguments from text. These include arguments about 
definitions of the words and phrases in the text; arguments that 
compare and contrast different parts of the text; arguments that 
compare the text with other texts; and arguments that employ 
traditional canons of statutory interpretation. 
2. Arguments about constitutional structure and the 
structural logic of the constitutional system. These are arguments 
about how the constitutional system as a whole should operate 
and how the various parts of the system should interact with each 
other. These include arguments about the proper functioning of 
federalism, the separation of powers, democracy, and republican 
government. 
3. Arguments from purpose. These are arguments about the 
point or purpose of the Constitution. They include arguments 
about the purposes, intentions, and expectations of the people 
who lived at the time of the adoption of the Constitution and its 
subsequent amendments, as well as purposes attributed to the 
Constitution over time. 
4. Arguments from consequences. These are arguments about 
the likely consequences of interpreting the Constitution in one 
way rather than another. Arguments from consequences include 
arguments of institutional prudence: arguments that consider the 
political and practical consequences of a proposed interpretation 
(or implementing doctrine), the likely responses of other 
institutions or persons if the interpretation were accepted, and 
how well or how badly other actors will be likely to administer the 
interpretation in the future. 
5. Arguments from judicial precedent. These are arguments 
based on previous judicial decisions, about what is holding and 
what is dicta, about what is controlling authority and what is 
merely persuasive authority. They include familiar common law 
arguments for distinguishing cases, generalizing from cases, 
reasoning from case to case, and reasoning by analogy. 
Arguments from precedent include arguments based on the 
doctrinal topics that previous precedents generate. As a result, 
arguments from judicial precedent collectively form a very large 
family of topics and subtopics. 
6. Arguments from political convention. These are arguments 
about political conventions and settlements that arise within 
institutions or branches of government (for example, within the 
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Executive Branch); or among institutions or branches of 
government (for example, conventions that arise between the 
Executive Branch and Congress). 
7. Arguments from the people’s customs and lived 
experience. These arguments consider the public’s customs, 
expectations, and ways of life and whether a proposed 
interpretation of the Constitution will conform to, vindicate, 
assist, defy, or disrupt them. 
8. Arguments from natural law or natural rights. These 
arguments concern rights that governments exist to secure and 
protect (natural rights); as well as arguments about what kinds of 
laws are necessary to protect human flourishing (natural law). 
9. Arguments from national ethos. Arguments from ethos 
appeal to the character of the nation and its institutions and to 
important, widely shared and widely honored values of 
Americans and American culture. 
10. Arguments from political tradition. Arguments from 
political tradition appeal to cultural memory, to the meaning of 
key events in American political history, and to the lessons to be 
drawn from those events. 
11. Arguments from honored authority. Arguments from 
honored authority appeal to the values, beliefs, and examples of 
culture heroes in American life. Examples of culture heroes 
include the founders as a group and key founders like George 
Washington and James Madison; or important historical figures 
like Abraham Lincoln or Martin Luther King. 
Because the modalities are topics, one of their central 
purposes is to help us analyze situations and create arguments. 
One can think of these modalities as a checklist, a series of 
questions that a lawyer or law student might run through to 
analyze a case or a constitutional question. Accordingly, I have 
divided up the arguments in a way that makes it easy for a lawyer, 
judge, or law student to run through them in search of things to 
say. 
In many cases, an argument might reasonably fall into more 
than one category: structural arguments, for example, are often 
also either arguments about constitutional purposes or arguments 
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about consequences. Moreover, many originalist arguments are 
hybrids that simultaneously employ more than one category.110 
One could expand the list of topics further, or combine or 
divide the classes of arguments differently. For example, one 
might separate arguments from natural law from arguments from 
natural rights. Conversely, one might group different categories 
together. Consider the last three topics, 9 through 11: arguments 
from ethos, political tradition, and honored authority. These 
arguments are especially important to lawyers’ use of history; 
many arguments that invoke history are (also) arguments from 
ethos, political tradition, and honored authority.111 Because these 
categories appeal to cultural memory and to the social meaning of 
persons and events, the three categories tend to fade into each 
other. Hence, one might group them together and refer to them 
collectively as arguments from ethos, tradition, and honored 
authority. Then there would be nine topics rather than eleven. 
C. TOPICS AS IMPLICIT THEORIES OF JUSTIFICATION 
How one divides up arguments into topics depends on what 
one is trying to achieve. I divide classes of arguments according to 
their implicit theories of justification. Each modality refers to a 
different theory about why a particular kind of argument furthers 
and implements the Constitution.112 
Earlier I noted that the many special topics are 
commonplaces—widely accepted premises in a culture that 
people use to justify their positions. The modalities of 
constitutional argument rest on commonplaces about 
constitutional interpretation. Each modality offers an implicit 
theory for why arguments of a certain kind should be accepted as 
valid or as persuasive when people interpret the Constitution, and 
why such arguments further the Constitution and are faithful to 
the Constitution. The reason why people think it is appropriate to 
make arguments from text in interpreting the Constitution are 
different from the reasons why they believe it is appropriate to 
make arguments from structure or consequences, for example. 
Hence, we can restate each of the modalities in terms of a 
commonplace theory of justification: 
 
 110. Id. at 652–53, 700. 
 111. Id. at 672–679. 
 112. Id. at 651–52, 658–59, 664. 
1 - BALKIN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 7/21/18 3:15 PM 
186 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 33:145 
 
1. Arguments from text: One should interpret a written 
Constitution consistent with the meaning of its text and inferences 
that can reasonably be drawn from the text. 
2. Arguments from constitutional structure: One should 
interpret the Constitution according to its structural logic and 
consistent with the proper operation and interaction of the 
different parts of the constitutional system; conversely, an 
interpretation is improper if it undermines the structural logic of 
the system and the proper operation or interaction of its various 
parts. 
3. Arguments from purpose: One should interpret the 
Constitution according to its purposes, including the purposes, 
goals, understandings, and expectations of those who drafted, 
adopted, or ratified it. 
4. Arguments from consequences: Where the constitutional 
text is otherwise unclear, ambiguous, or vague, one should 
interpret the Constitution so as to produce the best consequences; 
moreover, in implementing the Constitution, one should consider 
the political and practical consequences of a proposed 
interpretation, how other actors will administer it, and the likely 
responses of other institutions or persons. 
5. Arguments from judicial precedent: In interpreting the 
Constitution, one should follow, develop, and apply existing 
doctrines according to the rule of law, general and impartial 
reasons, and the practices of judicial precedent. 
6. Arguments from political convention. All other things 
being equal, in interpreting the Constitution, one should defer to 
settled precedents, practices, and conventions within and among 
the political branches. 
7. Arguments from custom and lived experience: All other 
things being equal, interpretations of the Constitution should be 
guided by the customs, expectations, and ways of life of those who 
live under it; conversely, interpretations that disrupt or 
undermine people’s expectations, customs, and ways of life should 
be suspect. 
8. Arguments from natural law or natural rights: One should 
interpret the Constitution to protect those rights that 
governments are or should be instituted to preserve and protect; 
one should interpret the Constitution consistent with the 
requirements of human flourishing and human nature. 
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9. Arguments from national ethos: One should interpret the 
Constitution consistent with the character of the nation and its 
institutions and with important, widely shared and widely 
honored values of Americans and American culture. 
10. Arguments from political tradition: One should interpret 
the Constitution consistent with the values of the American 
political tradition and the meaning and lessons of important 
events in American history. 
11. Arguments from honored authority: In interpreting the 
Constitution, one should look to the values, statements, and 
examples of honored figures in American life, including the 
Founding generation and important historical figures like George 
Washington and Abraham Lincoln who symbolize American 
values and teach valuable lessons. 
D. DIFFERENCES IN CLASSIFICATION 
My focus on underlying theories of justification explains the 
differences between my list of eleven common topics and 
Bobbitt’s and Fallon’s topic catalogs. In some cases, I classify 
arguments differently. For example, Bobbitt does not treat 
arguments from original meaning as textual arguments; textual 
arguments, he says, concern only contemporary meaning.113 He 
also does not accept as valid constitutional arguments based on 
natural rights or natural law.114 I disagree on both counts. In other 
cases, Bobbitt’s and Fallon’s lists do not crisply distinguish 
between what I consider to be quite different theories of 
justification. For example, Bobbitt’s modality of “doctrinal” 
argument appears to lump together appeals to judicial doctrine—
which gain their authority from rule-of-law values—with 
arguments from political settlements and interbranch 
conventions, social customs, and cultural traditions.115 In my view, 
 
 113. BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE, supra note 18, at 26. 
 114. Bobbitt, Reflections, supra note 18, at 1911, 1913, 1916–17. 
 115. This is because in each situation the interpreter crafts a set of applicable rules or 
principles out of past practices; for example, one might infer the existence of an 
interbranch convention by noting how Congress and the President have interacted in 
certain situations over long periods of time. See BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL 
INTERPRETATION supra note 18, at 78–79 (“The most important doctrinal approach … is 
not one simply applying a test from precedent, but, . . . crafting a test from precedential 
materials.”). 
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each of these arguments rest on different kinds of justifications.116 
Fallon has two fairly capacious categories in his list: arguments 
from “theory” and arguments from “value.”117 These categories, 
as Fallon himself recognizes, comprehend a wide array of 
different and potentially incompatible justifications.118 
A second reason why my list of topics looks different from 
Bobbitt’s and Fallon’s is that their catalogs are not very good at 
explaining how lawyers use history in constitutional 
interpretation. When it came to history, Bobbitt and Fallon were 
heavily influenced by the debates over originalism that were just 
getting started in the early 1980s. Each of them described a 
category of “historical” arguments, but they identified arguments 
from history with arguments about the intentions or 
understandings of the framers.119 
By speaking in this way, they encouraged people to think that 
historical arguments were just arguments about adoption history, 
and, in particular, arguments about original understanding or 
original intentions. Each of them associated historical argument 
with originalism, and originalism with historical argument. Given 
the debates that were roiling law schools at the time, this may have 
been an excusable oversight. But it fostered unnecessary 
confusion. 
First, lawyers use history in many other ways than simply 
inquiring into original intention or original understanding. 
 
 116.  It is also possible, as Ernest Young has urged, that none of Bobbitt’s modalities 
actually covers customs, conventions, settlements, or other nonjudicial precedents. See 
Ernest A. Young, Our Prescriptive Judicial Power: Constitutive and Entrenchment Effects 
of Historical Practice In Federal Courts Law, 58 WM. & MARY L. REV. 535, 546–47 (2016). 
 117. Fallon, Constructivist Coherence, supra note 99, at 1200–02 (describing different 
types of arguments from constitutional theory); cf. id. at 1204–09 (describing a wide range 
of different kinds of philosophical theories that might generate arguments from value). 
 118. Id. 
 119. BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE, supra note 18, at 9 (defining “[h]istorical 
arguments” as those which “depend on a determination of the original understanding of 
the constitutional provision to be construed”); BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL 
INTERPRETATION, supra note 18, at 13 (“A[] historical modality may be attributed to 
constitutional arguments that claim that the framers and ratifiers [of a constitutional 
provision] intended, or did not intend . . . .”); id. (“Historical, or ‘originalist’ approaches to 
construing the text . . . are distinctive in their reference back to what a particular provision 
is thought to have meant to its ratifiers.”). Similarly, Richard Fallon’s list of constitutional 
arguments refers to “[a]rguments of historical intent,” which he identified with “the intent 
of the framers.” Fallon, Constructivist Coherence, supra note 99, at 1244, 1254. Both 
Bobbitt and Fallon wrote at a time when the focus of originalist theory was shifting from 
original intention and understanding to original meaning. 
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Lawyers look to post-adoption history as well as adoption history. 
And when they look to history, they are not always trying to 
discover commands in the past that bind us in the present. For 
lawyers, history may serve as a negative example rather than a 
positive command. It may explain how things came to be. It may 
emphasize what has changed and how different the past is from 
the present. 
Second, calling a certain class of originalist arguments 
“historical” arguments tends to suggest that originalism is the only 
approach to constitutional law that is genuinely “historical,” and 
that those who reject originalist arguments also reject a historical 
approach. That has never been the case. 
Third, identifying historical arguments with arguments from 
original intent encouraged the idea that “originalism” is centrally 
about discovering original intentions. But even as Bobbitt and 
Fallon wrote, originalism was changing, and most originalists 
today focus on original public meaning rather than original 
intentions. 
Fourth, Bobbitt’s and Fallon’s lists suggested that 
originalism, i.e., “historical” argument, was a single, distinctive 
mode of argument. But originalism is actually a large family of 
competing theories, not a single theory. In addition, there is not a 
single style of argument called “originalist” argument. Lawyers 
use adoption history to make originalist arguments that employ 
each of the standard modalities of constitutional argument.120 
Perhaps the most important difference between my list of 
arguments and Bobbitt’s and Fallon’s is that there is no separate 
class of “historical” arguments. That is not because no forms of 
argument use history; rather, it is because all of them can use 
history and usually do. Each mode of justification makes different 
kinds of history relevant, and shapes the way that lawyers search 
for, describe and use history. 
For each modality of constitutional argument—text, 
structure, purpose, consequences, and so on—there is a different 
way to use history. Because I divide arguments into eleven 
different categories, it follows that there are (at least) eleven 
different distinctive uses of history in constitutional argument. 
 
 120. Balkin, The New Originalism and the Uses of History, supra note 2, at 691–707. 
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One can compare Bobbitt and Fallon’s approach with mine 
using these two diagrams:121 
 
Figure 1: Modalities of Constitutional Argument 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Bobbitt’s model of modalities of constitutional argument. 
 
 
In Bobbitt’s model, historical argument is a separate 
modality: it concerns Framers’ intent or understanding, and 
focuses on the history of adoption. Note also that arguments from 
judicial precedent, tradition, political convention, and custom are 
treated as a single type of argument. 
 
Figure 2: Historical Argument in Constitutional 
Construction 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A basic model of styles of argument in constitutional construction. 
 
 121. Id. at 661. 
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By contrast, my catalogue of topics classifies and separates 
arguments according to different ways of justifying a position. 
Note that there is no separate modality of historical argument; 
instead, history is available to support each style of justification. 
Moreover, history is not limited to the Framers’ intentions, 
meanings, or understandings; no distinction is made between 
adoption and nonadoption history. 
E. THE MODALITIES ARE INCOMPLETELY THEORIZED 
JUSTIFICATIONS 
The standard topics that lawyers use in constitutional 
argument are useful because they rest on commonplaces about 
constitutional interpretation—their underlying theories of 
justification are widely accepted. In fact, these theories are widely 
accepted only when stated in the most general way—for example, 
that “one should follow the text.” Lawyers often disagree about 
theories of interpretation, about which kinds of considerations are 
the most important, and about how to justify constitutional 
claims. These disagreements are also part of legal culture and of 
the practice of constitutional argument. 
First, as one can see from the above list, the implicit 
justifications underlying the modalities are fairly shallow and 
undeveloped. That is often true of rhetorical commonplaces. They 
are widely accepted precisely because people don’t think very 
deeply about why they are so. 
Second, people might disagree about the scope and the 
boundaries of these widely shared theories. Everyone might agree 
that one should follow the text. But people might disagree about 
what constitutes a valid argument from the text. Some people 
(like Bobbitt himself) might argue that textual arguments concern 
only the contemporary meaning of the text;122 others might insist 
that the only legitimate arguments from the text concern its 
original meaning. (In my view, both qualify as textual arguments, 
although contemporary meanings are only relevant to 
construction.) Some people might argue that one must interpret 
the constitutional text as an ordinary person would understand 
 
 122. BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE, supra note 18, at 25–26. 
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it;123 while others might insist that the text must be read in the way 
that a well-trained lawyer (at the time of adoption) would read 
it.124 All of these contrasting views fall within the general class of 
textual argument. 
Arguments from text usually include arguments that employ 
familiar canons of construction. But people might disagree about 
the nature and scope of these canons. They might disagree about 
whether the canons of interpretation can be conclusive, especially 
because in many cases canons have counter-canons. People might 
distinguish between canons that are default assumptions or 
common-sense assumptions about how to read language, and 
other, more substantive canons of construction, which state a 
preference for certain kinds of policies where the text is unclear. 
(An example is the rule of lenity in criminal law.) Linguistic and 
grammatical canons, they might argue, should be included as part 
of textual argument, but not substantive canons. Finally, people 
might disagree about which canons are appropriate or legitimate 
in constitutional interpretation and about the best way to state 
and apply them. For example, some people might argue that 
canons that are appropriate for statutes, wills, contracts, or 
treaties are not appropriate for constitutional interpretation 
because constitutions have a different nature than these other 
legal documents. One could find similar disagreements within 
each of the modalities. 
Third, even if people agree that a particular form of 
argument is valid, they might still disagree about why it is valid. 
Take arguments from purpose. At the most general level, most 
lawyers might agree that lawyers should interpret the 
Constitution according to its purposes. But there might be many 
different competing theories explaining why people should 
interpret according to purpose. Disagreements about why one 
should interpret according to purpose, in turn, may connect to 
disagreements about what kinds of purposes should count as 
 
 123. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 576–77 (2008) (“In interpreting this 
text, we are to be guided by the principle that ‘[t]he Constitution was written to be 
understood by the voters; its words and phrases were used in their natural and ordinary as 
distinguished from technical meaning.’”). 
 124. John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Original Methods Originalism: A 
New Theory of Interpretation and the Case Against Construction, 103 NW. U.L. REV. 751, 
770–72 (2009) (arguing that it is “mistaken” to apply the meanings of ordinary persons 
rather the meanings of well-trained lawyers, who can explain the Constitution’s operation 
to the public). 
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relevant. For example, people might disagree about whose 
purposes are relevant (framers, adopters, the general public). 
People might disagree about whether one should look to actual 
beliefs or merely to a constructed purpose inferred from the text. 
Finally, people might disagree about the level of generality at 
which to state purposes or intentions. Each of these 
disagreements about the scope of arguments from purpose may 
reflect deeper theoretical disagreements about why purpose 
counts in interpreting the Constitution. 
In his work on legal reasoning, Cass Sunstein explains the 
phenomenon of “incompletely theorized agreements.”125 He 
notes that people with very different moral or political theories 
can still converge on what he called “narrow” or “shallow” 
agreements on substantive issues.126 Commonplaces in rhetoric 
operate in an analogous way. Topics like the modalities allow 
people with very different theories of legal authority to use 
common forms of argument to make legal arguments that are 
comprehensible (and potentially persuasive) to each other. 
People don’t have to completely agree about the scope of textual 
arguments or even why textual arguments are valid in order to 
make them. People can switch from abstract to concrete accounts 
of purpose as they move from case to case; they can offer 
arguments about constitutional structure without agreeing in all 
respects on the correct theory of constitutional structure, and so 
on. Hence, we might call the theories of justification associated 
with the modalities incompletely theorized justifications. 
The difference from Sunstein’s model is that we are not 
converging on specific substantive conclusions in constitutional 
law, but rather on ways of arguing for particular positions in 
constitutional law.127 Under Sunstein’s account, for example, most 
lawyers can agree that racial discrimination violates the 
Constitution, but still disagree about what constitutes racial 
discrimination and the reasons why discrimination violates the 
Constitution. My point is that most lawyers will agree that 
arguments from purpose are a valid way to justify a constitutional 
 
 125. Cass R. Sunstein, Incompletely Theorized Agreements, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1733 
(1995). 
 126. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE 
SUPREME COURT 10–11 (1999). 
 127. Sunstein, supra note 125, at 1734–37 (explaining that incompletely theorized 
agreements refer to agreements about outcomes or results, backed by different 
justifications). 
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interpretation, but they may still disagree about what constitutes 
a valid argument from purpose and why we should accept these 
arguments. The modalities offer a common language for lawyers 
both to persuade others and to disagree with them. 
There is one other important difference: Sunstein offered the 
idea of incompletely theorized agreements to explain why judges 
should make minimalist decisions—decisions that are either 
narrow in their scope or shallow in their theoretical 
ramifications.128 But the incompletely theorized justifications we 
find in constitutional topics do not give us any particular reason 
for adopting minimalism. One can use the very same modalities 
to argue for maximalist positions as well as minimalist positions. 
Rather, we should understand Sunstein’s argument for judicial 
minimalism as itself an example of how lawyers use rhetorical 
topics in making theoretical claims. Sunstein’s argument for 
judicial minimalism is an argument of institutional prudence that 
asserts that a minimalist approach to interpretation will have the 
best consequences. 
F. THE MODALITIES, ORIGINAL LEGAL METHODS, AND 
ORIGINAL LAW 
Constitutional construction uses the commonplaces of 
constitutional argument. These commonplaces originate in the 
common law at the time of the Founding. Bobbitt pointed out that 
“we have the modalities we do because the Anglo-Americans 
took the forms of argument at common law and superimposed 
these on the state when they imposed a written, limiting 
constitution on the state.”129 
This claim connects my arguments about the use of topics in 
constitutional construction with two alternative versions of 
originalism. The first is original legal methods originalism, 
championed by John McGinnis and Michael Rappaport;130 the 
second is original law originalism, introduced by William Baude 
and Stephen Sachs.131 
 
 128. SUNSTEIN, supra note 126, at ix–xiii, 4–6. 
 129. Bobbitt, Reflections, supra note 18, at 1891. 
 130. MCGINNIS & RAPPAPORT, supra note 10. 
 131. See William Baude & Stephen E. Sachs, The Law of Interpretation, 130 HARV L. 
REV. 1079 (2017); William Baude, Is Originalism Our Law?, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 2349 
(2015); Stephen E. Sachs, Originalism as a Theory of Legal Change, 38 HARV. J. L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 817 (2015). 
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McGinnis and Rappaport argue that we should interpret the 
Constitution according to the original legal methods that lawyers 
at the time of adoption would have used; we should use the 
methods of 1787 for the original Constitution, the methods of the 
1860s for the Reconstruction Amendments, and so on.132 
In Living Originalism, I offered several criticisms of this 
approach. Drawing on the work of several historians of the 
Founding era, I pointed out that there may have been no 
consensus about the interpretive methods that people should use 
to interpret the new Constitution, because nothing like the 1787 
Constitution had been enacted before, and there was some 
dispute whether the proper analogy was to contracts, trusts, wills, 
treaties, or previous state constitutions.133 There was also a 
dispute about whether the text, or parts of the text, should be 
interpreted as ordinary language accessible to citizens or as 
specialized legal language.134 A final problem is that McGinnis 
and Rappaport were trying to set out the basic theory of original 
legal methods rather than give a detailed account. Although they 
offered a few suggestions based on readings of Blackstone and 
other authors,135 they did not attempt serious historical research 
into discovering the original legal methods of 1789, much less the 
 
 132. MCGINNIS & RAPPAPORT, supra note 10, at 116, 138 (“If enactors of subsequent 
amendments deemed other rules applicable to those amendments, those interpretive rules 
would apply.”). 
 133. See Saul Cornell, The People’s Constitution vs. The Lawyers’ Constitution: 
Popular Constitutionalism and the Original Debate over Originalism, 23 YALE J.L. & 
HUMAN. 295 (2011); Larry Kramer, Two (More) Problems with Originalism, 31 HARV. 
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 907, 912–13 (2008); Caleb Nelson, Originalism and Interpretive 
Conventions, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 519, 555–56, 561, 571–73 (2003); BALKIN, LIVING 
ORIGINALISM, supra note 2, at 47 n. 18, 353–56. See also Kurt T. Lash, Originalism All the 
Way Down?, 30 CONST. COMMENT. 149, 161 (2015) (reviewing MCGINNIS & RAPPAPORT, 
supra note 10) (denying that there were pre-existing methods for interpreting the new 
federal Constitution, because no such constitution had ever existed before). 
 134. Compare Cornell, supra note 133, at 304–05 and LARRY D. KRAMER, THE 
PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 6–7 
(2004) (arguing for popular understandings) with MCGINNIS & RAPPAPORT, supra note 
10, at 130–32 (arguing that lawyers’ understandings count over popular understandings) 
and John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, The Constitution and the Language of the 
Law (2017) (San Diego Legal Studies Paper No. 17-262), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2928936 (arguing that most of the 
Constitution’s language involves legal terms of art). See also Baude & Sachs, The Law of 
Interpretation, supra note 131, at 1141–42 (arguing that the question of whether elite 
lawyers’ interpretive rules control is itself a legal question.). 
 135. MCGINNIS & RAPPAPORT, supra note 10, at 133–38. 
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original legal methods of 1865, 1868, and so on.136 Nor did they 
take into account the possibility of serious differences in 
perspective between 18th and 21st century lawyers in how they 
understood the practice of interpretation.137 Instead, McGinnis 
and Rappaport assumed that even though they were 21st century 
lawyers, the practices of 18th century lawyers were sufficiently 
intelligible to them that they could understand and reproduce the 
same moves that these lawyers made. 
Despite these concerns, I did share one point of agreement 
with McGinnis and Rappaport. I noted that if all they meant by 
“original legal methods” were the standard forms of legal 
argument inherited from the common law, there would be a great 
deal of convergence between their views on constitutional 
interpretation and my views on constitutional construction.138 In 
Living Originalism, I argued that in constitutional construction, 
lawyers should use familiar common-law modalities of 
argument.139 In fact, the only examples of original legal methods 
that McGinnis and Rappaport identified in their 2013 book 
Originalism and the Good Constitution were common law 
modalities: arguments about the original meaning of the text, 
arguments from canons of statutory construction, arguments from 
structure, and arguments from purpose or intention.140 
McGinnis and Rappaport deny that there is any evidence of 
construction in the Founding period;141 yet at the same time, they 
point to evidence that lawyers used standard common-law forms 
of argument—the very techniques that I assert are used in 
 
 136. Id. at 133 (“We do not have space to provide a comprehensive account of the 
original interpretive rules.”); id. at 138 (assuming no significant changes in interpretive 
rules at least until the beginning of the 20th century). 
 137. See, e.g., JONATHAN GIENAPP, THE SECOND CREATION: FIXING THE 
AMERICAN CONSTITUTION IN THE FOUNDING ERA (forthcoming 2018). 
 138. Jack M. Balkin, Nine Perspectives on Living Originalism, U. ILL. L. REV. 815, 
824–25 (2012). 
 139. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM, supra note 2, at 4, 46, 89, 129, 205, 229, 256–57, 
272, 333, 341–42 (explaining that in constitutional interpretation and constitutional 
construction interpreters should use all of the traditional modalities of constitutional 
argument). 
 140. MCGINNIS & RAPPAPORT, supra note 10, at 133–38 (arguing that original 
methods included textualism and intentionalism); id. at 142 (“When the interpretation of 
language was unclear, the interpreter would consider the relevant originalist evidence—
evidence based on text, structure, history, and intent—and select the interpretation that 
was supported more strongly by that evidence.”). 
 141. Id. at 144–45 (citing to Blackstone and Joseph Story). 
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constitutional construction! This suggests that our approaches 
have more in common than one might think. 
The central difference between our approaches, I think, does 
not concern original legal methods but original legal meanings. 
McGinnis and Rappaport argue that the Constitution is a lawyer’s 
document, and that most of its language involves legal 
terminology.142 Accordingly, they ask how 18th century lawyers, 
applying original legal methods, would have understood and 
applied the legal meaning of the Constitution. They assume that 
in most cases lawyers would have converged on a single legal 
meaning of the Constitution’s words and phrases.143 They argue 
that this professional legal meaning does not change over time, 
although, of course, it may produce unexpected results given 
changes in facts. By contrast, I argue that we are not bound by 
Founding-era lawyers’ initial constructions of the text, although 
their constructions should surely inform our own. Rather, each 
generation must engage in construction of the text, building on 
the constructions of previous generations dating back to the time 
of adoption.144 
Should we conclude that the above list of eleven topics 
constitute original legal methods or are part of original legal 
methods? I want to make a more modest claim: These eleven 
topics are the descendants in contemporary legal practice of the 
various methods that Founding-era lawyers used to argue with 
each other. We can trace examples of these topics back to the 
Founding, and for that matter, to Reconstruction. Lawyers may 
employ these arguments in different ways today than they did at 
the Founding. But I maintain that there is nothing inappropriate 
about lawyers using contemporary versions of these topics in 
interpreting the Constitution today. 
I offer this more modest claim for two reasons. First, I expect 
that as historical research proceeds, we will find considerable 
differences between how we think about law, legal argument and 
constitutions today and the way that lawyers at the Founding (or 
 
 142. McGinnis & Rappaport, The Constitution and the Language of the Law, supra 
note 134. 
 143. MCGINNIS & RAPPAPORT, supra note 10, at 140 (“[T]he evidence suggests that 
ambiguity and vagueness were resolved by considering interpretive rules that resulted in a 
single interpretive meaning.”). 
 144. See, e.g., BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM, supra note 2, at 227–28 (arguing that we 
do not have to accept lawyers’ initial constructions of the Reconstruction Amendments on 
questions of race). 
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Reconstruction) did.145 Second, I believe that even if our practices 
of argument have changed in important respects, it is still 
perfectly legitimate to apply them in constitutional construction. 
That is because these contemporary methods are part of our 
contemporary “law of interpretation,” to use Baude and Sachs’ 
phrase.146 
Even without extensive historical research, we have at least 
some evidence that the way lawyers used common topics at the 
Founding may not correspond in all respects to the way that 
people would use them today. 
Three examples will illustrate the point. First, H. Jefferson 
Powell famously argued that the Founding generation, following 
British practice, did not make arguments from legislative 
intention; rather, they made arguments about the purpose or 
intent of a statute drawing from the text of the statute.147 A few 
arguments based on the original intention of the framers or the 
understanding of the ratifiers did appear in the 1790s; for 
example, in the debate over the Jay Treaty.148 Today, however, 
arguments from original intention are commonplace. Arguments 
from original intention and legislative history are subtopics of the 
larger class of arguments from purpose and intention. These 
subtopics became commonplaces in constitutional argument only 
after the Founding. Even so, I would count them as valid forms of 
argument in constitutional construction today. 
Second, although the Founding era certainly knew how to 
make arguments from consequences, a certain class of arguments, 
namely arguments about judicial prudence and restraint, develop 
during the first half of the 20th century. Such arguments are most 
famously associated with progressive Justices like Frankfurter 
and Brandeis (for example, in Ashwander v. TVA).149 Founding-
era lawyers had arguments that we might today call arguments for 
judicial restraint, but they were based on a different conception of 
 
 145. GIENAPP, THE SECOND CREATION, supra note 137. 
 146. See supra note 131. 
 147. H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARV. L. 
REV. 885, 897–98, 903 (1985). 
 148. JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING 
OF THE CONSTITUTION 360–65 (1996). 
 149. Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 341 (1936) (Brandeis, J. concurring); BOBBITT, 
CONSTITUTIONAL FATE, supra note 18, at 64–67; BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL 
INTERPRETATION, supra note 18, at 101–02. 
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the judicial role.150 We speak of judicial restraint today precisely 
because the role of the judiciary has evolved from the Founding 
era.151 The modern subtopics of judicial restraint and institutional 
prudence become common topics in constitutional law many 
years after the Founding; even so, I consider them valid 
arguments in contemporary constitutional construction. 
Third, arguments that employ public choice theory or 
political science literatures on representation and voting systems 
are subtopics within structural argument: they show how different 
kinds of institutional designs have different kinds of effects for 
republican government. But the framers did not have access to 
this literature and they did not use this terminology, even though, 
of course, we may attempt to translate the arguments they did 
make into contemporary political science terminology. These 
subtopics developed long after the Founding. But this makes them 
no less valid for constitutional construction today. (The same is 
true of many doctrinal topics—for example, Youngstown analysis, 
and the idea of representation reinforcement made famous by 
footnote 4 of Carolene Products).152 
We can generalize this point. Because special topics in law 
(or the sciences) inevitably rest on the growth of professional 
knowledge, the number and kind of subtopics may evolve as 
knowledge develops. Hence many subtopics in common use today 
would have been unknown at the Founding, but they are valid 
arguments in constitutional construction today. 
How lawyers make arguments today may not correspond in 
all respects to the way that lawyers made arguments at the 
Founding precisely because Founding-era lawyers lived in a 
different world with a different set of assumptions about the law 
(including the common law), the nature of constitutions, and the 
nature of government.153 They tended to speak in terms of 
 
 150. See, e.g., SYLVIA SNOWISS, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE LAW OF THE 
CONSTITUTION 34–38 (1990). 
 151. Larry D. Kramer, The Supreme Court 2000 Term - Foreword: We the Court, 115 
HARV. L. REV. 5, 120–23 (2001) (arguing that the modern conception of judicial restraint 
emerged during the New Deal period from the acceptance of a very powerful Court that 
was effectively supreme in the field of constitutional interpretation, in contrast to the 
Founding-era model of departmentalism and popular constitutionalism). 
 152. Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 636–38 (1952) 
(Jackson, J., concurring); United States v. Carolene Prod. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 
(1938). 
 153. GIENAPP, THE SECOND CREATION, supra note 137. 
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discovering what the common law always already required; today 
we speak of developing the common law in a principled fashion. 
What an argument meant to them in the context of their times 
might not be what it means to us in the context of our own. The 
way we argue today has evolved in legal practice from the kind of 
arguments that earlier lawyers made; even so, these changes in 
jurisprudential outlook do not render our common topics invalid 
for contemporary construction. 
William Baude and Stephen Sachs’s conception of original 
law originalism is closer to this position. They argue that 
interpreters should apply the law at the time of the Founding, the 
legal methods that existed at the time of the Founding, and the 
common law legal doctrines of interpretation that existed at the 
time of the Founding. But they add that interpreters should also 
apply any legitimate changes in law, in legal methods, or in the 
law of interpretation that have occurred since the Founding.154 
Like McGinnis and Rappaport, Baude and Sachs have not yet 
attempted a thorough historical study of the original legal 
methods, or the original law of interpretation at the Founding. 
Nor have they done significant historical research into all of the 
moments of change in interpretive rules that have occurred since 
the Founding and whether each of these changes were legitimate. 
Instead, they appear to work on the assumption that unless there 
is evidence to the contrary, contemporary lawyers are using the 
legitimate descendants of original legal methods and the original 
law of interpretation.155 They operate on a defeasible presumption 
of continuity and legitimacy. 
 
 154. See Baude & Sachs, The Law of Interpretation, supra note 131, at 1127 (arguing 
that canons of interpretation apply if they existed at the Founding or resulted from 
legitimate changes in interpretive rules since the Founding); see also id. at 1130 (“[A]t a 
first approximation, we’d say that the appropriate theory of construction is simply to apply 
the law of interpretation.”). Baude and Sachs argue that some kinds of interpretive 
practices are “application rules,” because they explain what future decisionmakers should 
do at the time of application. Id. at 1133. Because they operate at the time of application 
and not at the time the text is enacted, “a change to an application rule can have full effect 
in all future cases to which the rule applies, even if they involve texts that were adopted 
long ago.” Id. at 1134. According to this account, to the extent that topics for construction 
involve application rules, even if they change over time, interpreters may still use them to 
apply the Constitution to new fact situations. 
 155.  See id. at 1132 (suggesting that if the interpretive rules are understood correctly, 
there may have been much less change than one might imagine.). 
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G. THE TOPICS IN JAMES MADISON’S SPEECH ON THE FIRST 
BANK OF THE UNITED STATES 
The casebook that I co-edit with Sanford Levinson, Akhil 
Amar, and Reva Siegel emphasizes the role of the modalities in 
interpreting the Constitution.156 We begin the book with James 
Madison’s 1791 speech on the constitutionality of the First Bank 
of the United States.157 We do so precisely because it mentions so 
many of the modalities. Madison’s speech is useful not merely 
because he is a famous founder, but because of what his speech 
reveals about the practice of constitutional argument at the 
Founding. Madison’s speech relies on commonplaces about 
interpretation; he assumed that he and his audience shared many 
assumptions about how to analyze a constitutional problem and 
make a constitutional argument. Here are the principles that 
Madison says we should consider in interpreting the Constitution: 
[1] An interpretation that destroys the very characteristic of the 
Government cannot be just. 
[2] Where the meaning is clear, the consequences, whatever 
they may be, are to be admitted—where doubtful, it is fairly 
triable by its consequences. 
[3] In controverted cases, the meaning of the parties to the 
instrument, if to be collected by reasonable evidence, is a 
proper guide. 
[4] Contemporary and concurrent expositions are a reasonable 
evidence of the meaning of the parties. 
[5] In admitting or rejecting a constructive authority, not only 
the degree of its incidentality to an express authority is to be 
regarded, but the degree of its importance also; since on this 
will depend the probability or improbability of its being left to 
construction.158 
Proposition (1) describes structural argument; (2) an 
argument from consequences; (3) and (4) could be arguments 
from text or from purpose and intention; and (5) is a subspecies 
of structural argument resting on the idea that the federal 
government is one of limited and enumerated powers. 
 
 156. BREST ET AL., PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING (7th ed. 
2018). 
 157. Id. at 29–32 (reprinting James Madison’s Speech to the House of Representatives 
(1791), in JAMES MADISON, WRITINGS 480–90 (Jack Rakove ed., 1999)). 
 158. Id. at 29. 
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Textual arguments include arguments that compare different 
parts of the text as well as arguments from widely shared canons 
of construction. Later in his speech, Madison employs common 
law canons of construction to argue that we cannot imply the 
power to create a bank from enumerated powers like the Coinage 
Clause.159 Madison uses the canon of redundancy—that, all other 
things being equal, we should not interpret a text so that its 
provisions are unnecessary or redundant.160 This canon counsels 
against the argument that Congress has whatever powers might 
be related to or implied by the list of enumerated powers, because 
a broad reading of implied Congressional power would make 
several of the enumerated powers redundant: “Congress have 
power ‘to regulate the value of money’; yet it is expressly added, 
not left to be implied, that counterfeiters may be punished.” 
Similarly, “[t]he regulation and calling out of militia are more 
appurtenant to war than the proposed Bank to borrowing; yet the 
former is not left to construction.”161 
Madison also makes arguments from purpose and intention 
to explain the proper interpretation of the necessary and proper 
clause: “The clause is in fact merely declaratory of what would 
have resulted by unavoidable implication, as the appropriate, and, 
as it were, technical means of executing those powers. In this sense 
it has been explained by the friends of the Constitution, and 
ratified by the State Conventions.”162 He also points to the Ninth 
and Tenth Amendments as concurrent expositions that provide 
evidence of the adopters’ purpose to restrict federal power.163 
Madison also rejects the argument for a broad reading of 
implied powers because of its consequences: “If implications, thus 
remote and thus multiplied, can be linked together, a chain may 
be formed that will reach every object of legislation, every object 
within the whole compass of political economy.”164 
Madison also mentions arguments from precedent, or more 
correctly, from previous practice by the political branches, 
working under the assumption that the new Constitution gives 
 
 159. Id. at 30. 
 160. John M. Golden, Redundancy: When Law Repeats Itself, 94 TEX. L. REV. 629 
(2016) (discussing the interpretive principle “that law should generally be understood or 
designed to minimize redundancy”). 
 161. BREST ET AL., supra note 156, at 30. 
 162. Id. 
 163. Id. at 32. 
 164. Id. at 30. 
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Congress all of the powers it enjoyed in the Articles of 
Confederation: “The case of the Bank established by the former 
Congress has been cited as a precedent.”165 But Madison argues 
that it is not an appropriate precedent: “This was known, he said, 
to have been the child of necessity. It never could be justified by 
the regular powers of the articles of Confederation.”166 
Madison concludes his speech with a flurry of different 
modes of argument: “It appeared on the whole, he concluded, that 
the power exercised by the bill was condemned by the silence of 
the constitution [text]; was condemned by the rule of 
interpretation arising out of the constitution [same]; was 
condemned by its tendency to destroy the main characteristic of 
the constitution [structure]; was condemned by the expositions of 
the friends of the constitution [to] the public [purpose or 
intention]; was condemned by the apparent intention of the 
parties which ratified the constitution [same]; was condemned by 
the explanatory amendments proposed by Congress themselves 
to the Constitution [same]; and he hoped it would receive its final 
condemnation, by the vote of this house.”167 
If we look to early decisions of the Supreme Court, we will 
find the other modalities of argument. Calder v. Bull makes 
arguments from natural law, natural rights, precedent, and 
customary practice;168 the various opinions in Chisholm v. Georgia 
offer arguments from natural rights, ethos and political tradition, 
as well as from structure, purpose, and text;169 Iredell’s dissent in 
 
 165. Id. 
 166. Id. 
 167. Id. at 32. 
 168. Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798) (holding that the Connecticut 
legislature did not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause of the U.S. Constitution by granting a 
new trial in a probate case); id. at 388-89 (opinion of Chase, J.) (arguing that legislatures 
may not violate principles of republican government, the social compact, and natural law, 
but that Connecticut had not done so in this case); id. at 391–92 (arguing for the 
construction of Ex Post Facto clause based on precedents of prior state constitutions); id. 
at 393 (arguing from British precedents and Blackstone’s Commentaries); id. at 395–97 
(opinion of Patterson, J.) (arguing for meaning of Ex Post Facto Clause from established 
customs, practices and usages of the state of Connecticut and other states); id. at 399–400 
(opinion of Iredell, J.) (arguing from purpose of Ex Post Facto Clause to limit it to criminal 
cases). 
 169. Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793) (holding that citizens of other 
states may sue the State of Georgia in federal court); id. at 456–68, 466 (opinion of Wilson, 
J.) (arguing from social contract theory and “the principles of general jurisprudence”); id. 
at 462–64 (arguing from ethos of American government, which is based on popular 
sovereignty and rejects monarchy, as well as from the text of the Preamble); id. at 464–66 
(arguing from “the general texture of the Constitution” and from the intentions of the 
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Chisholm argues from English common law precedents and from 
Blackstone’s account of natural law.170 
H. THREE KINDS OF CONSTRAINTS ON CONSTITUTIONAL 
CONSTRUCTION 
The modalities play a special role in constitutional 
interpretation. They connect the Constitution’s original meaning 
to the practice of constitutional construction. Constitutional 
constructions that employ standard modalities of argument rest 
on widely accepted theories—commonplaces—about the 
permissible ways to justify an interpretation of the Constitution. 
The connection between topics and widely accepted justifications 
allows us to say that constructions are guided by and attempt to 
further the Constitution. 
One can therefore say that constructions are connected to the 
Constitution, or, in the alternative, that the Constitution guides 
and contributes to constitutional construction, when (1) people in 
a shared practice of legal argument, (2) employ shared topics for 
analyzing, arguing, and solving constitutional problems and 
developing constitutional doctrines, and (3) when these common 
topics, in turn, rest on widely accepted theories of justification. 
Call this the objective constraint on constitutional construction. It 
is objective because it depends on the social fact of wide 
acceptance of particular topics and justifications. 
 
people who instituted it); id. at 466 (arguing from the text of Article III); id. at 466–68 
(opinion of Cushing, J.) (arguing from the text of Article III); id. at 468 (arguing from 
federal structure); id. at 470–72 (Opinion of Jay, C.J.) (arguing from ethos and traditions 
of the United States as a government created by a free and sovereign people in which 
government officials are agents of the people, in contrast to European states, which are 
based on feudalism and monarchy); id. at 473 (arguing from ethos or character of 
American government: “the equal rights we claim; with the equality we profess to admire 
and maintain, and with that popular sovereignty in which every citizen partakes”); id. at 
474–78 (arguing from text of the Preamble and Article III); id. at 477 (arguing from “the 
great and leading principles of a free and equal national government, one of the great 
objects of which is, to ensure justice to all: To the few against the many, as well as to the 
many against the few”). 
 170. Id. at 437 (Iredell, J., dissenting) (“[I]t is incumbent upon us to enquire, whether 
previous to the adoption of the Constitution (which period, or the period of passing the 
law, in respect to the object of this enquiry, is perfectly equal) an action of the nature like 
this before the Court could have been maintained against one of the States in the Union 
upon the principles of the common law.”); id. at 442 (quoting Blackstone’s view that the 
sovereign allows lawsuits at his discretion and arguing that this view “is exactly consonant 
to what is laid down by the writers on natural law.”). 
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This objective constraint is a necessary but not a sufficient 
condition. As noted in Part II above, when participants engage in 
constitutional construction, fidelity to the Constitution requires 
them to have a particular interpretive attitude both about the 
Constitution and about their work. This interpretive attitude 
operates as a subjective constraint on their arguments. 
Finally, there is an intersubjective constraint. Professional 
legal norms and processes of social influence shape when lawyers 
and judges regard proposed constructions as off-the-wall or on-
the-wall.171 Good faith constructions, especially by non-lawyers 
and political activists, may sometimes be off-the-wall from the 
perspective of most lawyers and judges, because of their 
professional training and shared professional norms. Therefore 
most lawyers and judges will consider these proposed 
constructions bad or failed attempts at construction. The 
expectation that government officials should limit themselves to 
on-the-wall constructions constrains construction in a third way; 
it is intersubjective because it relies on what members of the 
professional community think about each other’s work. (In fact, 
what I have called the “objective” constraint of arguing through 
the modalities is also intersubjective.) Lawyers and judges 
discipline each other through professional education and 
socialization, and through the ways that they argue with each 
other. 
Nevertheless, people’s views about the plausibility of 
particular arguments can change over time. Professional norms 
are hardly insulated from the outside world. Processes of social 
influence both within and outside of the legal profession allow 
constitutional dissenters to try to change people’s minds through 
legal and moral argument and through political mobilization. 
Sometimes, as a result of these processes, proposed constructions 
will move from off-the-wall to on-the-wall, and sometimes they 
will even become common sense or orthodox later on.172 
At any point in time, intersubjective constraint can keep 
constructions of the Constitution within certain limits. 
Nevertheless, it can also work at cross-purposes with fidelity to 
original meaning. That is because the dominant consensus among 
lawyers and judges about the Constitution may be contrary to its 
 
 171. BALKIN, CONSTITUTIONAL REDEMPTION, supra note 36, at 179–180. 
 172. Id. at 181–82. 
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original meaning, or to its spirit and underlying purposes. If 
lawyers and judges stick only to on-the-wall arguments, they may 
actually hinder the enforcement of original meaning. 
Constitutional dissent is necessary to rectify these mistakes. Like 
other constitutional dissenters, many originalists have made off-
the-wall arguments in an attempt to restore the Constitution’s 
meaning, spirit, and underlying purposes. This example shows 
why constitutional dissent—including arguments regarded as off-
the-wall at a given point in time—is an important feature of any 
system of constitutional construction. 
In sum, constitutional construction is constrained in three 
ways: by objective constraints—the use of common topics; by 
subjective constraints—interpretive attitudes of fidelity and good 
faith; and by intersubjective constraints—the professional norms 
and social processes of influence that determine, at any point in 
time, which constructions are judged on-the-wall and off-the-wall. 
Despite these three kinds of constraints, however, there will still 
be many disagreements about the best construction of the 
Constitution. For example, several possible positions on a given 
question can be on-the-wall at any point in time. 
I. CONSTRUCTION ACCORDING TO THE LAW AND THE 
CONSTITUTION 
In describing these various constraints on constitutional 
construction, I do not deny that participants in constitutional 
argument may have a range of different political values and policy 
preferences, and that they attempt to further those values and 
preferences through constitutional argument and constitutional 
development. Nor do I deny that the development of 
constitutional construction often reflects struggles between 
people’s political values and policy preferences. Nothing I say 
here is inconsistent with either the perspective of political science 
or the legal realist account of constitutional decisionmaking. 
Often the development of constitutional doctrine is the result of 
struggles over what Sanford Levinson and I call the “high politics” 
of constitutional principle and value.173 That “high politics” is 
shaped by contemporary problems, interests, and political 
mobilizations. So it was in the years immediately after the 
Founding; so it is to this day. 
 
 173. See supra note 41. 
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I am interested in a different set of questions. First, how can 
people, acting in good faith, be guided by the Constitution in their 
development of constitutional doctrine? Second, how can people, 
acting in good faith, attempt to maintain fidelity to the 
Constitution as they adapt to successive waves of political, 
economic, demographic, and technological change? Third, how 
can people who may have very different values and interests 
engage in reasoned discussion and analysis about the best way to 
implement and apply the Constitution, so that they can 
understand themselves as engaged in a common enterprise? 
Fourth, what tools of analysis can people bring to bear for these 
tasks? Fifth, how do these tools connect their work—including 
their inevitable disagreements—to the furtherance of the 
Constitution? 
Understanding the modalities as commonplaces and special 
topics allows us to answer these questions. 
First, the topics help ensure that construction is according to 
law. When Madison makes his arguments about the First Bank, 
he reasons about the best construction of the Constitution using 
standard common law approaches of text (including canons of 
construction), purpose, intention, consequences, and so on. He 
uses these topics to make legal arguments, apply legal sources, 
and draw legal conclusions. In common law systems, the work of 
constructing doctrine involves, to a very great extent, employing 
standard topics and approaches to articulate legal theories and 
offer legal arguments about how best to continue existing 
practices. 
Second, the use of common topics allows the Constitution to 
guide or contribute to construction, even when original meaning 
“runs out.” Consider once again Madison’s 1791 speech against 
the constitutionality of the First Bank. Madison’s position was not 
the only possible construction of the Constitution. The President 
and most members of Congress disagreed with him at the time 
and his view was ultimately not adopted.174 Indeed, Madison 
himself later came to accept the constitutionality of a national 
bank. He signed a bill authorizing a Second Bank in light of 
 
 174. The standard account of the fight over the First Bank is BRAY HAMMOND, 
BANKS AND POLITICS IN AMERICA FROM THE REVOLUTION TO THE CIVIL WAR 114–43 
(1957). 
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“deliberate and reiterated precedents,” as well as “expediency 
and almost necessity.”175 
Madison’s proposed construction of the Constitution in 1791 
was not required by original meaning; it was only a possible 
implementation, one among many others. It also happened, in 
1791, to be Madison’s policy preference.176 Many, if not most, 
proposed constructions have these features: they are not required 
by original meaning and they further an advocate’s policy 
preferences (or a client’s interests). 
If Madison’s argument about the bank is not the only position 
consistent with original public meaning, and if it also happened to 
reflect Madison’s preferred policy, what makes his argument a 
construction of the Constitution as opposed to merely Madison’s 
policy preference? What connects Madison’s use of common law 
modalities to the furtherance of the Constitution? 
Note that it is not enough to say that Madison’s argument is 
a faithful construction of the Constitution because James Madison 
made it, because anyone else acting in good faith—including 
people who were not among the Founding generation—could 
have made the very same argument. It cannot be that a legal 
argument is a permissible construction of the Constitution if made 
by an honored authority, but it is not a permissible construction if 
made by any other citizen. 
When lawyers use the topics, they attempt to analyze and 
solve legal problems posed by a legal text. Madison’s speech 
attempts to resolve the question of whether the United States can 
charter a bank by using common law topics, considering 
alternative solutions and discarding them. In the process, he tries 
to persuade his audience that his analysis and his solutions are the 
best ones. These tasks—problem formation, problem analysis, 
problem solution, and audience persuasion—are the point of a 
topical approach to legal argument. 
Madison says, “where [the meaning of the text is] doubtful, it 
is fairly triable by its consequences.”177 When the meaning of text 
 
 175. Id. at 210. 
 176. See Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Exorcising McCulloch: The Conflict-Ridden History of 
American Banking Nationalism and Dodd-Frank Preemption, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 1235, 
1243 (2013) (arguing that behind Madison’s constitutional objections “was a deeper 
ideological opposition to high finance, associated with large Northeastern cities” and a fear 
that powerful banks would dominate and corrupt politics). 
 177. BREST ET AL., supra note 156, at 29. 
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is doubtful, a problem arises. How do we solve it? Each modality 
offers us ways of solving the problem. In this case, Madison says 
that we may “try” (i.e., test out) possible solutions by asking what 
consequences they might have. (One can do a similar test with 
respect to the criteria of each of the modalities.) If the 
consequences of a particular solution are bad or absurd, then 
perhaps this solution is not the best way to implement the 
Constitution. Perhaps adopting this solution is not the right way 
to further the constitutional project. Perhaps it is not consistent 
with the spirit and purpose of the Constitution. 
I say “perhaps” because it is always possible that the best 
implementation doesn’t have the best consequences. Topics are 
guides for our thinking, tools for analysis and practical judgment. 
Because they are only guides or tools, they do not offer necessary 
and sufficient conditions for a correct answer. At most we can say 
that bad or absurd consequences are persuasive evidence that our 
analysis is faulty; they are merely an indicator that we are going 
down the wrong path to a solution. 
J. THEORIES OF JUSTIFICATION CONNECT CONSTRUCTIONS TO 
TOPICS, AND TOPICS TO THE CONSTITUTION 
What makes an argument that employs one of the standard 
topics (text, purpose, structure, consequences, etc.) useful 
evidence of what the Constitution requires? What connects 
widely-accepted rhetorical topics to the furtherance of the 
Constitution? 
The answer is that the modalities rest on justificatory 
theories. Each modality is premised on an implicit theory of 
justification about what makes a constitutional interpretation a 
good interpretation. 
Take arguments from consequences as an example. The 
implicit theory of justification goes something like this: All other 
things being equal, when the text is unclear, the best 
implementation of the Constitution is the one that avoids bad or 
absurd consequences. When we reason this way, we seek to 
further the Constitution rather than merely impose our own 
policy preferences. To be sure, we may also be arguing for a 
position that accords with our policy preferences—but the point 
is that we are explaining to other people why our proposal 
furthers the Constitution and is a good implementation of the 
Constitution. 
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Structural arguments assert that, to paraphrase Madison, 
proposed interpretations that undermine the Constitution’s 
structures and functions are bad interpretations; conversely, we 
should endeavor to interpret the Constitution so that its structures 
and functions operate properly. Again, to reason this way is to put 
ourselves on the side of the Constitution, and attempt to make it 
work. 
When I introduced the eleven modalities, I also offered a list 
of the implicit theories of justification that underlie them. Each of 
these theories explains why arguments of that form are valid 
interpretations, and why they are a valid way to implement and 
further the Constitution. 
Hence, whenever we make an argument that uses the 
modalities, our arguments always rest implicitly on a theory of 
justification that explains how and why our arguments connect to 
the work of implementing and furthering the Constitution. To be 
sure, just because our arguments rest on a deeper theory of 
justification does not mean that our arguments are good 
arguments. It merely means that we have proposed one way to 
implement and further the Constitution. If we think that a 
proposed construction is bad, then we also think that the 
argument does not further and implement the Constitution (and 
the constitutional project) very well, and that is why it is a bad 
argument. On the other hand, if we think that a construction is 
particularly good, then we think it does a good job of furthering 
and implementing the Constitution (and the constitutional 
project), and that is why it is a good argument. 
This approach brings together the three kinds of constraints 
on construction—objective, subjective, and intersubjective. 
Proposed constructions purport to further the Constitution 
because they rest on widely shared normative theories about the 
kinds of approaches that implement and further the Constitution. 
But this by itself is not sufficient. Even if participants act in good 
faith, the proposed construction may be a bad one or at the very 
least implausible. Nevertheless, what makes a construction 
appear good or bad may change over time as people argue about 
the Constitution and seek to persuade each other. 
K. COHERENCE AND RECIPROCAL INFLUENCE 
So far I’ve argued that topics are devices for considering, 
analyzing and evaluating proposed implementations of the 
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Constitution. These tools for analysis do not exist in splendid 
isolation from each other. They are connected. If the 
consequences of a proposed solution are bad or absurd, then 
maybe this is not what the Constitution is designed to do (it is not 
consistent with its structure). And if the consequences are bad or 
absurd, perhaps this solution is not what the Constitution is trying 
to achieve (it is not consistent with its purposes). Perhaps this is 
not the best reading of the text. Perhaps it is not consistent with a 
constitution that protects the rights and interests that 
governments are designed to protect (natural rights). Perhaps it is 
not consistent with the political values underlying the 
Constitution (political tradition or ethos). Again, the operative 
word is “perhaps;” we are in the world of plausibility, not 
certainty. 
Arguments from one modality may therefore influence our 
judgments about the other tools we employ. The influence is 
reciprocal. Consider a reading that we believe is contrary to the 
Constitution’s structure, or in Madison’s words, “destroys the 
very characteristic of the Government.”178 If a proposed 
construction violates constitutional structure, then perhaps it is 
contrary to the Constitution’s purposes; it endangers the rights 
and interests that governments are designed to protect; it is not 
the best reading of the text; and it is not consistent with the 
American political tradition, rightly considered, or with the 
political values that underlie the Constitution. If a proposed 
reading is contrary to the Constitution’s structure, we should 
rethink our assumption that it has good consequences. Perhaps it 
will have bad consequences in the long run; perhaps we should 
rethink how we understand or measure what consequences are 
good or bad. 
One can express this relationship in positive as well as 
negative terms: a construction that protects the rights and 
interests that governments are created to protect may also (but 
need not) be more likely to be consistent with constitutional 
purposes, respect constitutional structures, avoid bad 
consequences, be the best reading of an unclear text, and so on. 
Often what makes an argument a good argument within any given 
modality may be influenced by how we think about the problem 
from the standpoint of the other modalities. Take the example of 
 
 178. Id. 
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consequences once again. Our judgment of what constitutes 
“good consequences” might change once we reflect on the 
potential structural damage to our democratic system, to the rule 
of law, to our political traditions, and so on. 
This suggests an important difference from Bobbitt’s 
approach. Bobbitt holds that the modalities are 
incommensurable. Our views of the best arguments within one 
modality cannot reasonably affect our views of the best arguments 
within another modality because the modalities share no common 
metric. That position makes the most sense if one accepts his 
original analogy between modalities and different ways of being 
true. It makes far less sense if one thinks of modalities as 
rhetorical topics—that is, as tools for analysis, problem solving, 
persuasion and practical judgment. There are not multiple, 
incommensurable truths, but a single, practical problem to be 
solved. One perspective for solving a problem might well 
influence how we think about the problem from another angle. 
After all, what we are trying to do is solve a problem, and 
persuade others that our solution is the best one. So coherence 
between different ways of attacking the problem may be a virtue, 
not a vice—much less a logical impossibility. 
In contrast to Bobbitt, Richard Fallon argued that lawyers 
implicitly approach constitutional argument with a theory of 
“constructivist coherence”:179 He meant that lawyers expect, or at 
least hope, that their judgments from one perspective can and 
should inform their judgments from another, and they should 
work toward the most coherent solution that is practically 
possible.180 In this respect, the topical approach to constitutional 
construction is closer to Fallon’s model than to Bobbitt’s. 
L. THE ROLE OF DOCTRINE IN CONSTITUTIONAL 
CONSTRUCTION 
Madison’s speech on the First Bank suggests how topical 
analysis and argument can be guided by the Constitution and 
further the Constitution. When Madison spoke, however, there 
was not a body of judicial doctrine expounding the Constitution. 
 
 179. Fallon, Constructivist Coherence, supra note 99, at 1192–93. 
 180. Id. See also Akhil Reed Amar, The Document and the Doctrine, 114 HARV. L. 
REV. 26, 31 (2000) (explaning that originalists and textualists “seek to braid arguments 
from text, history, and structure into an interpretive rope whose strands mutually 
reinforce”). 
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That is not the case today. When lawyers make arguments, and 
when judges decide cases, they do so in the midst of a thicket of 
previous judicial decisions. How does the analysis apply in these 
situations? 
It applies in precisely the same way. When I apply the four-
part test for regulation of symbolic speech in United States. v. 
O’Brien181 today, I am also constructing according to law and the 
Constitution. I use the various modalities of constitutional 
argument to apply an existing doctrinal structure that itself 
purports to be a construction of the First Amendment. That is, my 
proposed construction builds on previous constructions of the 
Constitution that, because of the doctrines of precedent, have the 
force of law. 
Doctrine has a dual nature. It is both existing law and a set of 
topics. One can think of previous case law both as law and as a 
short cut or heuristic for solving legal problems. Analyzing 
problems through doctrine avoids having to reinvent the wheel 
when we face a new constitutional problem.  
Viewing doctrine as a short cut or heuristic reveals not only 
its advantages but also its limitations. Over time, the sequence of 
short cuts and heuristics can travel some distance from the 
Constitution’s meaning or from the best construction of its 
meaning. That is why, especially in constitutional law, existing 
doctrine cannot be a conclusive determination of the 
Constitution’s meaning in practice. 
The term “doctrinal argument” has two senses. The first, 
narrower, sense is reasoning from existing precedents and 
applying precedents to facts. The second, broader sense of 
doctrinal argument means making arguments of any kind and of 
any modality in the midst of existing bodies of doctrine. Thus, the 
first sense of doctrinal argument is a synecdoche for the second, 
broader sense. It is a part that stands for a larger whole. 
People may assume that because most contemporary 
constitutional law occurs in the context of thick bodies of caselaw, 
that lawyers only engage in one modality of argument—doctrinal 
argument, in the narrower sense of reasoning from case to case 
and applying existing doctrinal structures to new factual 
situations. For that reason, one might assume that theories of 
 
 181. 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968) (offering four part test governing regulations of symbolic 
speech). 
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“common law constitutionalism”—like that championed by 
David Strauss182—are theories that use only precedential 
argument or that elevate this one modality over all of the others. 
In fact, arguments within existing doctrine—like those in the 
Supreme Court and the lower federal courts—often employ many 
different modalities of argument, and the best “doctrinalists” are 
really the masters of multiple modalities, not a single one. 
Lawyers embed considerations of purpose, text, structure, 
consequences, past practice, and tradition—among others—
within their discussions of doctrine.183 This is especially so when 
lawyers look to the purposes behind existing doctrines in order to 
decide how to apply or modify them in new situations. Lawyers 
articulate the purposes behind doctrines in terms of the other 
modalities of constitutional argument.  
Sometimes, in other words, lawyers and judges recognize that 
constitutional doctrine is not the Constitution itself but only the 
current way of implementing the Constitution. They understand 
that doctrine is only a means to a more important end—upholding 
and enforcing the Constitution. When this happens, they treat 
doctrine’s short cuts and heuristics as short cuts and heuristics, 
and they modify them accordingly, using the other modalities to 
justify their approach. Even when lawyers and judges merely 
apply existing doctrines—without purporting to change them— 
they may use the other modalities to justify their applications. 
To be sure, much doctrinal argument, especially in lower 
courts, operates within the framework of previous caselaw; it 
works on the assumption that existing doctrines are (sufficiently) 
sound constructions of the Constitution. There are good reasons 
why courts should do this, which mesh with larger justifications 
for systems of judicial precedent. First, as noted above, doctrinal 
constructions save time so that each judge does not have to 
reinvent the wheel in deciding a new constitutional case.184 
 
 182. STRAUSS, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION, supra note 34. 
 183. See BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION, supra note 18, at 55 (“[E]ven 
within an appellate opinion that relies on precedent and sees its purpose as crafting 
precedent, the various other modalities have important roles”). 
 184. See, e.g., BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 149 
(1921) (“[T]he labor of judges would be increased almost to the breaking point if every 
past decision could be reopened in every case, and one could not lay one’s own course of 
bricks on the secure foundation of the courses laid by others who had gone before him.”); 
Oona Hathaway, Path Dependence in the Law: The Course and Pattern of Legal Change in 
a Common Law System, 86 IOWA L. REV. 601, 626 (2001); Jonathan R. Macey, The Internal 
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Second, doctrinal constructions serve rule of law values to the 
extent that they promote predictability and uniformity in the 
application of law.185 Third, as a matter of intellectual humility, 
and because of their own limited perspectives, later courts should 
not lightly assume that their own constructions of the Constitution 
are superior to the constructions of earlier courts.186 
Everything is a matter of degree, of course: If later courts 
come to the firm conclusion that the constructions of earlier 
courts are truly inconsistent with what the Constitution requires, 
later courts may feel duty bound by their oath to uphold the 
Constitution to adjust these earlier constructions. But if earlier 
constructions offer reasonable-if-imperfect solutions and remain 
workable, courts should continue to work with them and improve 
them, imperfect as they are. In addition, lower federal courts have 
a special institutional obligation to respect and work within the 
boundaries set by the constructions of higher courts. The process 
of applying existing constructions to new facts, moreover, will 
eventually produce new distinctions and new doctrines, a process 
that may move the doctrinal structure closer to better 
implementations of the Constitution. 
Much doctrinal argument does not rest content with merely 
applying existing doctrines to new facts. Rather, it involves self-
conscious changes in doctrine by adding new concepts and 
distinctions.  
In United States v. Lopez,187 for example, the Supreme Court 
limited the powers of Congress under the Commerce Clause by 
creating a new doctrinal distinction between economic and non-
economic activities. It held that Congress could regulate 
economic activities that, viewed in the aggregate, had a 
substantial effect on interstate commerce, but not non-economic 
activities.188 This decision did not merely apply previous 
 
and External Costs and Benefits of Stare Decisis, 65 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 93, 102 (1989); 
Frederick Schauer, Precedent, 39 STAN. L. REV. 571, 599 (1987). 
 185. Schauer, Precedent, supra note 184, at 595–98 (discussing arguments from fairness 
and predictability). 
 186. Randy J. Kozel, The Scope of Precedent, 113 MICH. L. REV. 179, 212 (2014); 
David A. Strauss, The Common Law Genius of the Warren Court, 49 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 845, 857 (2007); David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 877, 891–95, 902, 913 (1996). 
 187. 514 U.S. 549 (1995). 
 188. Id. at 559–61. 
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precedents; it created a new way of analyzing regulations under 
the Commerce Power.  
The justification for Lopez, therefore, cannot be that the 
Supreme Court was simply following existing doctrine. It is true 
that the Court employed a traditional form of doctrinal argument: 
it created a new rule from its interpretation of the facts of previous 
cases.189 But the Court also employed other modalities of 
constitutional argument to support the new rule it created. The 
Court offered arguments about the Constitution’s text, structure, 
and purpose. It argued that the purpose and structure of the 
Constitution, and the enumeration of powers in Article I, section 
8, required the Court to maintain boundaries between local and 
national subjects of regulation in order to preserve the benefits of 
federalism.190 The Court also argued that any reading of the 
Constitution that produced the equivalent of a general federal 
police power was incorrect, because it would undermine the 
Constitution’s basic structural assumptions.191 
In sum, “doctrinal argument” is not simply the use of the 
modality of judicial precedent. Courts use most if not all of the 
modalities of argument when they reason within existing 
doctrines; they also use these modalities when they alter old 
doctrines or substitute new ones. Viewed as tools for analysis and 
argument, the modalities are just as useful within thick bodies of 
doctrine as they are in questions of first impression. 
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL TOPICS AND  
CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY 
So far I have noted three important differences between the 
topical approach to constitutional construction and Philip 
Bobbitt’s famous theory of constitutional modalities. First, the list 
of standard topics is different, in part because Bobbitt’s model is 
not very good for understanding how lawyers use history. Second, 
in contrast to Bobbitt’s position, the topics do not have to be 
 
 189. Id. 
 190. Id. at 566–67 (referring the enumeration of powers in Article I, section 8); id. at 
567–68 (arguing that the contrary view “would bid fair to convert congressional authority 
under the Commerce Clause to a general police power of the sort retained by the States 
. . . [and] would require us to conclude that the Constitution’s enumeration of powers does 
not presuppose something not enumerated, . . . and that there never will be a distinction 
between what is truly national and what is truly local”). 
 191. Id. 
1 - BALKIN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 7/21/18 3:15 PM 
2018] ARGUING ABOUT THE CONSTITUTION 217 
 
incommensurable. Third, I argue that the topics are consistent 
with both originalist and non-originalist theories of 
interpretation. By contrast, Bobbitt rejects originalism as an 
“ideology,” in part because originalists believe that the original 
meaning (or intent or understanding) takes precedence over all 
other kinds of considerations.192 
These differences, in turn, reflect deeper disagreements 
about the relationship between constitutional rhetoric and 
constitutional theory. This section goes more deeply into these 
differences, using Bobbitt’s theory as a foil to state my own views. 
First, Bobbitt’s theory asserts that the modalities are 
incommensurable: the best argument from modality A can have 
no influence on what should be the best argument from modality 
B, and vice-versa. My view, by contrast, is that the modalities are 
just rhetorical topics that we use to solve problems and persuade 
other people. We define their boundaries pragmatically rather 
than rigidly, and different problem-solving approaches may fade 
into each other. Moreover, because people employ topics to 
analyze and solve problems, they may well assume that different 
ways of looking at a problem might helpfully converge on a single 
answer or a small set of answers. Or people may reason through a 
process of reflective equilibirum between different topical 
approaches. 
Second, Bobbitt’s theory insists that the modalities must have 
equal status. But this assumption, too, is unnecessary. Lawyers 
and judges embrace multiple interpretive theories, some of which 
adopt a hierarchical ordering—for example, that textual 
arguments are more important than arguments from narrative 
ethos. Topics are tools for thinking, and these tools can fit into 
many different kinds of theoretical structures. Lawyers’ use of 
topics is consistent with many different kinds of constitutional 
theories, including originalist theories. In fact, most theories of 
constitutional law— such as process protection, judicial 
minimalism, or original public meaning originalism—usually can 
be deployed as topics for legal arguments within the practice of 
constitutional law. 
 
 192. Bobbitt, Is Law Politics?, supra note 18, at 1255 (describing originalism as an 
ideology involving a misplaced search for determinate answers that obviates the need for 
moral responsibility). 
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Third, Bobbitt maintains that when there are conflicts 
between the modalities, the only way to decide cases is by 
recourse to individual conscience. My account of legal argument 
focuses on the shared assumptions of communities and on social 
processes of mutual influence and persuasion rather than on the 
private consciences of individuals. This approach better explains 
the role of social influence in deciding what kinds of constructions 
are more plausible and less plausible at any point in history, and 
how positions move from “off-the-wall” to “on-the-wall” over 
time. 
Fourth, Bobbitt has argued that only his theory of the 
modalities explains the legitimacy of constitutional law and 
judicial review; and that all other constitutional theories are either 
fruitless or impossible. But the very fact that constitutional topics 
are widely shared features of constitutional culture suggests a 
different perspective on constitutional theory: Common topics 
provide a common playing field for theoretical disputes both 
within and outside of legal argument. As a result, people with very 
different theoretical commitments can and do use the same basic 
rhetorical techniques, fitting them into different theoretical 
structures. That is why apparently contradictory theories—for 
example, originalist and non-originalist theories—share so much 
in common, and why lawyers holding these views are able to 
participate in legal debates together. 
Moreover, arguing about constitutional theory—for 
example, about the proper role of the judiciary, and about which 
kinds of arguments should control in which kinds of situations—
is a regular feature within legal argument, rather than extraneous 
to the practice.193 Many theoretical disputes about the 
Constitution are internal to the ordinary practice of legal 
argument; they do not lie outside of it. Bobbitt believes that legal 
arguments that attempt to justify or provide ground rules for 
judicial review are fruitless; yet these arguments appear regularly 
 
 193. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., A Theory of Judicial Candor, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 2265, 
2303 (2017) ([Bobbitt’s] view “ignores the permeability of first-order constitutional 
argument to second-order debate about appropriate grounds for decision within our 
existing constitutional practice. Methodological argument about the premises that should 
control constitutional decisionmaking is familiar and intelligible . . . .”); Jack M. Balkin, 
The American Constitution as “Our Law”, 25 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 113, 141–43 (2013) 
(explaining that the history of constitutional argument is also the history of people arguing 
about the best way for judges to interpret the Constitution). 
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within constitutional litigation.194 This suggests that they play an 
important role within the practice of constitutional argument. 
This turns Bobbitt’s position on its head: if practice provides 
legitimacy, the practice we actually have involves lawyers making 
lots of arguments about what justifies the practice or what would 
make the practice better. 
Finally, Bobbitt’s account of “legitimacy” is idiosyncratic. It 
does not correspond to the way that most political and legal 
theorists talk about the various kinds of legitimacy—sociological, 
procedural, and moral. As a result, most constitutional theory 
asks questions that are orthogonal to what Bobbitt is trying to 
demonstrate. In fact, one can accept Bobbitt’s claim that the 
practice of constitutional argument generates a certain kind of 
legitimacy—in his sense of the word—and still pursue most other 
kinds of constitutional theory. And to the extent that 
constitutional theorists have different goals than Bobbitt’s—for 
example, when they ask which design of constitutional institutions 
would best serve certain values or functions—his objections do 
not really touch their work. 
A. BOBBITT’S THEORY OF CONSTITUTIONAL CONSCIENCE 
To explain these points, it is necessary to describe Bobbitt’s 
constitutional theory in some detail. His theory is quite 
sophisticated, carefully constructed and has many interlocking 
parts. It is also important to recognize that Bobbitt seeks to 
answer very different questions than most other constitutional 
theorists, and so much of what concerns him is orthogonal to other 
constitutional theories. 
Perhaps the best place to begin is with Bobbitt’s distinction 
between constitutional discourse and constitutional argument.195 
Constitutional discourse is ordinary talk about the Constitution 
that anyone might engage in. Constitutional argument, by 
contrast, is legal argument of the kind made and recognized by 
lawyers and judges. In addition, arguments about how to design 
 
 194. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Constitutional Precedent Viewed Through the Lens of 
Hartian Positivist Jurisprudence, 86 N.C. L. REV. 1107, 1144 (2008) (“[O]ur existing 
practices of constitutional adjudication and argument have multiple levels. . . [and] are, 
moreover, open and reflexive, permitting and even inviting arguments about what ought 
to count as good first-order constitutional arguments even if they are not, now, widely 
credited as such.”). 
 195. Bobbitt, Reflections, supra note 18, at 1911. 
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constitutions, about what justifies constitutions, or about what 
features would improve a constitutional system, count as 
constitutional discourse, not constitutional argument.196 That is 
because they speak from outside the system rather than from 
within it. Bobbitt points out, for example, that an argument from 
the Federalist, made before adoption of the Constitution about 
whether to adopt it, is constitutional discourse. But the very same 
set of words offered in the context of a lawyer’s brief about how 
to interpret the Constitution is constitutional argument.197 
In constitutional argument, Bobbitt believes, there are six 
and only six modalities.198 Bobbitt acknowledges that people may 
engage in other kinds of reasoning in constitutional discourse, but 
he denies that any other forms of reasoning count as 
constitutional argument.199 
For example, Bobbitt specifically denies that arguments from 
natural law and natural rights are part of constitutional 
argument.200 Natural rights arguments assert that the purpose of 
government (and thus of government under the Constitution) is 
to protect certain rights; natural law arguments assert that certain 
legal norms are required by human nature and human flourishing. 
Bobbitt maintains that no such arguments appear in judicial 
decisions or in legal briefs or oral arguments before courts, 
although he concedes that they might have appeared in the distant 
past, and might still appear today in political theory or in non-
legal conversation.201 When lawyers and judges quote the 
 
 196. Id. at 1923–24 (explaining that constitutional discourse involves a normative 
assessment of the practice of constitutional argument that is not within the practice and 
does not affect its legitimacy); id. at 1951 (“Constitutional interpretation by formal 
decisionmakers committed to confine their decisions to legal bases is not the same practice 
as constitutional discourse, which, among other things, evaluates those decisions.”). 
 197. Id. at 1911. 
 198. BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION, supra note 18, at 22 (“There is 
no constitutional legal argument outside these modalities.”). 
 199. Id.; Bobbitt, Reflections, supra note 18, at 1911–12. See also id. at 1936–37 (“I 
derive the modalities that determine the truth status of legal arguments from an 
examination of Supreme Court opinions, oral arguments by lawyers, presidential papers, 
and congressional hearings because these incidences of constitutional decisionmaking are 
constrained by their status as decisions according to law.”). 
 200. Id., at 1911, 1916–17. 
 201. Id. at 1916–18 (explaining that natural law and natural rights arguments do not 
count because although they have been used in the past, they are rare in contemporary 
Supreme Court opinions). 
  Although Bobbitt denies that appeals to natural law and natural rights are 
legitimate part of constitutional argument, a cursory inspection of recent Supreme Court 
opinions shows that natural law and natural rights arguments are not all that rare. See, e.g., 
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Declaration of Independence, for example, it might seem as if 
they were making an appeal to natural rights, but Bobbitt explains 
that they are probably really making an argument from 
constitutional ethos.202 
Bobbitt does not deny that the boundaries of acceptable 
constitutional argument might change over time.203 He simply 
insists that natural law arguments fall outside the boundary. It was 
for this reason that Sanford Levinson and I have called Bobbitt a 
 
Williams v. Pennsylvania, 136 S. Ct. 1899, 1912 (2016) (arguing that due process requires 
states “to adopt those practices that are fundamental to principles of liberty and justice, 
and which inhere ‘in the very idea of free government’ and are ‘the inalienable right of a 
citizen of such a government’”); Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2594 (2015) (arguing 
that same-sex couples’ “immutable nature dictates that same-sex marriage is their only real 
path to this profound commitment” ); id. at 2612 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“[T]he Court 
invalidates the marriage laws of more than half the States and orders the transformation 
of a social institution that has formed the basis of human society for millennia, for the 
Kalahari Bushmen and the Han Chinese, the Carthaginians and the Aztecs. Just who do 
we think we are?”); id. at 2636 n.5 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“The traditional definition of 
marriage has prevailed in every society that has recognized marriage throughout history.”); 
id. at 2637–38 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (arguing that courts should defer to representative 
government, which is a device designed to protect people’s natural rights from arbitrary 
interference); United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 728 (2012) (plurality opinion) (“The 
First Amendment itself ensures the right to respond to speech we do not like, and for good 
reason. Freedom of speech and thought flows not from the beneficence of the state but 
from the inalienable rights of the person.”); DA’s Office v. Osborne, 557 U.S. 52, 93 (2009) 
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (“The liberty protected by the Due Process Clause is not a creation 
of the Bill of Rights….the liberty safeguarded by the Constitution has far deeper roots. 
See Declaration of Independence P 2 (holding it self-evident that ‘all men are. . . endowed 
by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights,’ among which are ‘Life, Liberty, and the 
pursuit of Happiness’)”); Washington. v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 743 (1997) (O’Connor, 
J., concurring) (“I insist that the source of Nancy Cruzan’s right to refuse treatment was 
not just a common-law rule. Rather, this right is an aspect of a far broader and more basic 
concept of freedom that is even older than the common law.”). 
  Moreover, because the Supreme Court has incorporated an inquiry into natural 
rights into its doctrines, there are many doctrinal arguments that appeal to those rights that 
governments exist to protect. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 493 (1965) 
(Goldberg, J., concurring) (“The inquiry is whether a right involved ‘is of such a character 
that it cannot be denied without violating those “fundamental principles of liberty and 
justice which lie at the base of all our civil and political institutions.”’”). 
  Bobbitt points out that different judges tend to emphasize some modalities more 
than others. BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE, supra note 18, at 8. Among recent Justices, 
Justices Kennedy, Stevens and Thomas have been most attracted to natural rights 
arguments. See, e.g., Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2637-38 (Thomas, J., 
dissenting); United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709 at 728 (plurality opinion of Kennedy, 
J.); Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 230 (1976) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“I had thought it 
self-evident that all men were endowed by their Creator with liberty as one of the cardinal 
unalienable rights. It is that basic freedom which the Due Process Clause protects, rather 
than the particular rights or privileges conferred by specific laws or regulations.”). 
 202. Bobbitt, Reflections, supra note 18, at 1918. 
 203. Id. at 1919. 
1 - BALKIN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 7/21/18 3:15 PM 
222 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 33:145 
 
“constitutional grammarian.”204 His theory demands that when 
people engage in constitutional argument (as opposed to 
constitutional discourse), they must make the correct kinds of 
arguments correctly, and much of his work has tried to show that 
people have been using the modalities incorrectly or have 
misunderstood the kinds of arguments that they have actually 
made.205 
Next, Bobbitt argues that the six modalities are of equal 
importance in constitutional argument and wholly 
incommensurable.206 The equal status of the modalities means 
that, for example, arguments from text can have no greater 
priority or importance than arguments from ethos or 
consequences.207 The incommensurability of the modalities means 
that the plausibility or implausibility of an argument from one 
modality cannot properly affect the plausibility or implausibility 
of arguments from another modality. If textual arguments, for 
example, could help us arbitrate which are the best arguments 
from structure, or arguments from original understanding could 
settle which textual argument is the best one, the argument forms 
would not be, strictly speaking, incommensurable. 
Bobbitt claims that the general acceptance of the modalities 
explains why the practice of constitutional argument and the 
 
 204. J.M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Constitutional Grammar, 72 TEX. L. REV. 1771 
(1994). 
 205. See, e.g., BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION, supra note 18, at 61 
(arguing that Justice Holmes’ opinion in Missouri v. Holland has long been misunderstood 
as a prudential argument when it is really a doctrinal argument.); id. at 95-101 (arguing 
that Judge Robert Bork did not understand that his dominant tendency was prudentialism, 
not originalism); id. at 105–06 (arguing that members of the Senate Judiciary Committee 
did not understand that Bork was actually a prudentialist and not an originalist); id. at 131–
38 (arguing that Mark Tushnet does not understand the nature of textual, structural, or 
ethical argument); Bobbitt, Is Law Politics?, supra note 18, at 1245 (“Tushnet often 
confuses the various modalities, and this failure to distinguish carefully and consistently 
among each of them leads to various analytical errors.”). 
 206. Bobbitt, Reflections, supra note 18, at 1954 (“[I]t is a fundamental part of my 
views that the modalities may conflict, that they are incommensurable, and thus that no 
decision-procedure can determine the outcome in advance without sacrificing 
legitimacy.”). 
 207. See id. at 1886 (“A theory that was comprehensive and provided certainty by 
privileging some modalities, as for example, by a hierarchical arrangement, could not be 
complete because it would require the inclusion of new principles to legitimate the 
hierarchy, and then new rules to legitimate the operation of these principles, and so on.”). 
Equal status follows from Bobbitt’s idea of incommensurability: if the modalities were not 
of equal status, then it would be possible to know in advance what to do when a modality 
of greater priority conflicts with one of lesser priority. 
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institution of judicial review are legitimate. Bobbitt argues that 
the practice of constitutional argument, and thus of judicial 
review, is self-legitimating.208 Legitimacy arises from the practice 
of constitutional argument according to the underlying grammar 
of the system.209 Because the practice of constitutional argument 
is self-grounding, constitutional discourse outside the practice 
does not and cannot bestow legitimacy on it. Legitimacy is not 
grounded on and does not depend on any larger political or moral 
theory. Indeed, Bobbitt believes that any attempt to ground 
constitutional argument on a political or moral theory outside the 
practice of constitutional law is fruitless.210 
The practice of constitutional argument began when the 
Constitution became part of American law. The Founding 
generation applied then-existing practices of common law 
argument to the interpretation of the Constitution, and ever since 
what makes the practice of constitutional argument (and judicial 
review) legitimate is that it is our practice and that we continue to 
employ this practice as a constitutive part of our legal culture.211 
The equal status and incommensurability of the modalities is 
a basic feature of the practice. Therefore denying the equal status 
of the modalities or attempting to elevate one modality above 
another undermines the legitimacy of the system.212 
 
 208. Id. at 1938 (“legitimacy flows from following various legal rules. These rules 
depend upon modalities of argument—ways in which particular arguments are assessed, 
rather than arguments themselves. . . . There is nothing more to legitimacy than that. 
Justification comes from external sources and does not establish or undermine 
legitimacy.”); id. at 1914 (“Legitimation occurs when actors charged with deciding 
according to law frame their appeals and their explanations in the ways of which my sketch 
of the modalities is a description.”). 
 209. Id. at 1914, 1938. 
 210. Id. at 1938 (arguing that attempts to justify legitimacy are either circular or lead 
to a problem of infinite regress). Bobbitt believes that most constitutional theory simply 
asks the wrong questions. See id. (“[T]he counter-majoritarian objection has been kept 
alive so long because constitutional scholars played a kind of shell game—they questioned 
the legitimacy of judicial review by demanding justifications. Had they been willing to 
concede the legitimacy of the practice and simply asserted that, though legitimate, they 
believed it lacked an appealing political theory, I doubt there would have been much fuss 
about the matter.”). 
 211. Id. at 1952 (“For me, the use of the six forms of constitutional argument is the 
way we decide constitutional questions in the American legal culture. The use of these six 
forms maintains the legitimacy of judicial review.”); id. at 1914 (“To put it briefly: Practice 
legitimates because legitimacy is a matter of practice.”). 
 212. Bobbitt argued that Robert Bork’s originalism undermined constitutional 
legitimacy because Bork asserted that decisions that could not be squared with the original 
understanding were not legitimate. BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION, supra 
note 18, at 107–08. By claiming that one modality trumped the others, Bork was asserting 
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From time to time, Bobbitt explains, law professors purport 
to ground the practice of constitutional argument and judicial 
review on constitutional theories. In his view, all of these theories 
are mistaken from the outset. They almost always seize on one of 
the forms of common law argument—for example original intent 
or consequences—and make it the ground of constitutional 
legitimacy.213 This mistakes the true basis of legitimacy—the 
practice itself—and converts what is merely one form of argument 
into an “ideology.”214 Pragmatism is an ideology that converts 
arguments from prudence or consequences into the ground of 
constitutional legitimacy; originalism is an ideology that converts 
arguments from “history” (i.e., original intention) into the ground 
of constitutional legitimacy, and so on.215 Attempting to elevate 
one modality among others is an illegitimate move in 
constitutional argument, and undermines the legitimacy of the 
system.216 This is why Bobbitt opposes all versions of originalist 
theory, although, to be sure, he recognizes the legitimacy of the 
kinds of arguments (text, structure, original 
meaning/intention/understanding) that originalists make. 
Bobbitt also strongly distinguishes between legitimacy and 
justification.217 By “legitimacy,” Bobbitt does not mean “moral 
legitimacy,” that is, the degree to which a regime is just and/or 
protects human rights; or democratic legitimacy, that is, the 
degree to which a regime is responsive to popular will or popular 
opinion. Nor is a regime legitimate because there are sound 
prudential reasons for maintaining it. Thus, Bobbitt’s concept of 
legitimacy has nothing to do with “legitimation”—that is, 
providing an apology or justification for a state of affairs.  
Rather, by “legitimacy,” Bobbitt means that people generally 
accept a legal regime and work and reason within it. He argues 
 
that the other modalities were insufficient to explain constitutional decisions. “[A]n attack 
on those modalities is an attack on the legitimacy of the decisions they support.” Id. at 108. 
 213. Id. at 27–28, 114, 176; Bobbitt, Is Law Politics?, supra note 18, at 1234. 
 214. BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION, supra note 18 at 22; Bobbitt, Is 
Law Politics?, supra note 18, at 1234. 
 215. Cf. Bobbitt, Is Law Politics?, supra note 18, at 1251 (arguing that Mark Tushnet 
adopts the ideology of pragmatism because he sees everything through the lens of 
prudentialism); id. at 1255 (suggesting that originalists turn historical argument into an 
ideology that seeks determinative answers). 
 216. Bobbitt, Reflections, supra note 18, at 1924 (explaining that “Tushnet’s sole 
reliance on prudentialism is illegitimate as a matter of law,” even if it is a legitimate 
approach to “academic assertion and discussion”). 
 217. BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION, supra note 18 at 27–28, 114, 176. 
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that the legitimacy of the American constitutional system arises 
from the self-grounding practice of making arguments using the 
modalities.218 
To justify the practice means trying to ground the practice in 
some set of reasons that are prior to it. This is what most 
constitutional theory tries to do, and Bobbitt argues that when 
constitutional theorists attempt this, they confuse justification 
with legitimacy.219 We cannot make the practice legitimate by 
offering arguments for why it is a good thing or a bad thing.220 The 
practice is legitimate because we participate in it, and because 
doing so is part of who we are. 
It is true that people can justify particular positions within the 
practice; they do this by making constitutional arguments 
according to the modalities. But these arguments cannot justify 
the practice itself.221 Justification within the practice is not 
justification of the practice from the outside. Law, and therefore 
constitutional law, Bobbitt explains, is something that we do, not 
something we have as a consequence of something we do.222 The 
continuation of our practices ensures their legitimacy. This is one 
explanation of the title of his book Constitutional Fate. It is our 
constitutional fate to use the modalities which we inherited from 
the common law; doing so legitimates the constitutional system 
and the practice of judicial review. Our practice of constitutional 
argument is our constitutional fate. Our constitutional fate is our 
practice of constitutional argument. 
Bobbitt’s account also gives an explanation of constitutional 
disagreements and how to resolve them. This is Bobbitt’s theory 
of conscience.  
Bobbitt argues that within each modality, lawyers use their 
professional judgment and the norms of inquiry associated with 
each modality to decide which argument is best. So, for example, 
 
 218. Id. at 114; Bobbitt, Reflections, supra note 18, at 1872, 1952. 
 219. Id. at 1869 (“For some time, the academic debate about U.S. constitutionalism 
has looked for justifications for our practices, believing this would confer legitimacy on 
them. In my work, I have endeavored to derive legitimacy from the practices themselves, 
reserving the task of justification for other purposes.”). 
 220. Id. at 1870 (“justification does not assure legitimacy”); id. at 1898 (“It would be 
a mistake to think that a political theory (like majoritarianism),which can justify a system, 
can also legitimate it.”). 
 221. Id. at 1952 (asserting that “the various modalities of constitutional argument do 
legitimate, but they do not justify”). 
 222. BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION, supra note 18, at 24. 
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he argues that professional norms of history will determine which 
argument within the modality of “history” (i.e., original intention) 
is the best one.223  
This approach, however, does not apply to contrasting 
arguments from different modalities. To be sure, it is possible that 
the best arguments across the different modalities will not 
conflict. In that case, there is a correct answer to a particular 
constitutional question. But sometimes, perhaps often, the best 
arguments among the various modalities do conflict. The best 
argument from modality A (judged by norms of inquiry 
characteristic to that modality) may conflict with the best 
argument from modality B (also as judged by norms of inquiry 
characteristic to that modality). In that case, there is no meta-
principle that can decide between the two arguments. The 
modalities are completely incommensurable with each other.224 
Instead, lawyers and judges must turn to their individual 
consciences to decide which argument is the best one.225 Because 
the consciences of individuals may differ, the practical result is 
that the development of constitutional doctrine—where the 
modalities conflict—depends on the conscience of constitutional 
decisionmakers. 
Bobbitt distinguishes between how we decide cases from how 
we explain them to others.226 Within the practice of constitutional 
argument, we always explain our decisions to others through the 
modalities of constitutional argument, and that is what makes the 
practice legitimate.227 But that is not how we decide cases when 
the modalities conflict. In these cases, we decide according to 
conscience. The distinction between the forms of public 
explanation and the process of private decision is most important 
when the modalities conflict, as they often do. 
Bobbitt views this feature of constitutional argument—that 
the modalities are often incommensurable and that individual 
conscience is necessary to decide cases —not as a problem for 
 
 223. Bobbitt, Reflections, supra note 18, at 1923. See infra the discussion 
accompanying notes 238–250. 
 224. Id. at 1954 (arguing that “the modalities may conflict, that they are 
incommensurable, and thus that no decision-procedure can determine the outcome in 
advance without sacrificing legitimacy”). 
 225. BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION, supra note 18, at 163–64, 183–84. 
 226. Id. at 114, 153, 163–64, 169. 
 227. Bobbitt, Reflections, supra note 18, at 1914. 
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constitutional argument, but as its saving grace.228 This feature 
makes individual conscience indispensable to the resolution of 
many constitutional disagreements, and thus implicit in the 
legitimacy of the constitutional system. An important feature of 
Bobbitt’s work is that in constitutional law, the moment of moral 
decision, and thus the responsibility of conscience, can be 
postponed, but it can never be avoided.229 
The role of individual conscience in the practice of 
constitutional law is crucial because it allows for the possibility of 
justice in the otherwise self-contained and self-legitimating 
system of constitutional argument.230 Because the modalities 
sometimes conflict, decisionmakers, relying on individual 
conscience, can decide to do what is right and just by choosing the 
position that furthers justice. The more often the modalities 
conflict, the greater the space for individual conscience. 
As one can see from the above discussion, conscience is 
among the most important ideas in Bobbitt’s system. All of his 
other claims about the practice of constitutional argument revolve 
around his views about the importance and necessity of individual 
conscience. That all constitutional argument occurs within a fixed 
set of modalities, that the modalities are of equal status, that they 
are incommensurable, and that there is no general principle of 
priority among them, are not, in Bobbitt’s view, defects of the 
system. Rather, they are important and valuable features of the 
system. These features of constitutional argument preserve a role 
for individual conscience, and hence for the possibility that our 
system of government will achieve a greater degree of justice over 
time.231 
 
 228. BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION, supra note 18, at 114, 163–64, 
177; see also id. at 170 (“The justice of the system lies in the extent to which it is able to 
confer legitimacy on the right moral actions of its deciders. It is thus in the very fact that 
legitimacy rationales do conflict that enables justice to be done.”). 
 229. Bobbitt, Reflections, supra note 18, at 186 (“We are incapable of making 
something that will obviate (rather than suppress) the requirement for moral decision.”). 
 230. See supra note 208. 
 231. As Bobbitt explains: 
Constitutional Fate asks, “What legitimates judicial review?” and proposes an 
antifoundationalist answer. That is, I located legitimation in a particular practice, 
rather than in a prior, external rationale. Constitutional Interpretation asks, 
“What makes the system of constitutional decisionmaking just?” The answer I 
offered was an antirepresentationalist one. Treating the issue as one in which 
“just” is a judgment of the system as a whole, I argued that the American system 
permits acts of conscience to be decisive, instead of determining that particular 
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One can now better understand why Bobbitt insists that all 
of the modalities must be on an equal footing and completely 
incommensurable; and that no form of argument (say, arguments 
from the original public meaning of the text) can be lexically prior 
to any others. To assert that one modality was subordinate to any 
other, or that the modalities were commensurable with each other 
would deny the central role of conscience in arbitrating among 
them.232 
Bobbitt’s theory leads to considerable freedom for 
constitutional interpreters. Indeed, this freedom is virtually 
required by his conception of conscience. Bobbitt explains that 
this is not the freedom to do whatever one likes, but rather the 
freedom to employ one’s conscience in deciding what is truly 
just.233 
People may therefore assume that any constitutional theory 
that utilizes the modalities, or standard forms of constitutional 
argument, must depend on conscience in the same way. It must 
feature the same degree of interpretive freedom, it must feature 
equal and incommensurable modes of argument, and it must be 
irredeemably opposed to all forms of originalism. But this is not 
the case. 
Bobbitt started with an undeniable fact about legal 
practice—that lawyers use a set of standard rhetorical methods 
inherited from the common law to interpret the Constitution. He 
then built a grand theoretical edifice atop of it. But one does not 
have to accept the entire edifice to accept his starting point. When 
expressed in the language of rhetorical topics, many of his claims 
about the modalities are unnecessary, and others seem disputable. 
B. TOPICS ARE NOT SILOS 
Lawyers employ common topics with an eye to analyzing 
situations, solving problems and persuading other people. I agree 
with Richard Fallon that lawyers use topics with a defeasible 
assumption of coherence: When lawyers ask constitutional 
 
outcomes are just when correlated with the outcome hypothesized by a theory of 
justice. 
Bobbitt, Reflections, supra note 18, at 1872 (internal citations omitted). 
 232. Or, as Bobbitt puts it, the creation of an algorithm that would relieve us of moral 
decision would be pernicious, because it would disable the power of moral reflection and 
choice. BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION, supra note 18, at 154–55, 162. 
 233. Bobbitt, Reflections, supra note 18, at 1874. 
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questions and attempt to solve constitutional problems, they 
operate on the assumption that employing different ways of 
looking at a problem can help them converge on a single answer 
or a small set of answers.234 This assumption is defeasible because 
it may not turn out to be the case; even so, interpreters should 
start out by assuming that it is the case and do their best to make 
the answers fit together. 
Moreover, the process of interpretation is not individual but 
social; we do it not only to convince ourselves but also to convince 
other people. Therefore, as we test and refine our analyses, we 
always have in mind an imagined audience of other people we 
want to persuade; we consider their imagined views as we decide 
the best way to ask questions and answer them. We hear not only 
the imagined voices of people who we think mostly agree with us 
but also (and especially) those we think will disagree, because 
their arguments most need to be met and rebutted. The imagined 
audience not only shapes how we express our arguments; it also 
shapes what we think are plausible and implausible claims, 
reasonable and unreasonable moves in our arguments. 
This approach to interpretation makes more sense of the way 
that lawyers actually use the topics in legal argument than 
Bobbitt’s theory of incommensurability and individual 
conscience. It also better accommodates the roles of mutual give-
and-take and social influence in deciding what kinds of 
constructions are off-the-wall and on-the-wall at any point in time, 
and how positions move from less plausible to more plausible over 
time. 
My argument will proceed in two steps. First, I will explain 
why Bobbitt’s model of incommensurability—which treats the 
modalities as rhetorical silos—does not succeed on its own terms. 
Then I will argue that the social nature of legal argument—among 
members of a community who very often disagree—makes it far 
more plausible to understand lawyers as striving for coherence 
and reflective equilibrium among the different means of problem-
solving and persuasion. 
 
 234. Fallon, Constructivist Coherence, supra note 99, at 1193. 
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1. Topics do not have to be incommensurable 
Bobbitt’s view that the topics are incommensurable is not a 
good account of lawyerly practice. To see why, one might begin 
by distinguishing three different claims about legal arguments: 
(1) Given arguments from different modalities (i.e., topics), 
there is no general formula or decision procedure for deciding 
which argument is better when they conflict, even if in some cases 
certain arguments are better than others. Instead, we have to 
judge each conflict on its own terms, and the argument that proves 
better in one context might prove worse in another. 
(2) Arguments from one modality should not affect our 
judgment about whether arguments within another modality are 
more or less plausible. That is, it is not possible to engage in 
methods of coherence-based reasoning or reflective equilibrium 
to reach a conclusion. No matter how strong we think a textual 
argument is, for example, it should not give us any reason to 
change our minds about what constitutes the best structural or 
prudential argument. 
(3) Given conflicting arguments from different modalities—
for example, text and structure—we have no reasons to prefer one 
argument to another. Hence the decision between them must be 
left to individual conscience. To be sure, we may justify our 
decision to others in public by making a textual or structural 
argument, but the textual or structural argument is not the basis 
of our private decision. 
Proposition (1) is not a very controversial claim. It allows for 
coherence-based reasoning and reflective equilibrium between 
different kinds of arguments. Many people—and even some 
originalists—would accept it, at least if one limits it to cases of 
constitutional construction, in which original public meaning does 
not resolve the question. Proposition (1) does not even rule out 
the possibility that some kinds arguments (for example, textual) 
are usually more important than others (consequences, natural 
law, etc.), as a rule of thumb. 
Bobbitt, however, takes a much stronger position than (1). 
He appears to hold proposition (2); and sometimes he seems to 
argue for (3).235 Proposition (3) makes how people decide 
according to conscience somewhat mysterious. If so, it is a mystery 
 
 235. Bobbitt, Reflections, supra note 18, at 1874, 1882–85, 1923. 
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that Bobbitt invites. He speaks of conscience as an “unreasoning 
decision,”236 and he argues that “[i]t is only when assailed by 
doubt—when nothingness prevails and there is no point to further 
legitimate judgment—that one resorts to one’s conscience.”237 
In any case, Bobbitt’s strong version of incommensurability 
between different modalities is untenable because it depends on 
a rigid and ultimately untenable distinction between intermodal 
and intramodal conflicts. 
Intermodal or cross-modal conflicts are conflicts between the 
best arguments in two different modalities, for example, between 
the best textual and the best structural argument. Intramodal 
conflicts are disputes within a given modality about which version 
of an argument within that modality is the best one. 
For example, an argument that employs an abstract 
characterization of the original understanding might conflict with 
an argument that employs a relatively concrete characterization 
of the original understanding. The petitioner argues that the 
framers and adopters of the Fourteenth Amendment intended to 
ban all class and caste legislation; therefore sex discrimination is 
unconstitutional. The respondent argues that the framers and 
adopters of the Fourteenth Amendment did not intend to abolish 
the common-law coverture rules by which women lost almost all 
of their rights on marriage; hence sex discrimination is not 
unconstitutional. 
Another example of an intramodal conflict would be one 
between a textual argument that uses the canon expressio unius 
est exclusio alterius and another textual argument that invokes the 
absurdity canon. The petitioner argues that the First Amendment 
does not apply to the President because it says “Congress shall 
make no law;” the respondent applies that this reading would 
have absurd results because it would allow both the President and 
the federal judiciary to run roughshod over freedom of religion, 
speech, and press.  
As these examples demonstrate, intramodal conflicts are 
ubiquitous in constitutional argument. In fact, whenever we find 
a conflict between modalities we can usually find a corresponding 
conflict within a single modality. 
 
 236. Id. at 1923. 
 237. Id. at 1874. 
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Bobbitt argues that we cannot resolve intermodal conflicts 
except by conscience. In contrast, he argues that we can almost 
always resolve intramodal conflicts by using the norms that are 
characteristic of each modality238: “[W]ithin a single modality,” he 
explains, “the arguments are entirely comparable; the standards 
for the better argument are supplied by the modality itself. For 
example, there are well-developed canons of historical assessment 
against which can be measured competing historical arguments in 
constitutional law.”239 The only exception is where deciding 
between two different arguments requires facts that we do not or 
cannot know, for example, when there is a gap in the historical 
record.240 Then “there is … a role [for conscience], but it is distinct 
from that played when the modalities conflict.”241 In this situation, 
a legal interpreter turns to conscience not because the arguments 
are incommensurable, but because there is a dispute about the 
facts and the interpreter lacks sufficient knowledge to resolve it. 
However, if one discovers additional facts, then the conflict will 
disappear and lawyers can settle on the best argument.242 
To justify this difference between intermodal and intramodal 
conflicts, Bobbitt must make two further claims, each of which is 
implausible. 
First, Bobbitt must hold that every kind of legal argument 
can be classified according to one and only one modality. Suppose 
that a certain type of argument A could be classified as either an 
historical argument (i.e., in Bobbitt’s system, an argument from 
original intention or understanding) or as a structural argument. 
Then by hypothesis A would be commensurable with all other 
historical arguments and it would also be commensurable with all 
other structural arguments. But that would mean that historical 
and structural arguments are commensurable, and so people do 
not need to resort to individual conscience to resolve conflicts 
 
 238.  Id. at 1923. Bobbitt is emphatic on this point. It is, he says, a “gross misreading” 
to suggest “[t]he role I reserve for conscience (as that faculty by which we choose among 
incommensurables) must be available to choose among competing arguments within a 
modality” Id. 
 239. Id. 
 240. Id. 
 241. Id. 
 242. Id. (“The difference between this situation and that of a conflict between (or 
among) the modalities, rather than within a single one, is that some fact . . . can always 
appear to bring harmony within a modality, whereas no fact can accomplish this among 
different forms of argument.”). 
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among them. But this is impossible according to Bobbitt’s theory. 
Hence each kind of argument can belong to one and only one 
modality; all other categorizations of arguments must be 
incorrect. Although Bobbitt has sometimes described his 
categorization system as merely provisional,243 he cannot really 
maintain that view if he wants arguments from different 
modalities to be incommensurable. 
It is therefore not surprising Bobbitt has had to act as a sort 
of constitutional grammarian, correcting other people’s 
understanding of their arguments, and insisting on his particular 
system of classifications. Bobbitt has disclaimed any intention to 
impose his normative views; he insists that he is merely describing 
our practices of argument as they really are.244 Yet he must play 
the role of constitutional grammarian in order to preserve the 
central role of conscience in his system, because a special role for 
conscience is unnecessary if the modalities are generally 
commensurable. 
One can see the point in another way. In this Article I have 
mentioned three different ways of dividing up constitutional 
argument: Bobbitt’s, Fallon’s and mine. I argue that my division 
of the topics better accounts for how lawyers use history in 
constitutional argument than either Bobbitt’s or Fallon’s. So if 
one focuses on uses of history, one should use my account. On the 
other hand, Bobbitt’s catalog has proved very useful for teaching 
first-year law students how to make constitutional arguments. My 
view, consistent with the classical rhetorical tradition, is that the 
way people describe and classify topics should be pragmatic. It 
should be driven by one’s practical goals, and not by a belief in 
natural kinds of arguments. One need not assume that a complex 
social practice has to divide up in a single way; we should use 
whichever classification system best helps us achieve our 
particular purposes. 
At various points, Bobbitt seems to agree.245 But he cannot 
be so relaxed on this point, because of his views on 
incommensurability and the role of conscience. If one recognizes 
more than one classification system, one quickly gets into trouble. 
There are any number of arguments that fall under the same 
 
 243. Id. at 1915–16. 
 244. Id. at 1913–14, 1917, 1922. 
 245. Id. at 1915–16. 
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modality in Bobbitt’s model but fall in different modalities in my 
topic catalog or Fallon’s; conversely, there are any number of 
arguments that Bobbitt treats as falling into different modalities 
but that fall into the same modality in either Fallon’s system or 
mine. For example, Bobbitt lumps together arguments from 
judicial precedent, inter-branch conventions, and custom, while I 
treat them as three different kinds of arguments. Bobbitt 
distinguishes arguments from original meaning (which form part 
of his historical modality) and arguments from contemporary 
meaning (which fall into the modality of text), while I lump them 
together as textual arguments.246 
It follows that many pairs of arguments, A and B, are 
commensurable if one uses Bobbitt’s classification system and 
incommensurable if one uses Fallon’s or mine, and vice versa. 
That is, one can make two arguments commensurable or 
incommensurable just by changing the classification system. 
(Note that this need not be true of all pairs of arguments, but it 
will be true of some of them.) Again, for Bobbitt, this result is 
impossible. Hence he must hold that there can be only one correct 
way of classifying legal arguments, and all others must be 
mistaken. 
Put another way, Bobbitt can maintain that the way people 
classify arguments is pragmatic and provisional, or he can 
maintain that arguments from different modalities are 
incommensurable and that conflicts between them can only be 
resolved by individual conscience; he cannot maintain both things. 
It now becomes easier to see what is at stake in the choice 
between Bobbitt’s theory of distinct modalities and my pragmatic 
account of rhetorical topics. If Bobbitt is correct that modalities 
constitute different and incommensurable ways for a legal 
proposition to be true, then they must correspond to clear 
distinctions in social practice. But if they are just rhetorical topics, 
they are more like a checklist for analysis and argument 
construction, a set of commonplaces that people turn to for 
invention. They do not have to have clear boundaries, they may 
fade into each other, people can divide them up in different ways, 
and they need not be incommensurable in the way that Bobbitt 
describes. 
 
 246. See text at notes 113-118, supra. 
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2. The problem of intramodal conflicts 
Bobbitt’s arguments also depend on a second claim, which, if 
anything, seems even more implausible. Bobbitt argues that, 
absent gaps in the factual record, lawyers must be able to resolve 
all conflicts within a single modality by using a set of generally 
recognized standards internal to the modality.247 
Why is this assumption implausible? Recall my earlier point 
that because the modalities are commonplaces, they rest on 
incompletely theorized justifications—generalized claims about 
the importance of text, structure, and so on, that people can 
specify in many different ways. In other words, one can think of 
the modalities as big buckets of roughly similar kinds of 
arguments that do not have to agree with each other in all 
respects. 
Within each modality of argument, there are many different 
versions and approaches. These are the subtopics of a given 
modality. The number of subtopics in any given modality is likely 
to increase over time as lawyers build on the sophistication and 
creativity of previous lawyers. 
Examples of these different subtopics are different ways of 
characterizing purpose or intention (for example, general and 
abstract accounts of intention; looking to subjective inventions; 
looking to objective evidence of purpose); different ways of 
characterizing and drawing inferences from texts (for example, 
the various canons of statutory construction); different theories of 
constitutional structure (for example, dual federalism, process-
protection, subsidiarity, unitary executive, political safeguards of 
federalism, etc.); different ways of articulating and measuring the 
best consequences (for example, welfarism, rule-
consequentialism, wealth maximization, individual human 
flourishing); different doctrinal techniques for applying 
precedents (for example, broad holdings versus narrow holdings, 
multiple ways of characterizing holding and dicta, conflicting 
methods for distinguishing or expanding precedents); different 
doctrinal categories for characterizing a given situation (for 
example, clear and present danger, symbolic speech, public 
 
 247. Id. at 1923 (“[W]ithin a single modality, the arguments are entirely comparable; 
the standards for the better argument are supplied by the modality itself. For example, 
there are well-developed canons of historical assessment against which can be measured 
competing historical arguments in constitutional law.”). 
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forum, compelled affirmation of belief, content-based 
regulation); and so on. These subtopics are also special topics in 
legal rhetoric; they also serve as ways of characterizing, analyzing, 
and solving legal problems. 
Because they approach legal questions from different 
perspectives, these different subtopics will often generate 
conflicting answers. That is why lawyers are often able to respond 
to an argument from a given modality by invoking a different 
subtopic within the same modality. If petitioner argues from 
abstract intentions, respondent might invoke concrete intentions; 
if petitioner makes a representation-reinforcement argument, 
respondent might invoke the principle of state sovereignty, and so 
on. 
Nor will lawyers and judges restrict themselves to one 
subtopic. They will alternatively adopt and reject different 
conceptions of purpose and structure as they move from decision 
to decision. It is catch-as-catch-can. This opportunism should 
hardly be surprising if one recalls what topics are: resources for 
the invention of arguments that can persuade others. 
Bobbitt assumes that all conflicts within a modality can be 
resolved through well-developed and generally accepted norms 
that are characteristic to each modality.248 But in many, if not most 
of these situations, there are no such widely accepted norms. If 
there were a general way to decide between abstract and concrete 
versions of original intention and understanding, lawyers would 
have settled on it a long time ago. There is no general decision 
procedure for arbitrating between dueling textual canons, even if 
there are many situations in which one canon is more persuasive 
than another. Bobbitt’s assertion that lawyers (much less 
historians) have a well-developed professional set of norms for 
arbitrating between dueling interpretations of the same historical 
facts seems naive. Not all disputes among lawyers, historians—or 
between lawyers and historians—can be blamed on professional 
incompetence or missing facts. In fact, the more competent 
professionals are, they more likely they are to produce conflicting 
arguments within each modality. 
Skepticism grows as one moves through the various 
modalities. Take arguments from precedent. Common-law 
reasoning allows many different ways of characterizing 
 
 248. Id. 
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precedents—broadly, narrowly, excluding different classes of 
previous cases as mistakes, and so on.249 There are standard and 
familiar ways of characterizing facts in different ways, including 
both the facts in the case at hand and the salient facts of previous 
decisions. This play in the joints is a feature of precedential 
argument, not a bug. The notion that common law reasoning 
converges on unitary answers about the correct way to read 
precedents in contested cases seems implausible. 
It is even less clear that ideas internal to legal reasoning can 
tell us which account of consequences is the legally correct one. 
Philosophers have long debated which version of 
consequentialism makes the most sense; even if one restricts one’s 
self to professional debates among lawyers, there are many ways 
of characterizing and measuring consequences (which 
consequences, to whom, and over which area or time period?). 
And the notion that “there are well-developed canons of . . . 
assessment”250 for Bobbitt’s category of ethical argument is 
mysterious, to say the least. 
Why does this matter? Well, if Bobbitt’s thesis about 
intramodal conflicts turns out to be false, then it may not make 
much sense to speak of conflicts between modalities at all. The 
very idea of an intermodal conflict assumes that there really is a 
single best argument in two different modalities and that these 
arguments conflict. But if there is not a demonstrably single best 
argument within each modality, then the two modalities do not 
actually conflict. Instead conflicts within one modality correspond 
to conflicts within another modality. Modalities A and B do not 
really conflict if within each modality there are reasonable 
arguments on both sides and there is not a single generally-
accepted decision procedure within the modality that can resolve 
the conflict between them. Many apparent examples of cross-
modal conflict may actually reflect the fact that we have not 
 
 249. See, e.g., KARL LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION 77–91 (1960) 
(discussing various permitted moves in doctrinal argument); KARL LLEWELLYN, THE 
BRAMBLE BUSH 74–75 (1951) (1930) (describing broad and narrow techniques of reading 
precedents). One can understand Llewellyn’s work on precedent as more than merely 
Legal Realist skepticism, but rather as offering topic catalogs for lawyers; the same applies 
to his famous essay on dueling canons of statutory interpretation. See Karl N. Llewellyn, 
Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or Canons About How Statutes 
Are to Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395, 401–06 (1950). 
 250. Id. 
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thought hard enough about counter-arguments within each 
modality. 
The existence of multiple reasonable positions within each 
modality helps explain why a coherence-based approach to legal 
argument makes more sense than a strong claim of 
incommensurability. We don’t have to abandon one modality to 
accept another; we just have to switch our allegiances to another 
reasonable argument within the modality. 
C. PEOPLE USE TOPICS TO REASON BY COHERENCE AND 
REFLECTIVE EQUILIBRIUM 
The idea of “incommensurable” justifications might suggest 
that the modalities are walled off from each other, as if they were 
in separate silos. But this is not how either legal culture or legal 
topics actually work. 
First, the justifications underlying different topics overlap. 
Because structural arguments concern proper function, they 
overlap with arguments about purpose (for example, in arguing 
how the system is supposed to work) or consequences (in 
arguments about whether the system is functioning well or badly). 
Arguments from text and purpose may overlap because people 
may infer purpose from the text. Arguments from political 
tradition can overlap with arguments from purpose, because 
people often identify the values of the tradition as purposes of the 
Constitution. Arguments from inter-branch conventions may 
overlap with judicial precedents about these conventions. 
Arguments from custom and natural law may overlap because in 
order to understand what makes human beings flourish, one 
might want to look to how people arrange their affairs over long 
periods of time; custom may reflect the “wisdom of crowds” about 
the conditions of human flourishing. 
Second, the modalities offer explanations for why other 
modalities are good arguments. For example, one might offer 
structural reasons to explain why judges should take into account 
considerations of institutional prudence. One might argue that 
lawyers should look to natural law (1) because doing so produces 
the best consequences; (2) because the text of the Constitution 
implies it (for example, in the Ninth Amendment and the 
Privileges or Immunities Clause); or (3) because the framers 
expected that people would look to natural law in interpretation. 
One might defend interpretation according to original meaning 
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(an argument from text) (1) because it offers the best 
consequences; (2) because it is most consistent with the structure 
of a constitution grounded on popular sovereignty; (3) because 
the framers and adopters expected it; (4) because it is required by 
rule of law principles; or (5) because it is characteristic of the 
traditions of American legal practice. These examples show how 
different commonplaces mutually support each other. Indeed, if 
one thinks of the modalities as commonplaces, it would be 
surprising if this were not the case. 
Third, as noted above, Fallon pointed out that lawyers and 
judges often experience arguments from different modalities as 
pointing toward the same result.251 The reason is that when we are 
trying to decide which argument from modality A is the best one, 
our judgments may be influenced by our views about which 
version of an argument from modality B is best, and vice-versa. 
People may update and modify their initial impressions about 
which argument is best after they look at the problem from 
another angle. Again, if one thinks of modalities as special topics, 
there is nothing mysterious about this. That is precisely what using 
different topics achieves: topics offer multiple perspectives for 
solving a problem, and as we approach the problem from different 
angles, we may update our initial impressions. 
Here is a simple example. The First Amendment begins: 
“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of 
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the 
freedom of speech, or of the press.”252 Does the First Amendment 
apply to the Executive and Judicial branches of government? At 
first glance, the text would appear to say no. There is even a 
familiar textual canon that supports this result: expressio unius est 
exclusio alterius. When one or more things in a class are clearly 
specified in a law, the other elements of the class are excluded. 
Moreover, because the omission of the Executive and Judicial 
Branches would have such important consequences, we must 
presume that the omission was deliberate and that the framers 
and adopters thought carefully about the wording.253 
 
 251. Fallon, Constructivist Coherence, supra note 99, at 1193. 
 252.  U.S. CONST. amend. 1. 
 253. Hence, a few law professors have bit the bullet and insisted that the First 
Amendment really does apply only to Congress, and not to the President, to the Judiciary, 
or to the President and the Senate (as opposed to the entire Congress) in making and 
ratifying treaties. Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, The Subjects of the Constitution, 62 STAN. 
L. REV. 1209, 1250 (2010); GARY LAWSON & GUY SEIDMAN, THE CONSTITUTION OF 
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So far it looks as if the best argument from text is that the 
First Amendment applies only to Congress. But now consider the 
problem from the perspective of the other modalities.254 First 
consider consequences: Judges would be able to issue injunctions 
and contempt citations against newspapers that criticized or 
disrespected them under their contempt power. The President, as 
commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces, could require that all 
soldiers pray to the same God.255 
Next consider purpose: The goal of the Establishment and 
Free Exercise Clauses is to secure religious liberty. But religious 
liberty would be thoroughly undermined if government officials 
outside Congress could abridge it at will and with impunity. 
Next consider structure: The American government is a 
republic based on popular sovereignty. Federal government 
officials act as agents of We the People. Because they are only 
agents, We the People must have the right to criticize their 
conduct, which means that citizens must also be able to discuss 
public issues freely. It would undermine the structure of 
republican government if government officials could punish or 
hinder citizens from criticizing official conduct and discussing 
matters of public concern. Hence guarantees of speech and press 
must apply to all branches of government.256 
Next consider precedent: Every federal court that has 
considered the issue since the early 19th century has assumed that 
the First Amendment applies to all three branches of 
government.257 
 
EMPIRE: TERRITORIAL EXPANSION & AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY 42 (2004); Mark P. 
Denbeaux, The First Word of the First Amendment, 80 NW. U. L. REV. 1156, 1201 (1986). 
 254. Curtis A. Bradley & Neil S. Siegel, Constructed Constraint and the Constitutional 
Text, 64 DUKE L.J. 1213, 1241 (2015) (using this example to demonstrate that “the same 
considerations that are potentially relevant in resolving the meaning of ambiguous text can 
also affect the perceived clarity of the text in the first instance.”) 
 255. AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 316 (2005); 
BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM, supra note 2, at 204–05. 
 256. Cf. AMAR, supra note 255, at 316 (“[T]he amendment declared certain 
preexisting principles of liberty and self-government —’the free exercise of religion’ and 
‘the freedom of speech, [and] of the press’—that implicitly applied against all federal 
branches (not just Congress) and all federal actions (not just laws).”). 
 257. Magill v. Brown, 16 F. Cas. 408, 427 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1833) (Baldwin, J.) (arguing 
that the First Amendment “wholly prohibits the action of the legislative or judicial power 
of the Union on the subject matter of a religious establishment, or any restraint on the free 
exercise of religion.”); Shrum v. City of Coweta, 449 F.3d 1132, 1142 (10th Cir. 2006) 
(majority opinion of McConnell, J.) (“As this history shows, there was no intention to 
confine the reach of the First Amendment to the legislative branch.”); Bradley and Siegel, 
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Next consider natural rights: The freedoms of speech and 
religion are rights governments are instituted to protect. 
Therefore all branches of government must respect them. 
Next consider ethos and political tradition: Freedoms of 
speech, press, and religion are central to a free society and to a 
democratic republic. Failing to apply these guarantees to all 
federal officials would be inconsistent with the character of our 
institutions and the American people themselves. 
Given these arguments, does our initial the textual argument 
look so clear cut? No, it does not. In fact, these reasons may spur 
us to think of other textual arguments. 
Perhaps the term “Congress” is a nonliteral usage.258 Just as 
the words “speech” and “press” apply to more than just speaking 
and to using a printing press, perhaps the word “Congress” is 
actually a synecdoche—a figure of speech in which a part stands 
for a greater whole. So maybe “Congress” means something like 
“the Federal government as a whole” or “the Federal government 
acting according to law.” That would make sense given that 
Congress was by far the largest and most important branch of 
government at the Founding. 
There are two other reasons why we should read the text to 
subsume the other branches of government in the term 
“Congress.” First, as noted above, Congress was widely expected 
to be the most important branch in 1791. Second, it was generally 
assumed that government agents could and should only act 
according to law; i.e., consistent with the norms that bind the 
legislator, Congress. All other actions would be ultra vires. Thus, 
the inclusion of other branches literally goes without saying, and 
that is why nothing is explicitly said in the text. 
Finally, the fact that the text requires Congress to respect 
guarantees of speech, press, and religion does not preclude other 
branches from being bound for reasons of structure, prudence, 
precedent, ethos, or tradition. Unless we have strong reasons to 
the contrary, we should not read “Congress shall make no law” to 
mean that “All other branches may make law.” 
 
Constructed Constraint and the Constitutional Text, supra note 254, at 1244 (“American 
constitutional practice, however, has always viewed the First Amendment as relevant to 
the conduct of the entire federal government, not just Congress.”). 
 258. AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION: THE 
PRECEDENTS AND PRINCIPLES WE LIVE BY 34 (2012); BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM, 
supra note 2, at 204–05. 
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By the time we finish working through the other modalities, 
our initial textual argument looks much less convincing; and we 
might decide that one of the other textual arguments is actually 
the best one, all things considered. Because arguments from the 
other modalities seem so strong, we may revise our initial 
impression about which argument is best within a given modality. 
Put another way, our judgments using one tool or perspective for 
problem-solving can be influenced—and perhaps should be 
influenced—by what we learn from using other tools and 
perspectives.259 By using all of the forms of argument to check and 
inform each other, we may often converge on a best answer. 
Fallon calls this approach “constructive coherence.”260 
That experience would make little sense if the modalities 
were truly incommensurable with each other. But once again, if 
one thinks about them as special topics—that is, heuristics or aids 
to understanding and analyzing a problem—this process of 
mutual influence seems entirely natural. 
D. CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION IS SOCIAL 
Bobbitt emphasizes the incommensurability of modalities 
because he wants to clear a space for individual conscience. 
Accordingly, he distinguishes between how we decide—through 
the exercise of individual conscience—and how we explain our 
decisions to others—through shared modalities of legal argument. 
This, however, might generate a mistaken impression: On the one 
hand, we have social processes of persuasion; on the other we 
have the individual moment of decision far from the madding 
crowd’s ignoble strife. If we think of the modalities as rhetorical 
topics, we will get a more realistic picture of how constitutional 
judgment really works. 
First, people make, evaluate, and choose among legal 
positions using rhetorical tools of analysis, not outside them. They 
are tools to think with, not to think around. Moreover, these tools 
of thought offer contrasting perspectives on problems that people 
can consider together, rather than in isolation from each other. 
Reflective equilibrium in a community of mutual influence is a 
 
 259. See Bradley & Siegel, Constructed Constraint and the Constitutional Text, supra 
note 254, at 1243 (“[A] variety of modalities come into play, often in an interactive fashion, 
in constructing understandings about clarity and ambiguity in the constitutional text.”) . 
 260. Fallon, Constructivist Coherence, supra note 99, at 1192–93. 
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better account of legal decision making than a solitary retreat to 
individual conscience. 
Second, individual conscience does not operate in a vacuum. 
Our sense of what is just and unjust, as well as what is reasonable 
and unreasonable, on-the-wall and off-the-wall, is shaped by the 
opinions and beliefs of the people around us, even when we reject 
it in part. A strong distinction between social influence and 
individual conscience is spurious, a point on which Bobbitt and I 
agree.261 
Constitutional judgment, even within the mind of a single 
individual, is social and subject to multiple forms of social 
influence. Constitutional judgment occurs within a social practice 
of arguing with other people, reflecting on their best arguments, 
finding ways to persuade them, and readjusting and re-
characterizing one’s best arguments in light of what one imagines 
other people will think. That is, constitutional judgment is 
performed before the imagined audience of one’s community (or 
communities).262 These audiences include fellow judges, lawyers, 
professionals, scholars, family members; members of the same 
political party, religion, organization, or social movement; media, 
and the general public.263 In forming constitutional judgments, we 
take into account what these real or imagined audiences think, 
whether they will find what we say reasonable or unreasonable, 
plausible or implausible, and we shape and revise our judgments 
accordingly. This is true even of the iconoclast or of those who 
pride themselves on their individuality, authenticity, and 
 
 261. See id. at 1966 (“That an act of conscience may be motivated by many conscious 
and unconscious cultural, historical, political, and moral convictions is probably true. But 
these convictions cannot legitimate the act, nor is it necessary that they do so, so long as 
the decisions can be retrospectively explained in terms of the accepted modal 
arguments.”). 
 262. See LAURENCE BAUM, JUDGES AND THEIR AUDIENCES (2006) (arguing that 
judges decide cases with actual or imagined audiences of colleagues, acquaintances, family 
members, and others in mind). 
 263. See Peter Brooks, The Law as Narrative and Rhetoric, in LAW’S STORIES: 
NARRATIVE AND RHETORIC IN THE LAW, supra note 61, at 14, 21 (“[T]he audiences from 
which assent must be won are often multiple. In many a Supreme Court opinion . . . one 
can detect the Court’s attempts to address different listeners: dissenting Brethren first of 
all, then lower court judges, then state legislatures and the police forces of the nation, then 
the public at large.”); James D. Hopkins, Notes on Style in Judicial Opinions, 8 Trial 
Judges’ J. 49, 49–50 (1969) (explaining that judicial opinions are exercises in persuasion 
before different kinds of audiences); Abner J. Mikva, For Whom Judges Write, 61 S. CAL. 
L. REV. 1357, 1366 (1988) (“It is clear . . . that the audiences for judges’ opinions have 
gradually grown in both size and diversity.”). 
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incorruptibility. The effect of audience influence is obvious for 
lawyers, who need to persuade judges. But it is also true of judges, 
who want to decide cases and justify their views in ways that will 
be persuasive to fellow judges, other lawyers, and to the public at 
large. 
Third, individual constitutional judgment does not float free 
from the socially shared tools of constitutional reasoning and 
constitutional argument. The distinction between how people 
decide questions and how they explain their decisions to others is 
not clear-cut. People may use some of the same tools to reason 
that they use to persuade others, even if the processes of decision 
and persuasion are not identical. The process of constitutional 
interpretation is social, even—and especially—when different 
kinds of arguments conflict. 
The notion of decision according to individual conscience can 
be misleading: People do not reason in isolation, like lonely 
hermits. They reason in discussions and arguments with other 
people. Even when we are alone, we imagine the responses of 
others in our heads. And when people reason, they employ 
common tools of argument and analysis. Rhetorical topics have 
this dual character: they are simultaneously individual and social. 
They are tools for individual thought and invention, and they are 
also tools that people share with others for analysis and 
persuasion. 
Both Bobbitt and I offer theories of constitutional rhetoric, 
but we emphasize different things. Bobbitt emphasizes grammar; 
I emphasize problem-solving; Bobbitt emphasizes clear 
distinctions among forms of argument; I emphasize pragmatic 
boundaries; Bobbitt emphasizes the necessity of decision; I 
emphasize the role of persuasion; Bobbitt emphasizes individual 
conscience; I emphasize mutual social influence. 
E. COMMON TOPICS ARE CONSISTENT WITH MANY DIFFERENT 
KINDS OF CONSTITUTIONAL THEORIES 
Bobbitt holds that all constitutional theories that attempt to 
justify the constitutional system and judicial review are doomed 
to failure, as well as all constitutional theories that privilege some 
modalities over others. This view excludes most other 
constitutional theories. Does this mean that the social practice of 
using the modalities is inconsistent with most constitutional 
theories? It does not. Because the modalities are nothing more 
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than rhetorical topics, they are consistent with many different 
theories of constitutional interpretation, including the many 
theories that Bobbitt rejects. 
Bobbitt is correct in one respect. A good constitutional 
theory should try to explain most of our existing practices, even if 
it is quite critical of some of them. An interpretive theory that 
claimed that the only valid arguments are arguments from original 
intention or natural law, for example, will have a great deal of 
difficulty explaining our current practices of constitutional 
argument. But most theories of constitutional interpretation—
and most theorists—make space for all of the standard topics in 
constitutional argument; they simply give them different degrees 
of weight and emphasis. 
Topics are shared tools for solving problems and inventing 
persuasive arguments; and the modalities in particular are 
commonplaces about interpretation. By their nature, such tools 
are likely to be compatible with many different theories of 
constitutional interpretation, and can fit into many different kinds 
of theoretical structures. That is why lawyers and judges with very 
different theoretical commitments can and do employ the same 
topics. It follows that the modalities will be compatible with most 
theories of interpretation, including both originalist and non-
originalist theories, theories that treat all of the modalities as 
having equal status, and theories that give priority to some kinds 
of arguments over others. 
Bobbitt correctly views the modalities as offering a common 
language, but it is precisely for that reason that people can use 
them in many different ways, based on different theoretical 
commitments. Although lawyers and judges will use the same 
common topics when they attempt to persuade each other, this 
does not tell us very much about which interpretive theory is the 
best theory. 
Each interpretive theory will employ and order common 
topics according to its theoretical structure—its distinctive set of 
theoretical commitments, and its distinctive answers to the 
question of how to interpret the Constitution and why 
interpreting in this way is appropriate. Thus, constitutional 
theories may use the same topics in very different ways, 
depending on their internal structure. We can see this by 
comparing different kinds of pluralist and originalist theories.  
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Pluralist theories argue that interpreters should consider 
multiple factors in interpreting the Constitution and that no single 
factor controls all the time. Bobbitt’s theory is an example. 
Yet pluralist theories may have very different theoretical 
structures. Consider David Strauss’s common law 
constitutionalism. Descriptively, it contends that constitutional 
law changes through common-law development and through the 
evolution of conventions; normatively, it claims that lawyers 
should analyze and interpret the Constitution in this way.264  
In Strauss’s model, doctrinal argument is the standard 
aproach, but lawyers may use all of the modalities as they develop 
doctrine and conventions in common-law fashion. (Recall that 
“doctrinal argument” in the broader sense uses many different 
topics; it does not merely apply existing doctrine to new factual 
situations.) The constitutional text has no special status; 
interpreters adhere to the text as a matter of convenience and in 
order to promote stability and predictability.265 Strauss argues that 
his common-law approach is justified because the common law is 
a useful and legitimate way to develop law generally, and 
constitutional law in particular. The common law approach 
promotes stability, it conforms to rule of law values, and it 
economizes on wisdom.266 (Bobbitt, of course, would reject any 
attempt either to justify or to legitimate constitutional argument 
by offering these kinds of reasons.) 
Ronald Dworkin’s moral reading is also a pluralist theory, 
but it has a different structure. It argues that to interpret the 
Constitution interpreters should construct the best account of 
existing legal materials that is also consistent with the best 
available moral theory.267 Dworkin believes that this is the correct 
approach because in interpreting the Constitution—or the law 
generally—interpreters should promote the political value of 
integrity and strive to make the Constitution the best it can be.268 
People might associate Dworkin’s moral reading solely with 
arguments from consequences, or with arguments from natural 
 
 264. STRAUSS, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION, supra note 34, at 35 (stating that 
precedents of the Supreme Court and traditions and understandings that have developed 
outside of the courts “form an indispensable part” of our living Constitution). 
 265. Id. at 104–05. 
 266. Id. at 38–45. 
 267. RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 139, 230–32, 379 (1987). 
 268. Id. at 53, 77, 225, 233, 262–63, 338. 
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law and natural rights. But this is incorrect: moral readers will use 
all of the modalities in rationally reconstructing doctrine and 
constitutional conventions.269 
Pluralist theories can also differ in the weight and priority 
they give to different kinds of considerations. Some pluralist 
theories, like Bobbitt’s or Stephen Griffin’s, argue that all 
different kinds of arguments are on an equal footing.270 But other 
theories do not. Consider, as an example, William Eskridge and 
Philip Frickey’s “funnel of abstraction,” originally developed for 
statutory interpretation.271 This approach gives a general but 
defeasible priority to some considerations over others. Richard 
Fallon’s constructivist coherence theory also has a priority rule: 
when there is an irreducible conflict between different kinds of 
arguments, interpreters should give priority to arguments in a 
certain order.272 
Now consider originalist theories. Originalist theories share 
a common structure. They postulate that something is fixed at the 
time of adoption—whether original meaning, intention, or 
understanding—and that constitutional interpretations must be 
 
 269. Jack M. Balkin, History, Rights, and the Moral Reading, 96 B.U.L. REV. 1425, 
1439–41 (2016) (arguing that Dworkin’s moral reading is realized through standard forms 
of legal argument); James Fleming, Fidelity, Change, and the Good Constitution, 62 AM. J. 
COMP. L. 515, 518 (2014) (“[T]he multiple modalities of argument in constitutional 
interpretation . . . . are sites in which we argue about, and sources through which we justify, 
change: in particular, how best to realize and thus to be faithful to our constitutional 
aspirations. Or, as Dworkin put it, how to interpret the Constitution so as to make it the 
best it can be.”). 
 270. Stephen M. Griffin, Pluralism in Constitutional Interpretation, 72 TEX. L. REV. 
1753, 1765–67 (1994) (arguing that the plurality of methods suggests that legal scholars 
should not try to create grand theories to resolve individual cases). 
 271. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as Practical 
Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REV. 321, 353 (1990); see WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., 
INTERPRETING LAW: A PRIMER ON HOW TO READ STATUTES AND THE CONSTITUTION 
361-63 (2016) (applying the model to constitutional argument); see also Barry Friedman & 
Sara Solow, The Federal Right to an Adequate Education, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 92, 103 
(2013) (proposing a hierarchy of constitutional arguments that asks judges to consult, in 
order, Text, Framing Understandings, Ratification Understandings, Post-Ratification 
Process, Judicial Precedent, Evolving Practice, Consequential Arguments, and Ethical 
Arguments). These versions have their own distinctive set of topics. 
 272. Fallon, Constructivist Coherence, supra note 99, at 1193–94 (“[T]he implicit 
norms of our constitutional practice accord the foremost authority to arguments from text, 
followed, in descending order, by arguments concerning the framers’ intent, constitutional 
theory, precedent, and moral and policy values.”); see also id. at 1243–46 (proposing a 
hierarchy of text, historical intent, theory, precedent, and value.) 
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consistent with what is fixed.273 Beyond this, however, originalists 
differ greatly among themselves. 
People might be tempted to think of originalism as a monist 
theory—one that hopes to reduce all of interpretation to a single 
consideration.274 But this is incorrect. Most originalists are 
actually dualists, because their theories usually have a two-level 
structure; namely, figuring out what is fixed and then applying it 
to new facts. This is most obvious in the case of the New 
Originalism, but it is true even for originalists who reject the 
distinction between interpretation and construction. 
New Originalists use the same common topics that pluralists 
do, but in two different ways and for two different purposes: The 
first is to clarify what is fixed at adoption (interpretation); the 
second is to implement original meaning in practice 
(construction). 
In the first task, New Originalists will use topics to clarify any 
ambiguities in original meaning/intention/understanding. For this 
purpose, some kinds of arguments will probably be more salient 
and useful than others. The most prominent are textual 
arguments, which include a broad range of subtopics: arguments 
about evidence of contemporaneous use, dictionary definitions 
and textual canons of construction. In addition, one might clarify 
or resolve ambiguities in original meaning through considerations 
of purpose, structure, adoption-era practice, adoption-era judicial 
precedent, and adoption-era ideas about natural law and natural 
rights. New Originalists may well give priority to some kind of 
arguments over others, even if the priority is defeasible. 
In constitutional construction, New Originalists will also use 
all of the common topics in the construction zone. Here the goal 
is to develop, implement, and apply doctrine consistent with 
original meaning. In the construction zone, New Originalists can 
place all of the modalities on an equal footing, or they can have a 
soft priority for some kinds of arguments akin to Eskridge and 
Frickey’s funnel of abstraction. Barnett and Bernick’s theory of 
 
 273. Solum, Originalism and Constitutional Construction, supra note 1, at 456. 
 274. Brett G. Scharfs, Adjudication And The Problems Of Incommensurability, 42 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1367, 1412 (2001) (arguing that formalism and originalism are 
examples of legal monism because “each posit[s] a single value that should be consulted in 
determining the outcome of a case.”); Keith E. Whittington, Originalism: A Critical 
Introduction, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 375, 388 (2013) (noting, but rejecting the argument 
that originalism involves “argumentative monism” that contrasts with pluralist methods.). 
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good faith construction emphasizes fidelity to original purpose 
and function.275 That is, their theory simultaneously makes a claim 
about interpretive attitude and a claim about proper interpretive 
technique. Therefore their theory might give arguments from 
purpose and structure priority over other kinds of arguments.276 
What about originalists, like Judge Bork and Justice Scalia, 
who reject the interpretation/construction distinction? They are 
also dualists. To ascertain original meaning, these originalists will 
also use various topics such as text, purpose, structure, and natural 
rights, although they may place a different emphasize on some 
topics depending on their particular version of originalism. 
Moreover, as I argued previously, all originalists, even those who 
reject the interpretation/construction distinction, allow for some 
degree of doctrinal development, and some degree of deference 
to custom, tradition, and past practice. That is especially so if they 
are lower court judges or arguing before lower court judges—then 
they will mostly reason from and apply previous precedents. Even 
originalists who reject the interpretation/construction distinction 
must still fill in gaps, consult tradition and past practice, and 
reason from case to case. They must still apply original meaning—
and doctrines consistent with original meaning—to new facts and 
new technologies. They will use all of the modalities for these 
tasks, not simply one. 
A final example of how originalism incorporates multiple 
modalities is Bruce Ackerman’s theory of dualist democracy. 
Ackerman’s is an originalism with multiple starting points, one 
following each constitutional moment. As its name implies, the 
theory’s method of interpretation is also dualist. First, interpreters 
must articulate the basic commitments of each successive 
regime—Ackerman’s equivalent to original public meaning. Then 
interpreters must engage in what Ackerman calls 
“intergenerational synthesis.”277 They must ask how each 
 
 275. See supra text accompanying notes 43–49. 
 276. A topical approach helps us understand the similarities and differences between 
originalists and pluralists. In the construction zone, for example, the New Originalism 
resembles how pluralists think of constitutional interpretation generally; except that 
pluralists might be willing to discount clear evidence of original meaning because of other, 
stronger, considerations, while New Originalists would not. This difference marks them as 
originalists who have a two-step theory, and not pluralists, who have only one. 
 277. 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 88–90 (defining the 
problem of multigenerational or intergenerational synthesis); id. at 113–19, 141–62 (1991) 
(describing the technique of intergenerational synthesis). 
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successive regime’s commitments build on, alter, or affect the 
others. As with Dworkin, one might think that Ackerman’s model 
relies only on a handful of modalities: namely, purpose, political 
tradition, ethos, and honored authority. In fact, figuring out the 
commitments of each regime and combining them together 
artfully requires all of the tools in the lawyer’s toolkit, and 
therefore all of the standard forms of argument. 
When lawyers and judges with very different theories of 
interpretation argue about contested cases, they may often sound 
very much alike. The reason is that they use common topics that 
are compatible with many different theories. 
Original meaning originalists, for example, hold that original 
meaning trumps other considerations. But in appropriate 
circumstances originalists can and do use topics that are unrelated 
to original meaning—for example, arguments from doctrine, 
political convention, custom, tradition, and institutional 
prudence. Originalists may turn to these arguments when original 
meaning does not offer a determinative answer. Originalists may 
also use these arguments if they are otherwise consistent with 
original meaning but are likely to be the most persuasive to their 
audience.  
To be sure, when originalists write amicus briefs, they may 
exclusively argue in originalist terms, because they want to draw 
attention to evidence of original meaning. But when originalists 
represent parties in litigation before judges who may or may not 
share their theoretical views, they are likely to make every kind 
of argument that might convince a court. Doing this does not 
mean that they have abandoned originalism for pluralism or that 
they are secretly non-originalists. It means only that they shape 
their arguments to their audience. That is what sound lawyering 
requires. 
Conversely, non-originalists deny that original meaning, 
intention, or understanding trumps all other considerations. Yet 
non-originalists very often make arguments about original 
meaning, intention and understanding, especially when they 
discuss questions about which there is very little judicial 
precedent—for example, war powers or presidential 
impeachment. They will also make these arguments if they think 
that they will be most persuasive before a particular judge or 
decisionmaker. 
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Non-originalists are usually pluralists of some kind; they 
believe that interpreters should consider multiple approaches to 
interpretation and use whatever arguments are most persuasive 
given the available materials. It follows, then, that when the most 
persuasive arguments concern original meaning, intention, and 
understanding, non-originalists will make these kinds of 
arguments. Doing this does not mean that they have converted to 
originalism. What it does mean, however, is that nonoriginalists 
cannot, in general, claim that arguments from original meaning, 
intention, or understanding are impossible or futile—for example, 
because doing the necessary historical work is too difficult. That 
is because non-originalists will turn to the very same kinds of 
arguments if they believe that they are the most persuasive. 
One can multiply examples, but the point should be clear. 
People with very theoretical views can and often do make the very 
same arguments before decisionmakers. They can do this because 
constitutional argument builds on common topics for persuasion 
that, in turn, rest on widely accepted commonplaces about 
interpretation. 
F. THE TOPICS AND LEGITIMACY 
I have just argued that the modalities are consistent with 
many different theories, and do not play favorites among them. 
Bobbitt disagrees. He claims that the existence of the modalities 
renders other constitutional theories incorrect because they rest 
on a flawed conception of legitimacy. But this objection proves 
little, because Bobbitt’s conception of legitimacy is unique to him, 
and most constitutional theories are not concerned with it. 
Bobbitt’s theory has different goals than most other 
constitutional theories. His central focus is securing legitimacy. 
But by “legitimacy,” Bobbitt means general acceptance and use 
of common modalities for constitutional argument, and nothing 
more.278 He rejects all constitutional theories that attempt to 
establish the legitimacy of judicial review or of the constitutional 
system by force of theoretical argument. But most theories do not 
try to establish “legitimacy” in Bobbitt’s sense of the word. They 
have other fish to fry. 
 
 278. Bobbitt, Reflections, supra note 18, at 1938 (explaining that “there is nothing 
more to legitimacy” than following the rules of how to make a constitutional argument 
using the modalities). 
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There are many different kinds of constitutional theories, 
with many different kinds of projects. These projects include, but 
are not limited to: 
• explaining how to interpret the Constitution correctly; 
• explaining how judges should do their jobs; 
• explaining the historical development of the constitutional 
system and constitutional doctrine; 
• explaining how the Constitution, or certain features of it, 
would be more just, democratic, efficient, or reasonable or 
just if it were interpreted differently; 
• explaining why the Constitution, or certain features of it, is 
sufficiently just, democratic, efficient, or reasonable under its 
current interpretation; 
• explaining how constitutions in general serve important 
political values, including democracy, human rights, justice, 
and the rule of law; 
• explaining the pros and cons of constitutional design, and 
arguing for or against particular design features. 
• explaining how the current constitutional system, or parts of 
it, could be improved by redesigning or amending it; and 
• defending the adequacy and/or the justice of the current 
constitutional system against proposals for redesign or 
amendment. 
I agree with Bobbitt that none of these projects will establish 
legitimacy in his sense of the word. But that is largely because his 
definition of legitimacy is idiosyncratic. 
Legitimacy is a complex concept with many different 
versions. For purposes of present discussion, one can distinguish 
four different kinds of legitimacy. Sociological legitimacy is the 
general acceptance of the regime’s right to rule, including the 
right of state officials to employ coercion. Procedural legitimacy 
concerns whether the people clothed with state power in the 
system make decisions according to law—that is according to 
official legal rules and procedures. Moral legitimacy concerns 
whether the constitutional or political system is sufficiently just or 
morally admirable. Finally, democratic legitimacy concerns 
whether the constitutional or political system makes government 
action responsive and accountable to public opinion, public will, 
and public values, or otherwise allows the members of the 
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political community to govern themselves.279 A regime can have 
more or less of each kind of legitimacy, because legitimacy is a 
comparative and contextual term, like “tall.” Nevertheless, in 
some contexts, one might say that a regime is so deficient in some 
respect that it lacks legitimacy and is therefore illegitimate, just as 
one might say that people below a certain height are not tall.280 
What does Bobbitt mean by “legitimacy?” He means the 
acceptance and continuation of a practice of argument by a 
community of participants—the fact that people accept and 
reason in a certain way within a particular constitutional order.281 
Such a concept of legitimacy is not directed to either moral 
legitimacy or democratic legitimacy. It could be a limited form of 
procedural legitimacy, because Bobbitt believes that using 
modalities in argument helps ensure that decisions are made 
according to law.282 But there is a great deal more to procedural 
legitimacy than using the modalities. A legal system can be 
thoroughly corrupt and disregard all sorts of rule of law values 
even if officials employ standard legal arguments. 
Bobbitt’s concept of legitimacy could also be a limited form 
of sociological legitimacy. Bobbitt focuses on a particular social 
fact: that the sort of people who write briefs, make legal 
arguments, and decide cases accept certain ways of making 
constitutional arguments as appropriate for resolving 
constitutional controversies and directing the exercise of state 
power. But this, too, falls well short of a full version of sociological 
legitimacy in several important respects. 
Most people in American society never read judicial 
decisions or briefs, and therefore have no idea what kinds of 
constitutional arguments lawyers make. So the fact that lawyers 
and politicians use the modalities is unlikely to be the basis of 
sociological legitimacy in the United States. It does not explain 
why ordinary Americans think that government officials have a 
right to rule and use coercion.  
 
 279. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM, supra note 2, at 64–65; see also Richard H. 
Fallon, Jr., Legitimacy and the Constitution, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1787, 1790 (2005) 
(distinguishing between moral, sociological, and legal legitimacy). 
 280. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM, supra note 2, at 64–65. 
 281. Bobbitt, Reflections, supra note 18, at 1938. 
 282. Id. at 1881 (“[L]aw is legitimated by adherence to practice; this occurs when a 
decision is rendered according to law.”). 
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It is true that everyone in the United States has the right to 
make legal arguments about the Constitution using the 
modalities, but most Americans do not do so. Most citizens, if they 
discuss the Constitution at all, are likely to engage in what Bobbitt 
calls “constitutional discourse,” which, Bobbitt asserts, plays no 
role in legitimating constitutional law or judicial review.283  
Moreover, if Bobbitt did claim that the general public’s 
acceptance of the modalities bestows legitimacy, he would have 
to account for a troubling fact: Public opinion surveys suggest that 
a large part of the public does not agree with the equal status of 
the modalities. Many Americans think that judges should decide 
cases according to one modality—what the founders intended.284 
To the extent that Bobbitt’s account of legitimacy is 
sociological, it offers a very limited version of sociological 
legitimacy. The practice of making arguments helps bestow 
sociological legitimacy for constitutional law and judicial review 
among a limited class of educated professionals—lawyers and 
judges, political actors and a small number of citizens who 
regularly make constitutional arguments or otherwise pay 
attention to constitutional arguments. 
This limited form of sociological legitimacy is valuable and 
important. Rhetorical topics allow people to reason together from 
common ideas and premises. This is the point of rhetorical 
invention—to appeal to other people in a community by means of 
premises held in common.285 As Bobbitt himself notes—albeit 
disapprovingly—people with a range of different constitutional 
theories build on or incorporate these topics, and so these topics 
offer them a common language for theoretical disputes. 
Moreover, as argued in Part III, the use of common topics allows 
lawyers and judges to explain to each other why their 
interpretations are connected to and further the Constitution.286 
 
 283. See id. at 1952–53 (“The whole population is rarely called upon to make legal 
decisions with respect to the Constitution, although they are involved in constitutional 
discourse almost continuously.”). 
 284. See NATHANIEL PERSILY, JACK CITRIN, AND PATRICK J. EGAN, PUBLIC 
OPINION AND CONSTITUTIONAL CONTROVERSY (2008) (collecting public opinion surveys 
about constitutional interpretation); Jamal Greene, Nathaniel Persily & Stephen 
Ansolabehere, Profiling Originalism, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 356, 363 (2011) (noting opinion 
polls taken over seven years indicating that somewhere between 37 and 49 percent of the 
public believe that the Supreme Court should focus primarily on original intention.). 
 285. See supra Part III.A. 
 286. See supra Part III.F-J. 
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For these reasons Bobbitt rightly emphasizes the importance of 
modalities—which are really commonplaces and shared 
rhetorical topics—as a source of sociological and procedural 
legitimacy. 
Yet this conception of legitimacy remains quite limited. First, 
it does not secure sociological legitimacy among the members of 
the general public, most of whom never read constitutional 
decisions and pay little to no attention to what lawyers and judges 
say in their briefs, oral arguments, and decisions. Second, it does 
not secure procedural legitimacy in the work of legal officials, 
because one can use the topics to justify any number of practices 
that violate procedural legitimacy and rule of law values. 
When most constitutional theorists talk about legitimacy, 
they are interested in something quite different from Bobbitt’s 
very limited account. They want to know whether our current 
system is sufficiently morally legitimate, procedurally legitimate, 
or democratically legitimate; and what kinds of reforms, changes 
in practice, or changes in constitutional design and 
implementation would promote, improve, or increase these kinds 
of legitimacy. One might grant that the modalities help ensure a 
limited conception of legitimacy—in Bobbitt’s sense—and yet 
think that there is much more work for constitutional theory to 
do. 
One cannot help concluding that Bobbitt has engaged in a 
certain rhetorical sleight of hand. He notes that constitutional 
theorists have been asking about legitimacy; he then redefines 
legitimacy in a way that makes most of their inquiries superfluous, 
and then concludes that their inquiries are superfluous. But 
constitutional theorists might well respond that they really are 
interested in legitimacy, just not in Bobbitt’s version.287 
Bobbitt claims that “the forms of argument that can 
legitimate judicial review cannot justify it.”288 Conversely, he 
argues, the forms of argument that might justify the practice of 
judicial review—for example, in moral or political theory—cannot 
 
 287. See Bobbitt, Reflections, supra note 18, at 1938–39. In this passage, Bobbitt rejects 
Mark Tushnet’s view that constitutional theorists are asking a different question than 
Bobbitt. He argues that Tushnet has changed the meaning of “legitimacy” so as to avoid a 
certain set of objections. But given that Bobbitt’s concept of legitimacy is unique to him, it 
is probably Bobbitt himself who has engaged in this maneuver. 
 288. Id. at 1938. 
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legitimate it.289 He has no objection to people outside the system 
of legal argument offering arguments for why the system (or the 
institution of judicial review) is just or unjust, democratic or 
undemocratic, efficacious or inefficacious. Likewise, he has no 
problem with people offering proposals for reform, or engaging in 
comparative studies. All of this falls into the realm of what he calls 
constitutional discourse. But the kinds of arguments that lawyers 
make before courts should never be confused with moral or 
political theory; and in any case, these arguments, even if 
transposed into a treatise or article on political theory, cannot 
legitimate the system.  
Once again, because Bobbitt is relying on a very special 
definition of legitimacy, this is hardly an objection to most 
constitutional theory. Even if these projects involve constitutional 
discourse (because they propose reform of our institutions and 
practices), they do not aim at establishing Bobbitt’s very narrow 
brand of legitimacy. Instead, they want to know whether the 
system is morally or democratically legitimate, the very questions 
in which Bobbitt disclaims interest. 
G. CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY AND PRACTICE 
INTERPENETRATE 
Bobbitt’s general rejection of constitutional theory—and his 
attempt to establish a clear distinction between constitutional 
argument and constitutional discourse—create two additional 
problems for his approach. First, the practice of constitutional 
argument often includes constitutional theory—i.e., claims by the 
participants about what would make the system more morally or 
democratically legitimate. Second, although Bobbitt argues that 
justification cannot affect legitimacy, arguments about 
constitutional theory can be part of a reform project in political 
and legal culture that seeks to alter legal practice through social 
influence and persuasion. If such a reform project succeeded, it 
would alter the conditions of legitimacy in Bobbitt’s sense of the 
word. 
The boundary between constitutional argument and 
constitutional discourse, or between constitutional practice and 
 
 289. See id.; see also id. at 1898 (“It would be a mistake to think that a political theory 
(like majoritarianism), which can justify a system, can also legitimate it.”). 
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constitutional theory, is porous.290 Much of constitutional 
argument in legal briefs and judicial opinions involves disputes 
about constitutional theory. There we will find arguments about 
the proper role of judges, various justifications for judicial review, 
debates about the kinds of legal arguments that are appropriate 
and inappropriate in a given situation, and disputes about when 
some kinds of legal arguments should take priority over other 
kinds of legal arguments. 
Constitutional argument, in short, seems saturated with 
constitutional theory. This should not surprise us. The 
participants in the practice of constitutional argument think that 
arguments about theory are potentially persuasive or winning 
arguments before their intended audience, and that is why they 
make them. One of the best ways to outflank an opponent is to 
question the theoretical justifications behind his or her 
arguments; hence the ascent to theory is a fairly standard 
rhetorical move. It would be bizarre if it did not regularly occur in 
legal argument, that most rhetorical of disciplines. 
Perhaps equally important, disputes about constitutional 
theory can have significant consequences for the practice of 
constitutional argument over time. That is one reason why the 
people who train lawyers care about theory so much. If 
constitutional theories are taken up by a social or political 
movement, or if they are widely adopted and taught in American 
legal education, they may eventually convince many other lawyers 
and judges to change the way that they think about and engage in 
constitutional argument. Then the practice of constitutional 
argument will eventually change. 
Originalism, for example, has become the de facto 
interpretive theory of the modern conservative movement, just as 
living constitutionalism earlier was the de facto premise of much 
of American liberal legal thought. If political conservatives 
eventually control the judiciary and win out in institutions of legal 
education, they will reshape the practices of constitutional 
interpretation. We have already seen such a transformation, to a 
 
 290. This is a point on which Bobbitt and I have long disagreed. See Bobbitt, 
Reflections, supra note 18, at 1911–12, 1916. Bobbitt argues that I see no distinction 
between the two categories; I argue rather that the two interpenetrate and their boundaries 
are always provisional and porous. 
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certain degree, in constitutional litigation and in the practice of 
statutory interpretation.291 
Bobbitt is of two minds about such changes. On the one hand, 
he accepts that the practice of constitutional argument changes.292 
He purports merely to describe the practice correctly, rather than 
impose his own normative views on it.293 He denies that he plays 
the role of a normative grammarian, who demands that people 
speak the language correctly. That would suggest that if the 
practice of constitutional argument does change—for example, if 
originalism becomes dominant, or if lawyers and judges make 
appeals to natural law and natural rights—Bobbitt will simply 
accept the result. Perhaps, he will even rewrite his theory so that 
it is a characteristic feature of constitutional practice that certain 
kinds of arguments do have priority over others. If it turns out that 
lawyers and judges regularly engage in coherence-based 
reasoning, perhaps Bobbitt would jettison the strong version of 
his incommensurability thesis as well. 
On the other hand, Bobbitt does not seem to treat some 
features of the practice as mutable in this way. He views himself 
as a defender of the practices of constitutional argument (and thus 
of constitutional legitimacy) from those who would abuse them.294 
This is the reason for his strong opposition to originalism, which, 
he argues, undermines the legitimacy of American constitutional 
law. But what Bobbitt calls “abuse” might turn out to be nothing 
more than the cultural evolution of the system. It might represent 
American lawyers and judges arguing about the best way to 
engage in their practices, and slowly evolving to a new norm. 
Originalism offers a good example. Originalism is a reform 
project that seeks to get lawyers and judges to alter their practices 
of constitutional argument and judicial review. It is part of a larger 
set of social and political movements that characterized the last 
 
 291. See Anthony J. Bellia Jr., Justice Scalia and The Federal Court: Justice Scalia, 
Implied Rights of Action, and Historical Practice, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2077, 2077 
(2017) (noting Justice Scalia’s influence in pushing lawyers toward originalism in 
constitutional interpretation and textualism in statutory interpretation). 
 292. Bobbitt, Reflections, supra note 18, at 1911, 1919; BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL 
FATE, supra note 18, at 8. 
 293. Bobbitt, Reflections, supra note 18, at 1917, 1919. 
 294. BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION, supra note 18, at 185 (“We 
should be especially vigilant therefore to answer attacks on the legitimacy of our 
constitutional forms—forms that are likely to be among the most enduring and admirable 
of the American contributions to human history.”). 
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part of the twentieth century and the beginning of the twenty-first. 
If Bobbitt accepts changes in practice through social evolution, it 
is not clear how this reform project should undermine the 
legitimacy of American constitutional law—at least, as Bobbitt 
defines the term. Americans would have one practice before 
originalism’s triumph, and another, somewhat different practice 
after its success, but in both cases they would still engage in a set 
of shared practices of argument. The system would still be 
legitimate in Bobbitt’s sense. Perhaps Bobbitt’s point is that, like 
any good traditionalist, he should resist originalism until it has 
won the day; at that point, he will simply change sides and defend 
the newly constituted order. 
Nevertheless, I am not sure that Bobbitt would willingly 
jettison either the incommensurability thesis or the equal priority 
of the modalities just because most lawyers and judges no longer 
accepted them. I say this because they are necessary to his concept 
of decision according to conscience; and the role of conscience is 
central to his system. The lack of a decision procedure among the 
modalities, and the inevitable conflicts among them, create a 
space for the exercise of individual moral judgment. For Bobbitt, 
conscience is what allows a constitutional system that may be very 
wicked at times nevertheless to aspire toward justice. 
Without the saving grace of conscience, Bobbitt’s vision of 
the constitutional system might be very bleak indeed. That is why 
I suspect that although Bobbitt claims that his theory will continue 
to apply however the practice of constitutional argument might 
change, he must assume that certain features are more or less 
permanent conditions of constitutional legitimacy, in order to 
preserve the role of individual conscience. If so, he is a 
prescriptive grammarian of a certain sort, and there is a fixed star 
in his system. But that fixed star is not the modalities themselves; 
its name is conscience. 
V. CONCLUSION 
In this Article, I have argued that constitutional argument is 
a form of rhetorical invention that is structured in shared topics 
for persuasion, analysis, and problem-solving. Common topics do 
three things for the practice of constitutional law. First, they 
provide a common language for persuasion. Second, they offer a 
common way of showing that our legal arguments are connected 
to and further the Constitution. Third, they allow people with very 
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different values, policy preferences and theoretical commitments 
to engage in a common discourse about what is faithful to and 
what furthers a Constitution to which they all claim fidelity. The 
use of common topics allows each of the contending sides, in their 
own way, to express their fidelity to the Constitution through the 
thrust and parry of constitutional argument. 
Merely making arguments, of course, is not enough. The 
participants must not only go through the motions of using 
common topics, they must back them up with a particular attitude 
of interpretive fidelity. One can think of the topics as an 
orthopraxis that directs us toward fidelity, even if it does not 
guarantee it. To the extent that the Constitution is part of 
America’s civil religion, American constitutional argument 
emphasizes orthopraxy rather than orthodoxy. 
The use of rhetorical topics in constitutional argument does 
not commit us to any particular constitutional theory. Different 
theories will have different theoretical structures. But all of them 
will share a common starting point. That is because the topics are 
held in common within American constitutional culture. So it is 
not surprising that most if not all prominent constitutional 
theories find a way to make themselves consistent with the fact 
that American lawyers use these topics in constitutional 
argument. The topics make American constitutional culture 
pluralist, but not in the way that Bobbitt imagined. Their 
existence does not confine us to one possible constitutional 
theory—Bobbitt’s. Rather, precisely because they are shared 
aspects of our constitutional culture, they are consistent with any 
number of constitutional theories, including originalism. Indeed, 
lawyers who construct constitutional theories will inevitably find 
a space for the topics, because that is how lawyers with very 
different values, views, and interests, reason together about the 
Constitution. 
